Jimmy Akin

Earlier I blogged about a new proposal to get around the impasse in the stem cell debate.

THIS PROPOSAL, AND ANOTHER, WAS DESCRIBED IN AN ARTICLE IN SLATE.

Now I want to talk about the second proposal. It is this: We create human shoggoths.

The idea is that you disable one of the genes that controls organic development so that what develops isn’t an embryo but something that, if left to its own devices, will become a tumorous mass with jumbled up body parts. You then turn the gene back on in time to let it generate stem cells for harvesting.

According to the author for Slate:

It sounds perfect, until you look up at the projection screen.
Hurlbut has modeled his recipe on "aberrant products of fertilization"
and teratomas, which, he explains, are "germ cell tumors that generate
all three primary embryonic germ layers as well as more advanced cells
and tissues, including partial limb and organ primordia." Limb and
organ primordia? Yep, that’s what’s on the screen: a ball of tissue,
grown inside some poor creature, full of bits and pieces of what would
have been a body. Another slide shows an X-ray image of somebody’s
back. To the left of the spine, you can see a cluster of white spots
that look like teeth. And that’s exactly what they are, all dressed up
and no place to chomp. You wanted disorganized development? You got it.

This does not sound perfect to me at all, and I don’t need to look at a screen to get creeped out by it. Several problems immediately occur to me:

• First there is the problem of when you disable the gene. If you disable it after the germ cells have come together and formed a zygote then the act would amount to an assault on a living human being that is intended to cause gross bodily deformities. To avoid assaulting a human being you would have to turn off the gene in one of the germ cells before they come together and form a human zygote (a one-celled human being).
• If you only deactivate a single gene, have you really kept something from being a person? If it has a full human genetic code (I’m not talking about something with only one or two chromosomes instead of the usual forty-six) and you’ve simply turned off a gene (many of our genes are already inactive) does that really deprive the creature of humanity?
• Assuming that you did deactivate the gene in one of the germ cells, it seems to me that one could argue that what you have done in this case is genetically engineered a child that has a grave medical condition that will result in his life being very short. True, he will not have the bodily shape of a normal child, but then having a particular body shape is not needed to be a child. People do have bodily deformities and yet remain human beings. A human can be even a single cell, as with a zygote. True also, the child will not live long, but having a long life also is not needed to count as a human. If the creature has an otherwise intact human genetic code, I am not comfortable saying that if you switch off a single gene that you have deprived the creature of humanity.
• Even assuming that shutting off the gene deprived the creature of
  humanity, if you then switch on the gene so that the creature can make
  suitable stem cells for you, have you–by restoring its genetic code to
  normal functioning–are you then creating in it the property of being human? It now has a fully functional human genetic code. You’ve just severely interfered with its development such that it has a mangled body and a short life.
• Having said that, let me offer a counter argument: Scientifically, a human being is a living human organism. If something isn’t an organism then, even if it is made of human cells, it isn’t a human being (as is the case when someone has an organ removed; the organ isn’t a human being). If, therefore, you really can do something to the germ cells that prevents the development of an organism then what you are dealing with is not a human being and could be harvested without it being murder.
• The question is thus: If you create a zygote that cannot develop normally, have you created an organism with a grave genetic defect (in which case it’s a human with a grave genetic defect) or have you created something that’s not an organism (and thus not a human)?
• The problem is figuring out whether something constitutes an organism or not. In some cases (as with a normal embryo) it clearly is. In other cases (like a single ovum) it is clearly not. But when you start to get outside the clear categories that God set up, things get very blurry very fast. Body shape and length of life are not necessary conditions for something being an organism and we must at least proceed with caution here.
• In the absence of body shape and length of life being necessary conditions for the presence of humanity, we must assume that humanity remains present as a failsafe against taking innocent human life. This failsafe mentality in favor of life is mandatory. You have to be able to prove that humanity is not present. "Human until proven otherwise" is the rule when you’re monkeying in these waters.

It therefore seems to me that we have to proceed with caution and can’t go rushing off willy-nilly to create human shoggoths.

You may have heard rumblings about new options in the stem cell debate that could get us around the current impasse.

SLATE RECENTLY RAN AN ARTICLE ON TWO SUCH PROPOSALS.

I’m not convinced that either proposal works.

I’ll talk about the first, and simpler, proposal today and the second later.

Here’s Slate’s description of the first:

The first, by Drs. Donald Landry and Howard Zucker of Columbia
University, proposes that we take stem cells from embryos at the same
point at which we take organs from children and adults: right after
they die. All we have to do is agree on the point at which an embryo is
dead. Landry suggests that this point is "the irreversible arrest of
cell division," which conveniently applies to huge numbers of embryos
frozen in IVF clinics. With further study, he argues, we can clarify
the signs of irreversible arrest, which will tell us when it’s kosher
to start yanking stem cells. He cites an experiment in which stem cells
from arrested frog embryos were injected into normal frog embryos.
Twenty-five percent of the cells began to divide again and were
absorbed into the new embryos.

The conservatives on the council
like the idea. They have two concerns. They want to make sure the signs
chosen to certify embryo death don’t exclude some living embryos.
They’re also wary of the Columbia team’s suggestion that stem cells
could be harvested from embryos "in extremis," i.e., near death. But
Landry and Zucker point out that these are the same issues ethicists
have worked out in the case of a dying child or adult. We just need to
iron out the details. That’s the beauty of the proposal: It’s
conventional.

The idea of harvesting stem cells from deceased embryos is something that occurred to me before. While it would get around the fact that embryonic stem cell research is otherwise murder, the mere fact that we’re not dealing with murder any more does not mean that it is problem-free. Here are several concerns:

1. The first and biggest problem is that we don’t know when an embryo is dead. In the absence of heart or brain (neither of which has developed at the time researchers want to harvest stem cells), conventional tests for life don’t apply. The "irreversible cessation of cell division" proposal is not unobjectionable.
   • First, what counts as "irreversible" may be a technical matter that is not intrinsic to the question of life. Just as we can often now re-start the hearts of people who previously had technologically irreversible cessation of heart activity (and thus now no longer use merely the absence of a heartbeat as a test for life), research may make it possible to reverse cessation of cell division in embryos.
   • Second, and related to the former, cessation of cell division (reversible or not) may be one stage of dying for embryos, but not death itself, just as cessation of heartbeat is one stage of dying for adults, but not death itself.
   • Third, the most obvious (to me) point at which we could say that an embryo is dead is when cellular metabolism has stopped. But if you wait that long, the stem cells may not be of any use.
2. Supposing that there is a point at which the embryo can be established as dead and at which the stem cells could be usefully harvested, there are still other concerns. One is what should be done with all the embryos languishing in cryonic suspension in IVF facilities. One possibility is that they ought to be implanted and allowed to develop (though is is controversial among conservative Catholic moral theologians). Unfortunately, the vast numbers of these children make this a practical impossibility.
3. Supposing, then, that these children are not to be allowed to develop, what should happen to them? Baptizing them, unfreezing them (and baptizing them will itself unfreeze them), allowing them to die  naturally, and then respectfully dealing with their remains would seem to be the preferred way of addressing the situation.
4. Rather than proceding immediately to burial or cremation, though, would it be possible for parents to fill out the equivalent of an organ donor card for these children (a stem cell donor card)? We let parents do that with children are born and then die in the natural way.
5. In principle, perhaps it could be done. But I feel a moral discomfort with the idea of letting parents artificially create large numbers of children that they can’t possibly raise and then, upon their expiry, hand them over to researchers for experimentation on their corpses.
6. The root problem, of course, is the artificial creation of the children in the first place. That was immoral and unethical and should not have happened. But accepting it as something that cannot be undone, should parents be allowed to donate their children’s stem cells to bring some good out of their cruelly and immorally short lives–perhaps doing so to stop the outright murder of other children?
7. All I can say is . . . maybe. While the Church recognizes the moral legitimacy of organ donation in principle, it is not at all clear that it would be proper to allow parents who have artificially created children for themselves to exercise this possibility on behalf of these children.

It thus strikes me that the situation is far too ambiguous, and ultimately we’ll need guidance from the CDF on this one (which won’t offer such guidance until Catholic moralists have chewed this one over for a while).

In any event, it seems to me that this proposal is very far from being a slam dunk.

Yesterday Ed Peters, Mark Brumley, I, and another had an e-mail conversation about the situation of a Catholic school in Orange County, California that has admitted the children of two homosexual "fathers" to its kindergarten. This prompted outrage parents to demand that the situation be recitifed. The school has refused, and the parents are appealing to the Vatican. School officials, as well as William Donohue of the Catholic League have defended the school’s position, arguing that taking a different one would lead to not allowing children into the school whose parents are divorced or contracepting.

GET THE STORY.

ED HAS NOW BLOGGED HIS EXCELLENT THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION.

UPDATE: MARK BRUMLEY HAS ALSO PUT UP HIS EXCELLENT THOUGHTS.

Here are my thoughts (edited from our e-mail conversation):

• Though I have been unable to verify this online, part of my memory is

  telling me that the school has allowed one of the "fathers" to have a

  role caring for the kindergarten class. I don’t know if that’s the case,

  but it’s a situation that may arise in some school, so let’s consider it

  for theoretical purposes.

• As Ed points out, there seems to be a spectrum of progressively more

  disordered situations here. I would construct the spectrum along the

  following lines:

1. Children of normal parents living in accord with Church teaching.
2. Children of parents who formerly did not live according to Church

   teaching but who presently are.

3. Children of parents who are divorced and not remarried.
4. Children of parents who are secretly contracepting.
5. Children of parents who make no secret of the fact that they are

   contracepting or that they hold other opinions at variance with Church

   teaching.

6. Children of parents who are divorced and invalidly remarried.
7. Children of parents who are not married.
8. Children of parents who are divorced and now cohabiting with another.
9. Children of homosexual "parents."
10. Children of homosexual "parents" whose "parents" take a public role

    in the life of the class.

• The primary purpose of a Catholic school is to provide a quality

  Catholic education for all of its students collectively. This means

  that there would be rational grounds, even in the absence of a mandate

  from the Vatican, for the school to establish policies against anything

  that would substantially interfere with the ability of the school to

  fulfill its primary purpose.

• A quality Catholic education will involve not only imparting

  information to students but also shielding them from certain realities

  of life until they are cognitively and morally prepared to come to terms

  with them. This includes preserving the sexual innocence of young children and

  shielding them from knowledge of same-sex unions.

• Though in no case is the disordered situation of his parents the fault of the child, some of the situations on the spectrum above would clearly seem to

  pose a challenge to the school’s ability to provide a quality Catholic

  education for all its students. Somewhere between item #1 and item #10

  on the spectrum, a line must be drawn.

• Where this line is to be drawn, in the absence of a mandate from the

  Vatican, would seem to be a prudential decision best made by those in

  charge of the school (including the bishop, especially if it is a

  diocesan school) in consultation with the parents whose children will be

  affected by the impact of the decision.

• It would seem that there are several places where the line could

  rationally be drawn:

a) Since items #1-#3 do not involve situations in which parents are

violating Church teaching, they seem to all be permissible situations in which to admit the children to the school.

b) With item #4, an occult sin is introduced but, since it is occult, it

would not seem to pose any impediment to the school being able to

fulfill its mission.

c) With item #5, a rational case could be made if a school wished to

adopt a strict line to protect the children it serves, as the parents’

open dissent could pose an impediment to the school’s ability to

fulfill its mission. However, prudence makes one wonder the extent to

which the children of the school would even be aware of the parents’

dissent. Unless they are unusually obnoxious public activists, their

dissent is more likely to be known to other parents but not to the

children of the school.

d) Lines also could be drawn with even greater basis anywhere among

items #6-#8, as each of these involves a more obviously disordered

situation. However, the question must still be raised of the extent to

which the children of the school–apart from the children of the parents

in question–would be aware of the situation. The condition of the

parents might not be sufficiently known among the student body to

impeding the school in fulfillings its mission. Especially in schools

with young students, parents in these conditions might be perceived by

the children simply as the mommy and daddy of a student and presumed to

be married in accord with Church teaching.

e) A line most emphatically could be drawn before item #9, as the

introduction of a student who has "two mommies" or "two daddies" is

almost certainly to come to the attention of the children and create a

significant impediment to the school fulfilling its mission.

f) A line absolutely must be drawn before item #10. The introduction of

one or both of the homosexual "parents" into the life of the class is certain to fixate the

attention of the students on the situation and dramatically amplify the

impediment to the school’s mission.

Yesterday Ed Peters, Mark Brumley, I, and another had an e-mail conversation about the situation of a Catholic school in Orange County, California that has admitted the children of two homosexual "fathers" to its kindergarten. This prompted outrage parents to demand that the situation be recitifed. The school has refused, and the parents are appealing to the Vatican. School officials, as well as William Donohue of the Catholic League have defended the school’s position, arguing that taking a different one would lead to not allowing children into the school whose parents are divorced or contracepting.

GET THE STORY.

ED HAS NOW BLOGGED HIS EXCELLENT THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION.

UPDATE: MARK BRUMLEY HAS ALSO PUT UP HIS EXCELLENT THOUGHTS.

Here are my thoughts (edited from our e-mail conversation):

• Though I have been unable to verify this online, part of my memory is
  telling me that the school has allowed one of the "fathers" to have a
  role caring for the kindergarten class. I don’t know if that’s the case,
  but it’s a situation that may arise in some school, so let’s consider it
  for theoretical purposes.
• As Ed points out, there seems to be a spectrum of progressively more
  disordered situations here. I would construct the spectrum along the
  following lines:

1. Children of normal parents living in accord with Church teaching.
2. Children of parents who formerly did not live according to Church
   teaching but who presently are.
3. Children of parents who are divorced and not remarried.
4. Children of parents who are secretly contracepting.
5. Children of parents who make no secret of the fact that they are
   contracepting or that they hold other opinions at variance with Church
   teaching.
6. Children of parents who are divorced and invalidly remarried.
7. Children of parents who are not married.
8. Children of parents who are divorced and now cohabiting with another.
9. Children of homosexual "parents."
10. Children of homosexual "parents" whose "parents" take a public role
    in the life of the class.

• The primary purpose of a Catholic school is to provide a quality
  Catholic education for all of its students collectively. This means
  that there would be rational grounds, even in the absence of a mandate
  from the Vatican, for the school to establish policies against anything
  that would substantially interfere with the ability of the school to
  fulfill its primary purpose.
• A quality Catholic education will involve not only imparting
  information to students but also shielding them from certain realities
  of life until they are cognitively and morally prepared to come to terms
  with them. This includes preserving the sexual innocence of young children and
  shielding them from knowledge of same-sex unions.
• Though in no case is the disordered situation of his parents the fault of the child, some of the situations on the spectrum above would clearly seem to
  pose a challenge to the school’s ability to provide a quality Catholic
  education for all its students. Somewhere between item #1 and item #10
  on the spectrum, a line must be drawn.
• Where this line is to be drawn, in the absence of a mandate from the
  Vatican, would seem to be a prudential decision best made by those in
  charge of the school (including the bishop, especially if it is a
  diocesan school) in consultation with the parents whose children will be
  affected by the impact of the decision.
• It would seem that there are several places where the line could
  rationally be drawn:

a) Since items #1-#3 do not involve situations in which parents are
violating Church teaching, they seem to all be permissible situations in which to admit the children to the school.

b) With item #4, an occult sin is introduced but, since it is occult, it
would not seem to pose any impediment to the school being able to
fulfill its mission.

c) With item #5, a rational case could be made if a school wished to
adopt a strict line to protect the children it serves, as the parents’
open dissent could pose an impediment to the school’s ability to
fulfill its mission. However, prudence makes one wonder the extent to
which the children of the school would even be aware of the parents’
dissent. Unless they are unusually obnoxious public activists, their
dissent is more likely to be known to other parents but not to the
children of the school.

d) Lines also could be drawn with even greater basis anywhere among
items #6-#8, as each of these involves a more obviously disordered
situation. However, the question must still be raised of the extent to
which the children of the school–apart from the children of the parents
in question–would be aware of the situation. The condition of the
parents might not be sufficiently known among the student body to
impeding the school in fulfillings its mission. Especially in schools
with young students, parents in these conditions might be perceived by
the children simply as the mommy and daddy of a student and presumed to
be married in accord with Church teaching.

e) A line most emphatically could be drawn before item #9, as the
introduction of a student who has "two mommies" or "two daddies" is
almost certainly to come to the attention of the children and create a
significant impediment to the school fulfilling its mission.

f) A line absolutely must be drawn before item #10. The introduction of
one or both of the homosexual "parents" into the life of the class is certain to fixate the
attention of the students on the situation and dramatically amplify the
impediment to the school’s mission.