Category: Moral Theology

A reader writes:

I have a friend who has come back to the Church!  He has been going to Mass and Confession now for over a year.  He was married in a civil ceremony about eight years ago.  She is not Catholic but is Christian.  His Mother who is Catholic has said he should not being going to Communion until he is married in the Church.  Is this true?  He has nothing against getting married in the Church but I think it bothers him about not being able to go to Communion until this happens.

It’s wonderful to hear that your friend has come back to the Church, and I’ll do my best to help provide an answer here. Unfortunately, there are a few missing facts that I’d need to know the answer to in order to give an individually-tailored answer. Specifically:

1. Had your friend formally defected from the Catholic Church at the time of his civil ceremony (e.g., had he formally joined another church with the intention of no longer being Catholic).
2. If he had not formally defected then did he have a dispensation from the Catholic form of marriage?
3. Is he presently having conjugal relations with his spouse?

The easiest way to give the answer in light of the missing facts is in the form of a decision tree:

IF he had formally defected OR had a dispensation from form THEN based on the fact pattern you have laid out his marriage is presumed valid and he can participate in the sacraments of the Church, including confession and Communion. He also does not need to get married in the Church.

IF he did not formally defect OR have a dispensation from form THEN his marriage is presently invalid. (See next two points.)

IF his marriage is presently invalid AND he is having conjugal relations with his spouse THEN he is committing grave sin (having sexual relations with someone he is not validly married to) and cannot participate in the sacraments, including confession and Communion. He needs to get married in the Church in order for his conjugal relations to cease being sinful. At that point he can participate in the sacraments, including confession and Communion.

IF his marriage is presently invalid BUT he is not having conjugal relations with his spouse THEN he is not committing grave sin and so can participate in the sacraments, including confession and Communion. He does, though, need to get married in the Church before he can resume conjugal relations without sinning.

I hope this helps. It’s not phrase in the pastoral manner that I would like, but given the missing facts I thought it best to write as clearly as possible to avoid confusion. Documentation of any of the above answers can be provided from the Code of Canon Law if needed.

One pastoral note: I suggest that you DO NOT ask him about the third missing fact. That’s between him, his spouse, and his confessor.

In the meantime, we should rejoice that your friend has come back to the Church. He should be assured of God’s love for him and his spouse and that it sounds as if his marital situation can easily be regularized (if needed). It generally does not take very long to rectify situations such as this.

Back before I was Catholic, I was in such a situation myself (as the non-Catholic spouse) and so I have a special empathy for the situation.

20

A reader writes:

Jimmy, I can’t seem to find an answer to this.  I know
dreams are not sinful because you don’t have control
over them.  What if you do have control over your
dreams in lucid dreams?  If you think or do bad things
in lucid dreams knowing that "it is just a dream and
anything goes", is that sinful?  There are times where
I have thought things in my dreams I shouldn’t and
told myself "I’m dreaming right now so there is no
sin".  Of course I would never think these things
while awake, yet, I still am probably in control
enough to change what I’m thinking about so I suppose
it may be possible to sin if there is some control.
Please let me know, thanks.

If you check standard moral theologies (e.g., Henry Davis’s excellent four-volume Moral And Pastoral Theology–long out of print but available by used book services), they will point out that things that you do in dreams aren’t sinful, though it can be sinful to do things while awake in an attempt to cause dreams with sinful content.

These don’t really address the question of lucid dreaming directly, though, since they are talking about ordinary dreams.

For those not aware of the distinction, lucid dreams are those in which you are aware that you are dreaming. Sometimes people who are having a lucid dream are also able to take control of the dream and cause things to happen the way they want them to. It’s even possible to train yourself (while awake) to have lucid dreams while you sleep, though not in a reliable fashion. (I.e., it’s possible to train yourself to have lucid dreams more often, but you can’t guarantee that you’ll have one on any given night.)

Though the standard moral theologies don’t address the question of lucid dreams specifically, the basic answer holds: You are not sinning (certainly not more than venially) no matter what you do in a lucid dream.

The reason is that you still lack the use of reason and are thus incapable of committing the fully human act needed for mortal sin. You usually lack sufficient use of reason just before you fall asleep and just after you wake up–unless you are jolted back into the waking world for some reason. It normally takes your brain at least a few seconds to spool up your FTL reason drive.

The condition of a person having a lucid dream is in many respects simliar to that of a person who is drunk: Drunks thinks that they have more control than they do. That’s why they get behind the wheels of cars and go driving when in fact they are totally unsafe drivers at the moment.

They even do have a measure of control–they can drive, or try to drive, the car wherever they want. They’re just don’t have enough control to drive in a responsible manner, even though they think that they do because their reason has been impaired and it keeps them from recognizing this.

It’s the same with lucid dreamers. They feel like they are in control of their actions, and they do have a measure of control of the dream. They can drive, or try to drive, the dream wherever they want it to go. They just don’t have enough control over themselves to dream in a manner that triggers full human responsibility. They may think they do, but they don’t, because while they’re asleep their reason has been impaired, whether they recognize this or not.

Lucid dreamers, like dreamers in general, simply do not have the level of reason needed to perform fully human acts, and so they are not capable of committing mortal sin.

They may feel in control. They may even have moral-theological debates with themselves in the dream about whether it is right or wrong to undertake a particular course of action. But they lack the reason necessary for mortal sin.

Period.

So don’t worry about that.

On the other hand, don’t go training yourself to do lucid dreaming if you intend to use it as a means of engaging in sinful fantasy behavior. That would count as doing something while you’re awake to deliberately bring on sinful dream content.

A reader writes:

I am a fauclty member at a private college associated with a Protestant church.  I’m a convert to the Catholic Church.

There is a chapel service two days a week here and the opportunity has come up for me to speak at this service.  Am I allowed to speak at a service like this? 

Yes. Canon law does not prevent you from speaking if you are invited to do so.

If so is what are my obligations with regard to what I reveal to the assembled people?

You must not say anything contrary to the Catholic faith. Within that constraint, you should seek to deliver the kind of talk that your hosts expect. (E.g., if you are asked to speak on a particular topic or Scripture passage, you should do so.)

In addition, to the extent you can (without endangering your ability to make a living, for example) you should seek to introduce them to aspects of the truth (the Catholic faith) that they may not have considered. This may involve revealing the fact that you are a Catholic or it may not.

If you perceive that the topic you are asked to speak on could draw you into areas that would be problematic (e.g., if you couldn’t talk about the topic without getting into a subject that would cause you to lose your job) then you could ask for a different topic, a different day (i.e., one with a different planned topic), or simply decline the invitation to speak.

That’s about the best I can do with the limited information at hand (I don’t know, for example, whether people at the college would freak out upon learning that you are Catholic and demand your resignation or firing; that’s been known to happen at some Protestant schools, even when the administration is initially supportive of Catholic faculty members). The bottom line is: Do what good you can and be prudent as you do so.

Or as Our Lord put it: "Be wise as serpents and  innocent as doves" (Matt. 10:16).

A reader writes:

Reading your blog post “Disaster Ethics 3: Taking Things” brought to mind the Church’s teaching “One may never do evil so that good may result from it” (CCC 1756).

You wrote, “if an armed man takes your daughter hostage at gunpoint and says, "You go into that BestBuy and get me a color TV or I kill your daughter!" In that case, the color TV is a vital necessity for you (since someone under your care will be killed without it)”.

On the surface, this seems to be a case of doing evil (stealing a TV) so that good may result from it (saving your daughter’s life).  But I understand your logic that taking the TV would not be the sin of stealing because of its vital necessity.  (I also think the owner’s consent could be reasonably presumed under the given circumstances.)

But what if the armed man demanded that something intrinsically evil be done?  For example, what if he said to the girl’s mother, “fornicate with me or I kill your daughter”?  I think most mothers would reason that it is acceptable to commit the sin of fornication (or allow herself to be raped) to save her daughter’s life.  On the other hand, St. Maria Goretti chose to die rather than be raped.  Could she have morally complied with her attacker to save her own life?  Wouldn’t duress lessen or even remove her moral culpability?

Or could the principle of double effect be applied here?  For example, could we say that the choice one is making under such circumstances is the choice to save a life (one’s own or one’s daughter), not the choice to fornicate; the fornication is only tolerated for the greater good?  If so, then where do we draw the line?  Did all the martyrs have to die?  The story of those kids in a church (choosing to be shot rather than deny Jesus) a few years ago comes to mind.  Did they have to die?

It seems to me that a relevant distinction here is between the active commission of evil and the passive suffering of evil.

One cannot do something that is intrinsically evil, but one can allow oneself to suffer
an intrinsic evil at the hands of another. Thus one cannot kill another, but one can (in at least some circumstances) allow oneself to be killed even though one is innocent.

Something similar applies in the cases you mention. If someone points a gun at you and says that you’ll be
killed if you don’t allow yourself to be raped then it would be
morally licit to allow this rather than be killed. In this case, one is allowing one’s rights to be violated, but allowing one’s rights to be violated is not
intrinsically evil (though it can be evil depending on the circumstances).

On the other hand, if the gunman tells you to rape someone else then
that is intrinsically evil (you’re not allowing your rights to be
violated; you’d be violating someone else’s rights) and so you cannot
do that.

Denying Christ is intrinsically evil, so that cannot be done, even
under threat of death.

What Maria Goretti did was heroic but not morally obligatory (i.e.,
she could have allowed herself to be raped). She went beyond what
morality required and set a heroic example, for which she is honored
by the Church.

A reader writes:

Had some discussions with folks about shooting looters (on site really) in New Orleans (unless they are shooting back of course).

I feel that it violates the Gospel message of love your neighbor, and of doing evil for good’s sake.
Could you blog on this maybe?

Sure. Shooting looters is a way that has been used historically to prevent the breakdown of social order. It was used, for example, in the wake of the 1906 San Francisco quake. With a similarly massive natural disaster now having occurred in the Gulf states, some are calling for similar measures, including Peggy Noonan, Glenn Reynolds, and Arthur.

The prospect of shooting looters, especially with a shoot-on-sight policy, is frightening. I have no idea what kind of legal framework might allow such a policy in the United States. I suspect that nothing short of a declaration of martial law (or an equivalent legal state, since it appears that martial law technically is not envisioned under Lousiana law) would allow it to take place legally.

Martial law (or the equivalent) might allow it, though. I did some checking and found reports on the web that, at one point, our forces in Iraq were given the authority to shoot looters on sight in order to establish social order amid the post-invasion chaos. (I don’t know if that was accuate or if the order is still in effect at this point.)

Implementing a shoot-on-sight order here on American soil–not just close to home but in our home–would likely set of political and legal firestorms of unimaginable proportions. The benefit to be gained by implementing such a policy would have to be proportional to the cost of the political and legal firestorms that would ensue.

My suspicion, at least at this point, is that such measures are not necessary, that we can get through the present crisis without a generalized shoot-on-sight order, and that such an order will not be given.

Fortunately, I don’t have to make the decision whether or not to
implement such a policy in the present circumstances, which is a good
thing because I am not qualified to make that judgment. I am very
thankful that I am not in the position of whoever would have the
responsibility of making that determination (whoever that might be).

Having cleared away the legal and practical issues connected with this question, let me address the moral aspect of it.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church states:

2263 The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent that constitutes intentional killing. "The act of self-defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life; and the killing of the aggressor…. the one is intended, the other is not."

2264 Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of morality. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one’s own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow:

If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful:whereas if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful …. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.

2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their charge.

From this, it would seem that it would be morally legitimate to shoot looters IF AND ONLY IF doing so is the only practicable way to stop grave harm from being done to the common good, which in practice is going to be parsed in terms of threats to human life.

You can’t kill people just because they take merchandise. Human life is more valuable than simple merchandise. But if the actions of the looters create a situation that is gravely threatening to human life then the use of lethal force will be proportionate to that. If there is no other practicable way to end the threat, lethal force would be justified.

I can think of examples in which the selective use of lethal force would be moral. For example: Suppose you are a cop, all by your lonesome, guarding a gun shop that is about to be looted by a gang of hooligans. You have no ability to move the guns from where they are, back-up will not arrive in time, and when you try to threaten the hostages away, including pointing your gun at them and even firing warning shots, they refuse to be deterred.

It is a vital necessity to keep the guns in the gun shop out of the hands of the hooligans in order to prevent a grave threat to human life. Therefore, you having no other options, it would be moral to shoot the first looter who attempts to enter the store. And the second, and the third, and as many as it takes. If you can deter them just by injuring them then you are morally obligated to do that. But if the only way to deter them is to use lethal force then Catholic moral theology would permit and even require that if there is no alternative.

This situation is not a shoot-on-sight policy, though. It’s only shooting in a very specific circumstance. In order to justify a shoot-on-sight policy, one would have to establish that the looting itself (not just the looting of specific things like guns) constitutes a grave threat to human life and that there is no other way to deal with this threat effectively.

Presumably, one advocating such a position would say something like: "If you let people start taking merchandise then it will lead to a generalized breakdown of social order in which one has gangs of armed men roaming the streets and committing unspeakable atrocities against the remainder of the citizenry. Indeed, right now in New Orleans there are gangs of armed men tossing the elderly out of nursing homes so they can be ransacked and shutting down otherwise functional and vitally needed hospitals by confiscating their medical supplies at gunpoint. There are reports of rape, and no doubt numerous murders are being committed as well. The only way to end this is with a shoot-on-sight policy for looters."

If the person making such an argument is right, then he’s right, and such a policy is morally justified (assuming the benefit is proportional to the consequences of implementing such a policy).

My suspicion, though, is that the person making this argument would not be right. At least at this point (and being a non-expert in such matters), my suspicion is that a more targeted use of lethal force would be able to cure the problem. For example, if only the armed hooligans (as opposed to people taking food and water) are targeted. And, indeed, I’ve seen cops in New Orleans quoted as saying things like: "I’m not going to arrest anyone who is just taking food and water. Those people are just trying to survive."

If the hooligans themselves can be deterred by things like tear gas, rubber bullets, being winged but not killed then these things would be morally obligatory. If the National Guard (or whoever) could restore order by killing just the leaders or just a few members of the gangs then this would be morally obligatory. One must use the least amount of force necessary to solve the problem in an effective manner.

The situation could well degenerate into an urban warfare situation (though not a long-lived one, since I doubt the hooligans have that much ammo). In that case the hooligans would be functioning as a force of enemy combatants, and the normal rules regarding warfare would apply.

The hooligans, knowing their shortness of ammo, could attempt to extend the situation through hostage-taking, in which case the (ill-defined) rules regarding dealing with hostage-takers would apply to them.

I suspect, though, that order could be restored through a limited use of lethal force, or (in the best of all possible worlds) even a show of force that did not resort to lethal force. In any event, I suspect that the situation could be solved without a general shoot-on-sight policy.

But I’m an apologist, not a general.

And at the moment, I thank God for that.

As we saw in the first post in this series, the Catechism speaks of the possibility, in situations of urgent necessity, of taking another’s property without it being the sin of stealing.

In the second post in this series, I tried to sketch the general type of situation in which this is licit. I suggested that it occurs when you cannot get what you need by paying for them or through the government or another aid agency. I.e., when you can’t pay and are on your own.

In this post I’d like to talk about what things you are allowed to take in such situations and what other rules there are concerning taking them.

Regarding what one is allowed to take, I think it would be helpful to think of things as falling into three classes:

1. Vital Necessities: These are things that you (or someone under your care) must have in order to live. If you don’t have one of these things, you either will be dead very soon or you are likely to be dead very soon.
2. Practical Necessities: These are things that you (and those under your care) could reasonably be expected to survive without until the crisis is past, but having them will aid you immensely.
3. Non-Necessities: These are things that might be somewhat useful to you (and those under your care) or that you just would like to have.

What goes into each of these three categories depends on who you are and what the circumstances are.

For everybody, a certain amount of food and water is a vital necessity. You will die in short order if you don’t get it. (And you’ll be debilitated before that, further jeopardizing your survival in a crisis.) It is a practical necessity ot have a reserve supply of food and water, so some food and water beyond the vitally necessary amount is also a practical necessity. If you still have more food than that (e.g., enough food to weather the whole crisis without finding more) then lucky you, but that extra amount is a non-necessity.

In much of the world for much of the year, shelter and clothing are practical necessities but not vital necessities for most people. It isn’t pleasant, but it is often possible for people to survive outdoors and naked for significant periods of time if they have to. In other parts of the world, at certain times of the year (e.g., winter), and for certain people, however, shelter and clothing are vital necessities. If one has a large amount of shelter (e.g., a couple of houses or a house and a tent or a very large house) or clothing then past a certain point the shelter or clothing surplus becomes a non-necessity.

Guns and knives are generally practical necessities in an emergency. They can be vital necessities (e.g., if someone is threating your life with one or if you foresee that your life is likely to be threatened by someone). You can also have so many guns and knives that the excess are non-necessities.

Medicine can be anything from a vital necessity to a non-necessity, depending on how much you need it. (Think: heart medicine vs. acne medicine.)

Then there are all kinds of non-necessities, such as books, CDs, video games, color TVs, computers, etc., etc., etc. These can, however, become practical necessities or even vital necessities in specialized circumstances. For example, if an armed man takes your daughter hostage at gunpoint and says, "You go into that BestBuy and get me a color TV or I kill your daughter!" In that case, the color TV is a vital necessity for you (since someone under your care will be killed without it), though it remains a non-necessity for the hostagetaker.

Now: Supposing that you are in a situation where you can’t pay and can’t get what you need from the government or another agency, what can you take without it being theft? I suggest the following:

• You can take what is vitally necessary as long as they are not also vitally necessary for someone else. (For example, if you have no food at all and your neighbor enough food that some of it isn’t vitally necessary for him then you can take from that portion of his food. You must leave him the amount that is vitally necessary for him and those under his care, though.)
• You can take what is practically necessary for you as long as it isn’t vitally or practically necessary for someone else. (For example, you need shelter and your neighbor has a tent in his garage that he’s not planning to use or likely to need to use. You can take the tent).

I’d even go a little further than the Catechism and conjecture that you can take non-necessities in at least one circumstance:

• You can take non-necessities if they have no identifiable owner. (For example, you are walking down a street and find a color TV set sitting in the middle of the street. There is no electronics store nearby. It isn’t clear where the TV came from. The TV is not a vital or urgent necessity to you, but you could use it to barter for something that you do need. You can take the TV.)

Hanging over all of these is also a prudence requirement: You can’t take something if the odds are that more harm than good will come from doing so. There is almost always risk in taking something that doesn’t belong to you, and good to be achieved has to be proportionate to the risk you are assuming.

For example, suppose that you need a gun. It’s a practical necessity, though not a vital one. Your neighbor has a couple of gun cabinets that are full of firearms–more than he and his family can use. Unless you happen to stumble onto one of these gun cabinets when you know that your neighbor isn’t around, it would be very unwise to try to take one of your neighbors guns without his consent. He may shoot you if you try.

Similarly: Suppose you find something in the street that could potentially be identified at some point as stolen merchandise (e.g., by a serial number on it). You’d better weigh the odds of getting caught and punished against the benefit you’ll get by taking this thing.

The above, of course, are considerations that are hard to implement. For one thing, the defitions are vague and hard to apply. How much food is vitally necessary vs. how much is practically necessary vs. how much is non-necessary? I know of no way to objectify that. You’d just have to take your best guess, and people might make different guesses (leading to potentially violent confrontations). That’s the nature of emergencies, though: You just have to do the best you can under the circumstances.

Hopefully, these principles would make it easier to navigate an emergency in a moral manner. I just hope the readers (and myself) never have the misfortune to be in such a situation.

Incidentally, the above principles also only apply to taking things against the will of the owner. If you have his consent or if his consent may be presumed then you can take anything you want. Sometimes asking first is the best way to get what you need–even in a crisis.

Someone noted the tension that exists in part 1 of this series between three different statements in the Catechism. The first is the fact that sometimes we are obliged to pay money for the goods we need. The second is that sometimes it is okay to simply take the goods we need. And the third is that the government has a right to regulate the right of private property for the common good.

The Catechism doesn’t resolve this tension by telling us when these different statements are applicable, but as I thought about it, I think I may be able to clarify matters a bit. I’d like to propose three different types of situations. Let’s call them Type A, B, and C.

Type A situations exists when the market is functioning normally, or at least when it is capable of functioning adequately. In other words, it is not a situation of market failure. In this situation, even if prices have spiked and people are under strain as a result, basic human needs are still being adequately met. (They are never perfectly met.)

This is the type of situation we want to be in, and in Type A situations you are morally obliged to pay money for the goods and services you need or want to have.

Type B situations exist when the market is no longer meeting basic human needs adequately. In this case, the government’s right to regulate private property becomes operative and some form of government intervention is warranted.

This is a less desirable situation than Type A because the government is nowhere near as efficient as the market in routing resources to where they need to be. The government simply does not have the knowledge that the market as a whole does.

The situation is analogous to that of the Blogosphere vs. one of the major media outlets. It doesn’t matter how much info CBS had; their handful of flawed employees simply couldn’t compete with the distributed knowledge of the Blogosphere, which was incredibly efficient in ripping apart a story that CBS wanted to push.

In a similar way, a handful of flawed government officials can never compete with the distributed knowledge of the Market when it comes to efficiently routing goods and services. When governments try to do this, they fail. As I said last time, that’s why Communism failed (and continues to fail).

Experience thus teaches that we don’t want to be in Type B situations. Government interventions in the market needs to be as limited and infrequent as possible–or at least that’s my opinion.

In reality, there is considerable room for divergence of opinion on this point. One reason for this is that there is no objective definition of what counts as meeting basic human needs "adequately" or even what basic human needs are. There is a tremendous grey zone in which different individuals can have different opinions about when government interventions are warranted.

That’s what politics is for.

When one is in a Type B situation, the general duty to obey the law means that one has an obligation to go along with the way the government is handling things. For example, if they have imposed a price cap on a service you offer (like renting hotel rooms), then you have to go along with that. If they have issued ration coupons to citizens then you have an obligation to only use the ration coupons that are legitimately yours (i.e., you can’t steal someone else’s; though you could trade things to get the coupons you want).

The goal of the government’s actions in a Type B situation should be to get us back into a Type A situation as swiftly and smoothly as possible so that individual initiative can again replace govenrment intervention, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity.

Type C situations occur when one cannot pay for what one needs and in which the government and other agencies (e.g., church relief organizations) cannot be counted upon to supply it either. In Type C situations it becomes morally legitimate to simply take things (or at least certain things) that one needs, and this is not the sin of theft. It also should not be classified as the civil crime of looting.

Type C situations are obviously the least desirable of all, for a great variety of reasons (among them the sheer danger that one is exposed to in having to take things against the will of their owners).

These three situations can all exist simultaneously in a country.

Right now, much of the U.S. economy is in a Type A situation. There are, however, some parts of it that are being run in a Type B manner, including parts of the city of New Orleans. In other parts of the same city, Type C situations exist.

How to handle oneself morally in a Type C situation is a topic of its own.

That’s the subject of the next post in this series.

A bit of lunchblogging.

I’m getting enough queries about different moral aspects of the Hurricane Katrina situation that I’ve decided to do a series on the ethical principles that apply insituations such as this. I know that this is something a lot of folks are wondering about.

As the posts of the series will make clear, it often isn’t easy to determine the moral course of action in particular situations, but I’ll do the best I can to try to apply Church teaching and broader moral theology considerations to some of the situations that arise in the wake of disasters like this one.

Since questions on this are of interest to Catholics generally, as well
as other Christians and even non-Christians, folks around St. Blog’s
might want to give the series some coverage.

The first post in the series has already appeared. I’ve renamed the post below on price gouging as

DISASTER ETHICS 1: PRICE GOUGING.

More to follow.