Allowing One’s Rights To Be Violated

30 thoughts on “Allowing One’s Rights To Be Violated”

1. What is “intrinsically evil” and what is “not intrinsically evil” are cloudy areas for me. Is there a way to break down which is which?

2. Didn’t the Church Fathers deal with this during the perseuctions? (Denying Christ to save one’s life I mean.) If the words are spoken but they aren’t meant it gets tricky. One is not denying about Christ so much as LYING that one denies Christ. There’s certainly a problem, lying, but it isn’t apostacy. This doesn’t lessen the glory of the martyrs, who chose to proclaim their faith by their deaths. Is it fair to try to read that kind of nuance out of it? Great post Jimmy – never though of it that way.
   My two denarii.

3. If the words are spoken but they aren’t meant it gets tricky. One is not denying about Christ so much as LYING that one denies Christ.
   I think, that’s pretty much what is meant by denying Christ: Knowing Him but lying about it. That’s what Peter did, and that’s what we’re told specifically not to do.
   It’s one thing to deny Him in your heart anyway, and say so out loud to your tormentor. It’s another, bad thing (which we’re told not to do) to know him in your heart, and deny Him, because you are lying about knowing Him.

4. Jimmy,
   I think the key distinction here is between acts and omissions. In the case of rape, the act of raping is intrinsically evil because its object — to engage in sexual intercourse against the will of another — is in itself contrary to the good and the natural law. However, allowing oneself to be raped is not an act but an omission — failing to resist the rapist’s aggression. Failing to resist is not in itself contrary to the good and the natural law because there is no duty to resist violence in all circumstances. The fact that failure to resist will result in an evil — that one will be raped — is a foreseen but unintended consequence, which can be justified by the principle of double effect. In the case of allowing oneself to be raped to avoid some greater evil (e.g. the death of somebody else) the principle is satisfied and it is licit not to resist.
   Now, if one consents to the rape and the rape constitutes fornication (“OK, go ahead and rape me” as opposed to “I do not agree to your demands but I will not resist if you use force”) then one has committed an act which is contrary to the good and the natural law, and the principle of double effect can not be applied.
   As for denying Christ, that would be an act contrary to the good and to revealed truth and so the principle of double effect would not apply.
   Also, you are considering only the objective moral nature of these acts or omissions, but the reader also asked about duress, which goes to subjective guilt. Duress destroys freedom and excuses the agent from responsibility for the objectively evil act. So, while denying Christ would always be objectively evil, if there were sufficient duress, denying Christ might be excusable. It wouldn’t turn into a licit act, but the person doing it wouldn’t be responsible for the evil done, because she acted under duress.

5. Here’s a horrible situation: What if you’re told to deny Christ in order to save another person’s life?

6. Now, if one consents to the rape and the rape constitutes fornication (“OK, go ahead and rape me” as opposed to “I do not agree to your demands but I will not resist if you use force”) then one has committed an act which is contrary to the good and the natural law, and the principle of double effect can not be applied.
   I am not convinced by the distinction you make.
   The original question gave the example of a man demanding that a woman “fornicate with me or I kill your daughter.” Jimmy says the woman can allow herself to be torture, but you claim she sins by giving consent.
   But Saint Maximilian Kolbe volunteered to be murdered in another man’s place (“Take me instead!”) rather than simply suffering murder (“I do not agree to your demands but I will not resist if you use force”). He not only allowed his torture, he not only consented to his torture, he volunteered for his torture. According to your argument, it would seem that St. Maximilian is not a hero but guilty of suicide.

7. How does lying fit in with all that? I’m assuming that lying is intrisically evil.
   For instance, lying to Nazi’s at your door, telling them that you haven’t seen any Jews while in fact you are hiding a family in your attic.
   And then how does lying fit in with the “how do I look” question? Or lying to keep a suprise party secret?

8. Giacinto, you may not lie to people, but neither must you always tell them the whole truth.
   The “lying” issue has come up on Jimmy’s blog before…
   Desperate Midwives
   I Am Telling a Lie…

9. Pha,
   I was trying to illustrate the distinction between an act and an omission in this context, and I recognize that I could have been clearer. If one consents to a demand for sexual favors (“OK, I will do what you ask”) and the person demanding is not one’s spouse, then one commits an act — fornication. However, if one withholds consent but then offers no resistance when the person demanding uses force, then there is simply an omission — failure to resist. Fornication is evil by virtue of its object, so the principle of double effect can’t apply. However, failure to resist is not evil by virtue of its object, so it could be justified by the principle of double effect. That is really all I meant to say.
   The case of St. Maximillian Kolbe is an interesting one. He did do an act — He volunteered to be shut into the room. Why isn’t that suicide? Seems to me we would have to say that his death was a foreseen but unintended consequence of being shut in the room, so he didn’t do something intrinsically evil, and the principle of double effect applies. If you reject this reasoning, then how do you avoid the conclusion that he did commit suicide, which conclusion must be wrong?
   St. Maximillian Kolbe’s act isn’t like my fornication example because he didn’t consent to perform an intrinsically evil act. He never consented to killing himself or even to depriving himself of food, only to being placed in a situation where someone else would prevent him from receiving food.

10. John 15:13
    This is a direct action. We must avoid being too physicalist in applying natural law to the case of suicide. It is the context, purpose, and intent of the act of dying that gives it its moral dimension. Causing one’s own death cannot be intrinsically evil or Christ’s action would be intrinsically evil. Yes, His mission required it, but He was fully human and if we are speaking of human nature, then Christ’s human nature must have allowed it. To be certain, there are distinctions between allowing oneself to be killed, placing oneself in a position in which one will likely die, and physically causing the death oneself, but I don’t see the moral distinction entirely identical with the physical one.

11. If one consents to a demand for sexual favors (“OK, I will do what you ask”) and the person demanding is not one’s spouse, then one commits an act — fornication.
    So “If a person volunteers to be murdered then one commits an act — suicide”?
    He did do an act — He volunteered to be shut into the room.
    Maximilian Kolbe did not volunteer to be shut in just any room, he volunteered to be sent to the starvation bunker. He knew when he volunteered that he would certainly be murdered one way or another. Murder is not “a foreseen but unintended consequence of being shut in” a starvation bunker. Murder is the raison d’etre of the starvation bunker. The prisoners knew what the sentence was, that’s why Gajowniczek cried out, “Oh, my poor wife, my poor children. I shall never see them again.” Zegidewicz, in his testimony, called it “the death Block.” According to the witnesses, Kolbe said, “I am a Catholic priest. I wish to die for that man.” There’s no getting around it: Kolbe volunteered to be murdered so another man would survive.
    If you reject this reasoning, then how do you avoid the conclusion that he did commit suicide, which conclusion must be wrong?
    I avoid the conclusion that he committed suicide in the same way Jimmy avoids the conclusion that the mother commits fornication: “allowing one’s [right not to be tortured/murdered] to be violated is not intrinsically evil.”
    The case of the mother and the case of Kolbe are the same: both allow themselves to be tortured to spare another person’s life. Kolbe’s case is the more extreme of the two, because unlike the mother he volunteers the exchange and goes to death rather than mere torture.

12. Pha,
    Interesting exchange. Based on your last post, I’m not sure where your analysis departs from mine. We both agree that what St. Maximillian did was not suicide because he did not kill himself, but rather allowed himself to be killed. Likewise, the mother in Jimmy’s post does not commit fornication because she merely allows another to rape her. In both cases, the agent does not do anything intrinsically evil but merely allows another to do evil to him/her.
    At some point, however, one crosses the line between allowing another to do evil and doing evil oneself. If St. Maximillian had shot himself in the head, that would be suicide. He would be consenting not to be killed, but to kill himself, an intrinsically evil act. I suggested that the mother would cross the line if she consented to the fornication because at that point she would not be simply allowing another to rape her but would be actively participating in the fornication. She would no longer be a victim, but a fornicator. This is the crucial issue in most rape trials — did the alleged victim actually consent to the sexual activity he/she now complains of? If she consents, it is no longer rape, and she is no longer simply allowing evil to be done to her, she is a participant in the evil of fornication. She crosses the line because of what she consents to, not simply because she consents. St. Maximillian never crossed the line, because he never consented to kill himself, only to be killed.
    Do you disagree with that analysis?

13. Just Me,

    Here’s a horrible situation: What if you’re told to deny Christ in order to save another person’s life?

    There’s a beautifully written and haunting novel that has this situation in it: Shusako Endo’s Silence, about early Jesuit missionaries in Japan.

14. Based on your last post, I’m not sure where your analysis departs from mine. We both agree that what St. Maximillian did was not suicide because he did not kill himself, but rather allowed himself to be killed. Likewise, the mother in Jimmy’s post does not commit fornication because she merely allows another to rape her. In both cases, the agent does not do anything intrinsically evil but merely allows another to do evil to him/her.
    We agree on this.
    I suggested that the mother would cross the line if she consented to the fornication because at that point she would not be simply allowing another to rape her but would be actively participating in the fornication. She would no longer be a victim, but a fornicator.
    This is where your reasoning becomes suspicious to me. You make it sound as if the mother becomes guilty rather than a victim of torture if she says “OK” to the demand “fornicate with me or I kill your daughter.” I would definitely not agree with such an assessment. Being raped does not cease to be torture simply because the mother allows it to save her daughter’s life.

15. We may be getting hung up on the meaning of “consent” in this context. How would you distinguish between fornication and rape? At what point does a person involved in an act of sexual intercourse become an active participant rather than a innocent victim?

16. We may be getting hung up on the meaning of “consent” in this context. How would you distinguish between fornication and rape? At what point does a person involved in an act of sexual intercourse become an active participant rather than a innocent victim?
    Hmm… Consent = wanting to participate and saying so? And/or, not caring one way or the other and going along with it? Many dictionaries hint that the idea of one definition of consent, is “being of one mind”: 1. Agreement in opinion or sentiment; the being of one mind ; accord (Webster’s). I can see how you can comply with a demand under grave duress, but at the same time, not “be of one mind” with the tormentor at all.

17. I can see how you can comply with a demand under grave duress, but at the same time, not “be of one mind” with the tormentor at all.
    To say the very least!
    And that’s why I have a problem with the way decker2003’s been talking about the scenario. Saying “OK” to being tortured or killed for someone else’s sake is not the same thing as actually wanting to be tortured or killed.
    That’s why it’s especially valuable to bring the Kolbe scenario into the discussion. Just as “I want to die for that man” does not express a suicidal will, saying “OK” to the rapist’s torture demand does not express a willing desire to fornicate.

18. And just for the sake of clarity:
    St. Maximillian never crossed the line, because he never consented to kill himself, only to be killed.
    A man who asks someone else to kill him because he really wants to die commits suicide, even if he never pulls the trigger himself. Volunteering to be murdered, contrary to what you seem to be implying, can indeed be suicide.
    In fact, Kolbe comes closer to suicide than the mother in Jimmy’s scenario comes to fornication: Kolbe initiates the exchange and he says he wants to die.
    Do I believe that St. Maximilian actually committed suicide? Certainly not. But his scenario is far closer to suicide than the mother’s is to willing fornication.
    If St. Maximillian had shot himself in the head, that would be suicide.
    If he had shot himself in the head because he truly wanted to die, yes. If he had shot himself in the head to save the life of the other man at the demand of the Nazis, I would probably not agree.
    This is indeed an interesting exchange. Would you view Socrates as a martyr (executed by the state for firmly adhering to the truth) or a suicide (since he drank the hemlock he was sentenced to drink)?

19. Pha,
    I think you are placing too much emphasis on the motivation behind the action. Veritatis Splendor teaches that the moral quality of an action is determined first by its object — the result that one necessarily wills in performing a given action. If this result is contrary to man’s natural end, then the action is evil, regardless of one’s motivations for performing it. (See Veritatis Splendor paragraphs nos. 76 – 83)
    The encyclical gives the example of contraception and states that using contraception is always evil and that no reason, however grave, could make the act licit. Yet, you seem to be saying that if I used contraception to save someone else’s life at the demand of some unjust oppressor, then I would not commit sin. Your position seems inconsistent with the basic proposition that one may never do evil so that good may come of it.
    In keeping with the above, I would say that Socrates committed suicide, albeit under duress. He did not simply allow himself to be killed. He performed an act — drinking poison — whose object was to end his own life. I can’t think of any canonized martyr who actually took his own life. In each case, someone else did the actual killing.

20. It is interesting to me that your conclusion about Socrates is at odds with other Christians throughout history, like St. Justin Martyr.
    St. Justin wrote in his second apology: “When Socrates endeavoured, by true reason and examination, to bring [the worship of demons] to light and deliver men from the demons, then the demons themselves, by means of men who rejoiced in iniquity, compassed his death, as an atheist and a profane person, on the charge that ‘he was introducing new divinities;’ and in our case they display a similar activity.”
    Likewise in his first apology, St. Justin wrote: “Those who lived in accordance with the Logos are Christians, even though they were called godless, such as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus and others like them.”
    I have no doubt that you will simply counter that those Christians who understood Socrates as a martyr are just wrong, but their discernment still makes me doubt your judgment.
    Veritatis Splendor teaches that the moral quality of an action is determined first by its object — the result that one necessarily wills in performing a given action. If this result is contrary to man’s natural end, then the action is evil, regardless of one’s motivations for performing it. (See Veritatis Splendor paragraphs nos. 76 – 83)
    If any component of the act is bad –object (means), end, intention, or circumstances– the act is bad. I do understand this.
    My problem with your position is that you assume that allowing yourself to be tortured for someone else’s sake constitutes actual consent to the torture. It’s a totally absurd assumption that would mean that when St. Maximilian said “I wish to die for this man” he committed suicide rather than a heroic act. I cannot accept such a claim.
    And as I pointed out before, Kolbe comes much closer to suicide than the mother in Jimmy’s scenario ever comes to fornication: Kolbe initiates the exchange (he himself suggested it, not the Nazis) and he says he wants to die.

21. It is interesting to me that your conclusion about Socrates is at odds with other Christians throughout history, like St. Justin Martyr.
    St. Justin wrote in his second apology: “When Socrates endeavoured, by true reason and examination, to bring [the worship of demons] to light and deliver men from the demons, then the demons themselves, by means of men who rejoiced in iniquity, compassed his death, as an atheist and a profane person, on the charge that ‘he was introducing new divinities;’ and in our case they display a similar activity.”
    Likewise in his first apology, St. Justin wrote: “Those who lived in accordance with the Logos are Christians, even though they were called godless, such as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus and others like them.”
    I have no doubt that you will simply counter that those Christians who understood Socrates as a martyr are just wrong, but their discernment still makes me doubt your judgment.
    Veritatis Splendor teaches that the moral quality of an action is determined first by its object — the result that one necessarily wills in performing a given action. If this result is contrary to man’s natural end, then the action is evil, regardless of one’s motivations for performing it. (See Veritatis Splendor paragraphs nos. 76 – 83)
    If any component of the act is bad –object (means), end, intention, or circumstances– the act is bad. I do understand this.
    My problem with your position is that you assume that allowing yourself to be tortured for someone else’s sake constitutes actual consent to the torture. It’s a totally absurd assumption that would mean that when St. Maximilian said “I wish to die for this man” he committed suicide rather than a heroic act. I cannot accept such a claim.
    And as I pointed out before, Kolbe comes much closer to suicide than the mother in Jimmy’s scenario ever comes to fornication: Kolbe initiates the exchange (he himself suggested it, not the Nazis) and he says he wants to die.

22. I can’t think of any canonized martyr who actually took his own life. In each case, someone else did the actual killing.
    Here’s a couple of Christian martyrs who were not killed by someone else’s act:
    “Pelagia was a Christian virgin fifteen years of age. Soldiers came in search of her, evidently during the Diocletian persecution, in order to force her to offer publicly a heathen sacrifice. She was alone in the house, no one being there to aid her. She came out to the soldiers sent after her and when she learned the order they had to execute, she requested permission to go again into the house in order to put on other clothing. This was granted to her. The virgin who probably knew what was before her was not willing to expose herself to the danger of being dishonoured. She therefore went up to the roof of the house and threw herself into the sea. Thus she died, as St. Chrysostom says, as virgin and martyr, and was honoured as such by the Antiochene Church.” Catholic Encyclopedia
    Her feast is June 9. There’s also a short entry on Patron Saints Index.
    (Encyclopedia Britannica says: “15-year-old Christian virgin who, probably during the persecution of Christians by the Roman emperor Diocletian, threw herself from a housetop to save her chastity and died instantly. Her authenticity was endorsed and praised by St. Ambrose and St. John Chrysostom who celebrated her martyrdom in a homily.”)
    “St. Apollonia, a holy virgin advanced in years, was so struck in the face that she lost her teeth. They threatened to give her over to the flames if she refused to blaspheme. But she asked for an instant to reflect, and threw herself spontaneously into the flames.” The Christian Catecombs of Rome site of the Istituto Salesiano S. Callisto
    http://www.catacombe.roma.it/en/ricerche/ricerca12.html
    Her feast is February 9. Her entry on Patron Saints Index is longer than St. Pelagia’s, and includes a holy card image.

23. That last one was from me too. And sorry about the double post. Something went wrong. 🙂

24. “My problem with your position is that you assume that allowing yourself to be tortured for someone else’s sake constitutes actual consent to the torture.”
    That is not my position. If you go back to my first post, I think you will see that I was making a distinction between failing to resist a rape (e.g. allowing oneself to be tortured) and consenting to the sexual activity. I may have been less than clear about what I meant by consent, but let me set the record straight now. Simply failing to resist an aggressor does not constitute consent to what the aggressor intends to do.
    The examples of Socrates, St. Pelagia & St. Apollonia are interesting food for thought. How would you avoid the conclusion that their acts were evil because the natural object of those acts was to cause their own death?

25. “The examples of Socrates, St. Pelagia & St. Apollonia are interesting food for thought. How would you avoid the conclusion that their acts were evil because the natural object of those acts was to cause their own death?”
    Aquinas has the answer!
    “As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), “not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this.” He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.”
    Here’s the relevant Summa article:
    http://www.newadvent.org/summa/306405.htm

26. If you go back to my first post, I think you will see that I was making a distinction between failing to resist a rape (e.g. allowing oneself to be tortured) and consenting to the sexual activity. I may have been less than clear about what I meant by consent, but let me set the record straight now. Simply failing to resist an aggressor does not constitute consent to what the aggressor intends to do.
    Unfortunately, your “distinction” is the source of the argument. It doesn’t set the record straight at all.
    Going back to your first post, you said “if one consents to the rape and the rape constitutes fornication (‘OK, go ahead and rape me’ as opposed to ‘I do not agree to your demands but I will not resist if you use force’) then one has committed an act which is contrary to the good and the natural law.”
    According to your post, the mother “consents” merely by saying “OK” to the demand “fornicate with me or I kill your daughter.”
    So your argument puts the mother in a catch-22 scenario. If she says “no” to the either-or demand, her daughter will be murdered. If she says “ok” to the either-or demand, you accuse her of fornication.
    Unlike Jimmy, me, and Just Me, you’ve argued that merely saying “OK” to the demand is real, willing, let’s-get-it-on-baby “consent.” The absurdity of this claim is shown in the St. Maximilian scenario. St. Maximilian did much more than merely say “OK” to a your-death-for-his-life demand. Kolbe suggested the exchange to the Nazis, volunteering to die.
    It’s inconsistent to say that Kolbe can voluntarily give himself to murder without sinning but the mother cannot allow herself to be tortured without sinning. In reality, Kolbe comes much closer to suicide than the mother in Jimmy’s scenario ever comes to fornication.
    How can you accuse the mother of fornication without accusing Kolbe of suicide?

27. St. Augustine’s argument falls apart in that it assumes that God will command sin.
    But it is not wrong to wish to die. It is not even wrong to pray to die. It is not wrong to do something knowing or even hoping it will kill you, as long as you are also accomplishing something of proportionate value, and that is what you intend to do — that is, you would refrain from the action that will kill you if it did not obtain this end, or you could accomplish it by non-fatal means.
    Samson’s intent is to destroy the temple. He prays that God will mercifully permit it to kill him, too.

28. I think Mary’s point is well-taken, but would add that not only is Samson’s intent licit, but the object of his act is licit as well. The object of crushing the pillars is to destroy the building and kill his enemies. His own death is justified under the principle of double effect.
    But, this doesn’t work for Socrates and the “holy women” we’ve been discussing. It would seem that the object of their act is precisely to kill themselves and I agree with Mary that St. Thomas’s solution seems to run into a major difficulty.

29. I have to differ (and not just because I want to stick up for my patron). To try to add one to what Mary said – if the reason is proportionate then there is no wrong commited. I think the history, including the fact that these Saints are held as such and were commmended in their day by other saints, helps to indicate that this was the condition of their martyrdoms (ie proportionate reasons). If this is so then God wasn’t commanding sin in inspiring their venerable acts, and so Augustine is right to think that God granted his permission in those cases.
    Or, to think of it another way, it seems to me that the possible sinful aspect of these acts could is the possibility that they are an occasion of taking of the power of life and death out of the hands of God. Now if the Holy Spirit (as Augustine and Aquinas saw it) grants to a person through inspiration the knowledge that they can perform an action that will lead to their death (like the saints we’ve been discussing) – that is, if God grants permission that the person may perform this action, I don’t think a sin is commited in that case (like the holy women mentioned above) because God is still the one who is handling life and death.
    And I think God’s spirit was definitely present with these saints during their horrible trials and also with them in their final actions (and perhaps with Socrates, as I tend to agree with St. Justin on that one).
    Those are just my two offers, though. Maybe Jimmy could address the issue of these saints in a sequel post.

30. Any other thoughts?

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