Disasters Before The Fall

A reader writes:

We’ve been discussing the whole issue of Hurricane Katrina and God’s role in nature.  We have a grip on the whole problem of pain (thanks to Lewis and Kreeft), but we have another question concerning things like hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes and the like.  Did those things exist before "the fall" or are they a result of "the fall"? 

Scripture does not address this question directly, except possibly in the case of hurricanes. Hurricanes involve rain, and there is a passage in Genesis that many have taken to mean that there was no rain before a certain point in history. The passage is Genesis 2:4-5, which reads:

5: when no plant of the field was yet in the earth and no herb
of the field had yet sprung up — for the LORD God had not caused it to
rain upon the earth, and there was no man to till the ground;
6: but a mist went up from the earth and watered the whole  face of the ground

The Hebrew of this passage, and the surrounding text, contains a number of difficulties, and it is not certain that the passage is stating that there was no rain. The passage is referring to a time before the standard agricultural cycle with which the Hebrews were familiar had been set up. That cycle involves the elements named in verse 5: the springing up of plants and herbs of the field, the sending of rain from heaven for purposes of making them grow, the going forth of man to till the ground to make them grow.

The passage thus may simply be setting the timeframe as "before the agricultural cycle was set up." It may not be denying that rain took place any more than it is denying that the same plants and herbs that would later be cultivated already were growing, they were just growing wild. In the same way, the rain (if it existed) was wild in the sense of not being sent by God to cause crops to grow because there were no crops. There were just wild plants here and there, but no man had yet been created, and thus there was no agriculture.

Verse 6 may reflect this disorganized state as well. The term "mist" may not be the best translation here. If memory serves (I’m afraid I don’t have time at the moment to look it up for verification) the term translated "mist" more literally means "flow." This may represent the numerous shifting watercourses in the Tigris-Euphrates delta (where Eden was supposed to be located), which often resulted in a chaotic flooding, swamp-like conditions, and thus conditions unsuitable for agriculture. (One notes also that the term "earth" used in this passage just means "land" and can mean a specific land, like the land where Eden was; not the whole planet.)

The biblical author may simply be trying to get us to envision the chaotic, undeveloped Mesopotamian swamp which God then started to organize, creating a garden and a gardener and the first stirrings of horticulture/agriculture.

On the other hand, if the passage is stating that there was no rain, anywhere on earth, then it is possible that it was not intended by the biblical author to be taken literally (the Church acknowledges significant elements of symbolism in the early part of Genesis; see the Catechism’s discussions on this point) but as a literary device of some sort, perhaps to set the reader up for the drama of the Flood narrative, which definitely involved rain.

Or one might think that there just was no rain at this time. It seems very hard to square that with the geological record, but one is free to believe that if one wishes.

The other disasters that you mention do not seem to be addressed one way or the other in Scripture. However, there are factors that would suggest that they did exist.

Even if you just stick with Genesis 1 it seems clear that a basic fact about the universe was the same then as it is now: The universe is entropic or prone to entropy, which is the tendency for systems to run down and break down. Without entropy, stars don’t shine (their energy doesn’t dissipate in the form of light and heat) and animals don’t need food (because they aren’t losing energy either). Since Genesis 1 both depicts the sun and the stars shining and the earthly creatures–even man–needing food, it thereby acknowldges that the pre-Fall universe was entropic.

That suggests that the same basic physical laws were in place, and thus that the effects of the sun on the earth’s atmosphere, driving the hydrological cycle, would have been the same (meaning things like tornados, hurricanes, and rain would occur). Indirect testimony to the hydrological cycle is also found in Genesis 1 in the fact that the waters have been divided into "the waters above" (i.e., clouds) and "the waters below" (i.e., oceans, seas, lakes, rivers). That only happens if you’ve got sunlight causing water evaporation, and thus the hydrological cycle. Lightening also occurs as part of the hydrological cycle, which would give rise to things like forrest fires (though you didn’t mention those, I thought I’d throw them in as a lagniappe).

The innards of the earth, for their part, would also be trying to radiating their internal heat outward in keeping with entropy, causing the convection currents in the earth’s mantle that are one of the things driving continental drift. This would then produce things like earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanos (to throw in another couple of lagniappes).

Between the various lines of evidence, both from Genesis 1 and from what we know (or think we know) about the history of the earth from science, my best guess is that such disaster-phenomena did occur prior to the Fall, but if anyone wants to disagree with that, he’s welcome to.

I also heard that if they did exist before the fall that man had a special sense of imminent danger from these things and could take action to protect themselves.  What do you think?

That, I really couldn’t tell you. Many have conjectured that our first parents had a very large number of impressive superpowerspreternatural gifts. That could have been one of them. On the other hand, God might have kept them alive some other way.

The same could be true, theoretically, of animals before the Fall (e.g., there might have been animals with superpowerspreternatural gifts like those of Krypto the Superdog, or Streaky the Supercat, or Comet the Superhorse, or Beppo the Supermonkey, or Proty the . . . well, Proty the proty–or any other members of the Legion of Super-Pets).

On the other hand, we’ve got pretty good fossil evidence that some animals died in pre-Adamite disasters, but if one takes Augustine’s and Aquinas’s view that only human death entered the world through the Fall and that animal death could and did happen prior to it then this is not a problem.

Hope this helps!

Snowball! Snowball!

SnowballThe pup to the left is Snowball.

You may remember Snowball because of his heart-wrenching story:

Among the thousands of crushing moments from last week’s deadly
hurricane, one image brought the anguish home to many: a tearful little
boy torn from his dog while being shuttled to safety.

"Everyone wants to know about Snowball," said Laura Maloney,
executive director of the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals.

The boy was among the thousands sheltered at the Superdome after the
hurricane. But when he went to board a bus to be evacuated to Houston, a
police officer took the dog away. The boy cried out — "Snowball!
Snowball!" — then vomited in distress. The confrontation was first
reported by The Associated Press. Authorities say they don’t know where
the boy or his family ended up.

But now there’s a ray of hope!

The United Animal Nations said
Snowball was safe
, citing news from the state veterinarian’s office.
However, the information could not be immediately verified.

VERIFICATION FROM THE AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCATION!

The search is now on for the boy:

Reuniting Snowball and his owner will require work, patience and luck.

Volunteers planned to make visits to shelters in the Houston area
looking for the dog’s owners. They were considering walking around
carrying signs with Snowball’s photo.

"I don’t know how hopeful I am," Jones said. "They probably
don’t know anything about this — that there’s a reward out there and we’re
trying to look for them.

GET THE STORY.

VIDEO OF SNOWBALL.

KatrinaFound Pets.Com

A big CHT to the readers who e-mailed, one of whom wrote:

I, like everyone else, was dumbfounded at the aftereffects of the hurricane last week. I was so shaken that I couldn’t even cry. For some reason, your relating of this story was what enabled me to cry — not only for the little boy and his dog, but for the tens of thousands directly affected by this disaster.

It’s Unfortunate

Normally if someone on another web site writes a critique of something I’ve done, I let it pass. In keeping with Rule #1, not everyone has to agree with me. If someone wants to state their opinion and take exception with mine, fine.

Yesterday a couple of people pointed out to me THIS RESPONSE BY SCOTT RICHERT TO THE POST I DID ON PRICE-GOUGING, and I decided a response was in order.

Mr. Richert takes exception with what I said on the subject. That’s fine. I operate on the principle that not everyone has to agree with me.

In his post, Mr. Richert expresses the concern that many individuals feel when they see prices jump dramatically and therefore charge those who set the prices with "price-gouging." This is a natural, understandable, human reaction.

Mr. Richert regards raising prices out of a motive of greed to be a bad thing. On this, I am sure we can agree (provided that greed is understood as a disordered desire for profit rather than a properly ordered desire for profit).

It is difficult to tell from what he writes, but I suspect that Mr. Richert may think that I would disagree with him on this point.

Mr. Richert clearly has strongly held ideas about economics, and it would be very intersting to be able to interact with his position.

It’s unfortunate, therefore, that his articulation of his position is marred by things such as:

  • Ad hominem,
  • Guilt by association,
  • Distortion,
  • Exaggeration,
  • Uncharitable inaccuracy, and
  • Demonstrably false statements

Continue reading “It’s Unfortunate”

The Ex-City Of New Orleans

I was thinking about how to assess and explain the magnitude of losing New Orleans, which has gone from being a city of almost half a million to a ghost town of maybe 10,000, they think.

I thought about putting up a list of the Top 10 biggest U.S. cities and crossing a line through New Orleans as a way of visualizing the loss. Seeing that crossed out name next to other Top 10 names like "New York," "Los Angeles," or "Chicago" could powerfully communicate just what our nation has lost.

But it turned out that I couldn’t do that. On researching the matter, I discovered that–despite its fame and its history–New Orleans is not in the Top 10 biggest U.S. cities. It’s not in the top dozen, or the two two dozen. The list would simply be too long to make the point I wanted to make.

By population, New York is sixteen times as big as New Orleans. Los Angeles is eight. Houston is four. The city I live in–San Diego–is almost three.

Places like Columbus, Milwaukee, El Paso, Charlotte, OKC, and Tucson are all bigger than New Orleans was.

I guess we were lucky that–as unimaginably horrible as the damage of losing New Orleans has been–it was not as bad as if a Top 10 city was taken out. That would have been even more unimaginably horrible.

So where was New Orleans in the rankings?

IT WAS NUMBER TWENTY-EIGHT.

That distinction now belongs to Las Vegas.

Allowing One’s Rights To Be Violated

A reader writes:

Reading your blog post “Disaster Ethics 3: Taking Things” brought to mind the Church’s teaching “One may never do evil so that good may result from it” (CCC 1756).

You wrote, “if an armed man takes your daughter hostage at gunpoint and says, "You go into that BestBuy and get me a color TV or I kill your daughter!" In that case, the color TV is a vital necessity for you (since someone under your care will be killed without it)”.

On the surface, this seems to be a case of doing evil (stealing a TV) so that good may result from it (saving your daughter’s life).  But I understand your logic that taking the TV would not be the sin of stealing because of its vital necessity.  (I also think the owner’s consent could be reasonably presumed under the given circumstances.)

But what if the armed man demanded that something intrinsically evil be done?  For example, what if he said to the girl’s mother, “fornicate with me or I kill your daughter”?  I think most mothers would reason that it is acceptable to commit the sin of fornication (or allow herself to be raped) to save her daughter’s life.  On the other hand, St. Maria Goretti chose to die rather than be raped.  Could she have morally complied with her attacker to save her own life?  Wouldn’t duress lessen or even remove her moral culpability?

Or could the principle of double effect be applied here?  For example, could we say that the choice one is making under such circumstances is the choice to save a life (one’s own or one’s daughter), not the choice to fornicate; the fornication is only tolerated for the greater good?  If so, then where do we draw the line?  Did all the martyrs have to die?  The story of those kids in a church (choosing to be shot rather than deny Jesus) a few years ago comes to mind.  Did they have to die?

It seems to me that a relevant distinction here is between the active commission of evil and the passive suffering of evil.

One cannot do something that is intrinsically evil, but one can allow oneself to suffer
an intrinsic evil at the hands of another. Thus one cannot kill another, but one can (in at least some circumstances) allow oneself to be killed even though one is innocent.

Something similar applies in the cases you mention. If someone points a gun at you and says that you’ll be
killed if you don’t allow yourself to be raped then it would be
morally licit to allow this rather than be killed. In this case, one is allowing one’s rights to be violated, but allowing one’s rights to be violated is not
intrinsically evil (though it can be evil depending on the circumstances).

On the other hand, if the gunman tells you to rape someone else then
that is intrinsically evil (you’re not allowing your rights to be
violated; you’d be violating someone else’s rights) and so you cannot
do that.

Denying Christ is intrinsically evil, so that cannot be done, even
under threat of death.

What Maria Goretti did was heroic but not morally obligatory (i.e.,
she could have allowed herself to be raped). She went beyond what
morality required and set a heroic example, for which she is honored
by the Church.

New Seminarian Document Expected Soon

Remember that document I was telling you about that is expected to affirm that those with a homosexual orientation are not to be ordained to the priesthood?

CNA is reporting:

The chairman of the U.S. bishops’ committee on priestly formation, Bishop John Nienstedt, said the Congregation told him that he could expect the guidelines soon.

This document  is about to be issued as Vatican officials are expected to begin their visit of the 229 seminaries, theology schools and institutes in the United States this month [SOURCE].

Purgatory: Two Views

Recently someone engaged in an apologetic discussion about purgatory e-mailed me with a question about some of the questions that had arisen in the discussion. These touched on some significant issues, including the nature of purgatory and the way it is theologically elaborated. I thought I’d share (a slightly edited version of) my response to him, as it covers some ground one doesn’t often see covered.

I wrote:

There are different ways in which a doctrine can be theologically
elaborated. The core of the doctrine of purgatory is that (a) there is
something that occurs after death in which, for the saved, the
consequences of sin are dealt with and (b) those experiencing this
event or process can be assisted by the prayers and suffrages of the
living. That’s the core, but it can be developed and explained in
different ways.

Historically, a common way of explaining this among many theologians
has involved the idea of temporal punishments, understood in a literal
sense.

This would not conflict with the fact that Christ paid the price for
our sins because Scripture uses language indicating that Christ’s
Atonement, which rescues us from hell and which is sufficient in value
to wipe out all punishment if God wants to apply it that way, usually
does not eliminate all punishment for sin from the Christian life.
Instead, Scripture makes clear, God applies the infinite value of
Christ’s Atonement in a way that rescues us from hell and that
eliminates *many* of the sufferings in this life that we would
experience for our sins, but not *all* of the latter.

The book of Hebrews speaks of God chastizing us for our own good and
scourging every son he receives. There is thus a residuum of
punishment due for our sins that God allows us to bear in order to
teach us a lesson and encourage our growth in holiness. This is not in
contradiction to Christ’s Atonement but an outworking of it. The only
reason we receive this discipline from God is that we are his sons and
he is disciplining us to help us grow. The book of Hebrews makes this
point explicitly.

Since the chastisements and scourging that God allows to come to the
saved are not everlasting, they are therefore referred to as temporal
punishments–punishments that last only for a time, as opposed to the
eternal punishment of hell.

If, when we die, we have not dealt with all the remaining temporal
punishments that God has allowed us to experience for our sins then we
deal with them in purgatory.

This elaboration of purgatory has been popular for a number of
centuries, particularly in the West, where theologians have tended to
apply a juridical (courtroom) model to the situation, with God serving
as a judge who imposes penalties for transgressions of his law (albeit
in a fatherly manner).

Eastern Catholics have not always articulated purgatory in this way.
There are other ways in which the theological core of the doctrine can
be elaborated. One model that has been gaining ground in recent years,
including in the West, does not look to a courtroom/punishment model
but which instead speaks of purgatory as a purification or cleansing
that occurs to deal with attachment to sin. This kind of explanation
is found, for example, in the book Eschatology by Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger and also in the Catechism of the Catholic Church.

Exponents of this view tend to view the
punishment/chastisement/scourging language of Scripture less literally
than it has been historically taken, seeing punishment for sin not as
something God inflicts from without but as the natural outworking of
the consequences of our sins, which God allows us to experience.

(Hell is then understood similarly, not as a place to which one is
sentenced by an angry God but as the state of definitive alienation
from God, which one has freely chosen by rejecting God’s offer of
union. In other words, on this understanding, God doesn’t send us to
hell against our will; we insist on leaving his presence and he allows
us to do so.)

How the punishment model and the purification model are to be
reconciled–or even if they need to be reconciled–is not something on
which the Church has authoritatively pronounced.

It is possible to reconcile the two to a significant degree. For
example, relying on the biblical emphasis on the sufferings and the
divine "scourgings" of the saved as means of spiritual training, one
might use the punishment model but say that the *only* temporal
punishments God allows us to experience are those needed for our
sanctification (which on anybody’s account is a painful process for
most).

This would bring the two models significantly into harmony in that on
both there would be no "excess" punishments one received. The only
sufferings the believer would have on account of sin would be those
used for his sanctification.

The question would be how one is to look at these sufferings: Are they
things caused by God from without, on the manner of a father punishing
his children? Or are they the natural outworking of the consequences
of sin, which we might envision as the pain experienced by a patient
who has broken (or shot) his foot and is having it worked on by a
doctor.

There’s a difference between "It’s time to take your punishment" and
"I’ve got to set this bone and it’s going to hurt," but they both
involve sufferings meant for the good of the one who experiences them.
Which way one looks at purgatory is currently an open question in
Catholic theology.

The Future Of Apologetics

A reader writes:

I listened recently to Cardinal Dulles’ comments on the History of
Apologetics and was wondering if you could draw lessons from that history
and give the outlook for future apologetics efforts. 

Me personally? Well, I’m no Cardinal Dulles, but I’ll do what I can.

Christian apologetics always takes its cue from the envrionment that it is in. In the early days of the Church, it had to defend Christianity against challenges that are very different than those it faces today.

We have now entered the fourth age of human communications, which means that we are now in an unrestricted marketplace of ideas. It isn’t a question of Christianity vs. paganism or Catholicism vs. Protestantism, anymore. It’s Christianity (or, within Christianity, Catholicism) vs. Everybody. The challenges to the Christian faith are no longer confined to a single or a few ideological sources. The world is now so interconnected that the challenges come from every source there is.

This means that apologetics will have to be much more comprehensive in its scope and flexible in its approach. The demands placed upon it are now far, far greater than at any time in history.

Which leads to the next point . . .

In particular, I
was wondering if the predominantly lay involvement in current apologetics
will have an effect on the development of this work. 

Yes. It’s essential to the future of apologetics. Because of the fourth-age effect of connecting every viewpoint with every other viewpoint, there will now be a much greater demand for apologetics and thus a greater demand for apologists.

Think of it this way: How many apologists do you need when everyone in the village is Catholic and you have little contact with those outside the village? Now compare that to how many apologists you need when a minority of those in the village are Catholic and everyone in the village is talking to people all over the world on the Internet? The challenge to ideas is going to be far, far greater in the latter circumstance, meaning that there need to be more apologists out there. (Though they don’t necessarily need to live in the same village, since they can create online repositories the villagers can access via the Internet.)

Given the need for the number of apologists to grow, these will come overwhelmingly from the laity. The clergy is simply not prepared at the present moment to shoulder this task. Not only is there the broad-based vocations problem in the developed world, the seminary system has no present ability to teach apologetics to prospective clergymen, and in fact many currents of thought among the clergy are actively hostile to apologetics, wishing to see it go away in favor of ecumenism. Many churchmen today simply have no perception of the need for apologetics (Cardinal Dulles is one of the few who does), as most received their definitive intellectual stamp in an age when apologetics was at its nadir.

Thus apologetics is no exception to the trend of many tasks formerly reserved to the clergy (back in the age when everyone was a farmer) have now devolved to the laity under the pressures of the contemporary environment. For the first time in Christian history, the majority of major apologists are and will continue to be laymen.

Finally, given the
existence of some famously, unreliable "Catholic" apologists, do you
foresee some sort official certification process for public apologists?

Not any time soon. The Church is not at present set up to train or evaluate apologists. There are laws, both universal and particular, that could be brought to bear on particular apologists, but it simply is not practicable to try to certify everyone who wants to do an apologetics web page or write apologetic articles or books.

With the growth of human communications that occurred toward the end of the third age, it became impracticable to grant an imprimatur for every book of a religious nature that was published, and so the Church switched to a model whereby imprimaturs were needed only for certain books. The problematic ones that then got published were handled by another mechanism, with the bishops’ conferences and the CDF issuing warnings against the most egregious books–a process that has not been wholly effective, but which is unavoidable given the volume of publishing that takes place and that needs to take place if the Church is to maintain an active presence in the present media environment.

The same consideratins (among others) make it difficult to enact a broad-based mandatory certification program for apologists. Any attempt to institute one would cause far more harm than good. That’s not to say that it might not be tried in the future, but it would be ill-advised, as well as ineffective. The problematic apologists are the very ones who would ignore the requirements; all it would do is hamper the good ones by making them jump through more hoops, which would deter further good apologists from entering the field, knowing the hoops they’d have to jump through.

I therefore suspect that the future when it comes to cerifying apologists will look more like the present model of imprimaturs on books: Except for very specific exceptions, it’s largely a message of "Go forth and do good, and we’ll warn people about the really major problems that show up"

Rehnquist Revolution Over?

Well . . . THAT’S WHAT BERKELEY LAW PROFESSION JOHN YOO SAYS.

It’s not clear what he means.

His piece offers a good summary of Rehnquist’s time on the Court and the impact he made, as well as the Court’s recent spate of stupid decisions (Kelo, Raich, McCreary), in which Rehnquist dissented.

But the central theme of his analysis–that Rehnquist’s "revolution" is over–is unclear. It’s true that Rehnquist was a pivotal figure in the reorientation of the Court from the horrendous Warren and Burger days, when judicial activism undertook a massive, anti-democratic social engineering project on American society that is still underway, but Rehnquist was not the ideological leader of the return to originalism. Scalia and especially Thomas are much more pure in their originalism than Rehnquist was.

It’s hard to say in what sense the attempt to shift the Court back to orginalism (which Yoo barely touches on) is a revolution that can be called Rehnquist’s, except in the sense that he was on the Court early, was a substantial supporter of the effort, and happened to be chief justice for much of the time. But he wasn’t its ideological leader (Scalia), its strongest advocate (Thomas), or the man who put new originalists on the Court (Reagan and Bush 41).

If there was a Rehnquist revolution, it could be said to be over in the sense that Rehnquist himself is no longer with us, but Yoo’s list of recent stupid decisions is far from evidence that the judicial philosophy of originalism is receding into the background.

The recent stupid decisions were 5-4’s, which means that with the replacement of Rehnquist and O’Connor (who often capriciously voted with the anti-originalist side), these decisions and many others like them might flip to 5-4 decisions in favor of the originalist position.

They would have come out on the originalist side to begin with if Clinton hadn’t had the chance to appoint two anti-originalists to the Court.

With Bush 43 now getting to put two on the Court, we may not be facing the end of the Rehnquist revolution so much as the end of the Clinton hiatus.