A reader writes:
Often, when you’re arguing about abortion, you’re told that many embryos fail to implant, with the implication that if God lets this happen, he can’t place much value on early human life.
Yeah, bad implication. One can chalk it up to the Fall just as well. Also, it isn’t certain that all of these miscarriages were human beings. While under ordinary circumstances the union of sperm and ovum result in a new human being from the moment of conception, there might be situations of gross genetic defects in which we might not be dealing with a human being. Unfortunately, we simply don’t know enough–either about genetics or about what goes on in early pregnancy–to draw any conclusions with confidence at this point.
If we develop nanotechnology capable of surgery on a cellular level, would we:
a) be obliged to save these embryos if possible
b) allow the embryos to die (there may be good reasons why they fail to implant) – it is a natural lifespan, no matter how brief, or
c) make this a choice of the parents – many couples who have difficulty conceiving would benefit
The answer to this one is not yet clear. Almost certainly the situation would start out with (c) as the deault option, if for no other reason that initially such nanosurgery would be extraordinarily expensive and beyond the means of many couples. It would likely require heroic sacrifices for many couples to even gain access to the technology in its early days.
It would also take time for moral theologians and then the Church to come to conclusions about what is morally obligatory in this situation. Until that starts to get sorted out, it would still be up to couples to decide what to do.
I suspect that we would not arrive at a point where the Magisterium was saying that nanotechnology must be used in these situations. For one thing, as noted above, some of the conceptions may be so grossly genetically defective that they simply are not humans.
Imagine, if you will, a conception that has five chromosomes instead of the usual forty-six. I don’t know if that ever happens, but use it for purposes of a thought experiment. Such a conception likely would not be a human, could only live a very brief time, and could not be repaired by nanosurgery as adding in the needed genetic material would result in it simply not being the same entity any more.
If some conceptions are not human beings–even though, as we said, in the normal course of affairs the union of sperm and egg result in the creation of a new human being from the moment of conception–then, for those bizarre situations where conception fails to produce a human there would be no moral obligation to use the nanotech.
Further, the same kind of end-of-life calculations that we’re currently starting to go through with folks whose bodies are dying would begin to apply to those who are still in utero.
There might well be situations in which the use of the nanotech would be disproportionate to the goal to be achieved and thus not morally required. For example, using nanotech to force an embryo to implant when the embryo has a genetic defect that will cause the embryo to die in a few weeks anyway. In that case the use of the tech is likely not to be proportionate to the good to be gained and thus it will not be morally obligatory.
In cases where the nanotech is not capable of producing a proportionate good then the thing to do for many couples would be to entrust the child to God’s care and accept its death as a tragedy that will one day be undone by the power of Jesus to redeem individuals from death.
I thus find it hard to imagine a day in which it is morally obligatory to use nanotech in all circumstances. There may be some in which it is morally obligatory, but not all. Just as medical procedures to extend life for born people are obligatory in some but not all circumstances, medical procedures to extend life for the unborn may be obligatory in some but not all circumstances.
Another possible abortion-limiting benefit of nanotechnology might be to correct ectopic pregnancies, where the fetus develops outside the womb in the fallopian tubes.
I can see some circumstances in which this may help, though in other cases nanotech may not be necessary for a falopian-uterine embryo transplant. In other cases, it may not help.
And finally another benefit of nanotech would be the possibility of genetic surgery to correct defects.
Again, in some cases yes. In other cases, I don’t know that it would help. As noted, some genetic defects may be so extreme that nanosurgery might not help. Also, there may be stages of development in which there is not much for nanites to do–for example, if the baby is too small and growing too fast for the nanites to do the surgery without harming it in the process.
If nanotechnology is developed to the extent that the visionaries of the Foresight Institute hope, there could literally be no medical reason for having an abortion.
I’d want to put quotes around "medical reason" since, properly speaking, there are no medical reasons to have a direct abortion, however medical technology certainly has the potential to eliminate a large number of the instances in which individuals think that a therapeutic abortion is warranted, just as it has already eliminated many.
I would caution against thinking that we’re ever likely to get a technological fix for all the potentialities there are. There are intrinsic technological limits, and technological progress comes in stages. Sometimes those stages get sidetracked by economic factors, lack of interest on the part of researchers, political correctness, etc. We rarely get a brilliant, comprehensive fix right out of the box.
As was once pointed out to the eminent physician Dr. Stephen Franklin, "Maybe somebody should have labeled the future: ‘Some Assembly Required.’"
As soon as I emailed this I thought the same thing about there being no medical reason for abortion. It was badly worded.
I think the issue is linked to end-of-life questions of whether medical intervention is burdensome …
Often, when you’re arguing about abortion, you’re told that many embryos fail to implant, with the implication that if God lets this happen, he can’t place much value on early human life.
Riiiight. Let’s not stop there. Even when those embryos mature and are born as human beings, something like, oh, 100% of them die from natural causes (assuming they aren’t killed first by homicide, suicide, or accident). So I guess we should conclude that God doesn’t care very much about human life generally, and that we needn’t either.
there might be situations of gross genetic defects in which we might not be dealing with a human being
I think you’re treading on dangerous ground here, Jimmy. It would almost seem to justify genetic experimentation, creating human/animal hybrids, which are “not really human” and therefore not entitled to any rights. I don’t think we can presume on God’s prerogative to create for a “grossly defective” person a soul. Our spiritual life after death has no bearing on our physical limitations, and after the Second Coming, our bodies will be perfected, anyway. How deformed does a person have to be to lose human status, anyway? Is a person with Down Syndrome less human? What if a person is born “normal,” then suffers genetic alteration through radiation exposure? Are they no longer human?
I’m *well* aware of the danger here. My instinct is to call *anything* with human DNA a human. *Of course* people down Downs Syndrome are human.
I recognize, though, that there is a *hypothetical possibility* that something might not get enough genetic matter (try a single *gene* if you want) to be a human and that that Magisterium might one day make that determination.
That’s the nature of hypothetical questions: You have to allow for the possibility of hypothetical possibilities that you aren’t comfortable with.
I think, however, that genetic quality is not the real determiner of humanity, but rather the existence of a soul. The question becomes not whether a fertilized egg has enough human genes to qualify as a human being, but whether God would endow such an organism with a soul. I would guess that the Magisterium would assume that any living organism derived from the combination of human egg and human sperm (or by the cloning of another human being) would, in fact, be created with a soul. I think it would probably be a matter of whether or not it could be shown that a living organism was ever present, not whether DNA tests performed afterwards showed some certain level of genetic wholeness. I am, of course, just guessing here, but the idea of scientifically analyzing the DNA of a dead child and saying, “Well, your baby’s genes were only 85% wholly human, so he must not have had a soul, but was just an animal.” How do you determine the exact percentage? Theology never seems to work that way. A single gene would never be able to exist as a living organism, so I think my definition would be less problematical. No percentage necessary.
I’d be inclined to be on the safe side and call any embryo human no matter what its chromosomal structure. The only exception I can think of offhand is a hydatidiform mole, which occurs when two sperm fertilize one egg – this does not develop into a baby or anything resembling one, but rather into a mass which has the potential to cause cancer. Trying to force a molar pregnancy to implant would not only be useless in saving it but also very risky to the mother.
One thing I do wonder about with this whole issue, which is that embryos who have not yet implanted send off no chemical signals in the body that they are there – if a woman has an embryo traveling down the fallopian tube, any pregnancy test would be negative because the baby hasn’t taken root yet. The way they learned that so many were lost before implantation was by doing special studies which would be immensely impractical to perform on every woman, every month of her cycle. I guess what I’m trying to say is – how would the woman even find out about her at-risk embryo before it was too late?
I would guess that the Magisterium would assume that any living organism derived from the combination of human egg and human sperm (or by the cloning of another human being) would, in fact, be created with a soul.
On what basis?
I’d be inclined to be on the safe side and call any embryo human no matter what its chromosomal structure. The only exception I can think of offhand is a hydatidiform mole, which occurs when two sperm fertilize one egg – this does not develop into a baby or anything resembling one, but rather into a mass which has the potential to cause cancer. Trying to force a molar pregnancy to implant would not only be useless in saving it but also very risky to the mother.
One thing I do wonder about with this whole issue, which is that embryos who have not yet implanted send off no chemical signals in the body that they are there – if a woman has an embryo traveling down the fallopian tube, any pregnancy test would be negative because the baby hasn’t taken root yet. The way they learned that so many were lost before implantation was by doing special studies which would be immensely impractical to perform on every woman, every month of her cycle. I guess what I’m trying to say is – how would the woman even find out about her at-risk embryo before it was too late?
Just to add some speculation here:
A couple of days ago I saw a show about twins on a cable channel. An English couple discovered through ultrasound that the mom was carrying twins–one healthy and the other was just a partial trunk and a pair of legs. The partial twin had no heart or brain (I don’t know about any other internal organs) and received circulation through an umbilical cord attached to the healthy twin. The dilemma was that the healthy twin would probably die because his heart could not sustain both of them for very long. The couple went to a specialist who used laser surgery to detach the partial twin from the healthy one.
Was the partial twin a human being with a soul?
Catherine – if I can take a wild guess, I’d say that the partial twin was definitely a human with a soul – however, at this point it was a dead human being and the soul had gone on, so to speak.
I think that whether it’s a dead human being depends on its “history” – was it once a complete, living human being that fused with the other one (and at that point died) – or was there never more to it than what became the partial trunk and legs? In the latter case, I don’t think one could say that it was ever a human being, since it never had even the potentiality to develop in such a way that it could participate in the rational life of a human soul.
Remember that for us Catholics, the soul is not a “ghost in a machine.” It is the form of the living human person (see Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Catechism). Not just any kind of matter, or even living matter, can be endowed with such a soul.