Ministry Vs. Apostolate

A reader writes:

What is the difference between a ministry and an apostolate?  What does the Church teach on this? And lastly, are there restrictions on laymen, for example, who use the term ministry when in all actuality it is an apostolate.

This is a common question. People are often perplexed by the relationship between the two terms and the fact that they are often used interchangeably. And there’s a good reason for that: They are interchangeable–at least substantially so.

The term ministry (in a religious context) at its base conveys the idea of performing a spiritual service of some kind, while the term apostolate at its base conveys the idea of in some manner promoting the work of the apostles or functioning in a capacity somewhat like that of the apostles. Since the apostles performed spiritual services, the two terms basically converge.

Thus both "ministry" and "apostolate" can refer either to particular spiritual services or to organizations that are devoted to providing such services.

Because the clergy and laity have different functions, they perform ministries or apostolates in different ways, but the laity are envisioned in participating in apostolic activity. Thus Vatican II issued a Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity.

With recent dissident efforts at horizontalizing the Church and bluring the distinction between clergy and laity, there can be confusion about what apostolates are appropriate to clergy and laity. The same thing can happen regarding ministries, and the 1997 Instruction on Collaboration was notably concerned about the use of the term "ministry" in certain contexts involving lay individuals, for example (see Practical Provisions, Article 1).

Despite these difficulties, the two terms retain substantial overlap, even if they need to be carefully understood and distinguished in particular contexts.

I’m My Own Grandpa: A Canonical Analysis

"I’m My Own Grandpa," for those few who may not know, was a signature song for country comedy artists (and Grand Ole Opry regulars) Lonzo & Oscar. It has also been recorded by others, including Grandpa Jones, and it makes a memorable appearance in the hilariously stupid movie, The Stupids (which is also remarkably clean, one of the few such comedy films).

The premise of the song is that an unusual pair of marriages result in bizarre relational implications for the character in the song, such that he is now his own grandpa (as you might suppose from the title).

The bizarre relationships that result from this pair of marriages are extensive, and now someone has now gone and done a hypertext version of the song that allows you to keep track of how all the relationships work, complete with diagrams.

With this in mind (and linking the hypertext version), a reader writes:

Would the following be considered licit…   http://gean.wwco.com/grandpa/  from the Church’s perspective? 

Ever one for applying theological and canonical principles to far-out, eXtreme situations (what you might call  X-Canon Law and X-Theology), I’m more than happy to entertain the question.

Let’s start by looking at the opening verse of the song, which sets up the pair of marriages that results in the Me = Grandpa situation:

Now many, many years ago, when I was twenty-three,
I was married to a widow who was pretty as could be.

That’s marriage #1. We’ll refer to the groom in this song as The Singer. To keep things simple, let’s assume that this is a valid marriage and that both The Singer and The Widow are Catholic, so that they will be bound by canon law.

Now a new character enters the picture:

This widow had a grown-up daughter
Who had hair of red.

Okay, so the widow has a daughter, who we’ll creatively call The Daughter. How is she related to The Singer, and how might that affect who she can marry? Well, there are two ways you can be related to someone the become relevant in marriage situations. These are known as consanguinity and affinity.

Consanguinity occurs when you are related by blood. The song does not tell us whether any of the marriage partners are related by blood, but since the issue isn’t raised, it doesn’t seem to be relevant to the situation. We may thus set it aside and assume that The Singer is not related by blood to either The Widow or The Daughter, so issues of consanguinity don’t arise.

Affinity, however, occurs when one is related to someone by marriage. Since The Singer is married to The Widow, he is thereby related to The Daughter by affinity–which is crucial to setting up the bizarre complex of relationships that ensue. Here’s how that happens:

My father fell in love with her [the Daughter],
And soon they, too, were wed.

That’s marriage #2.

Now, absolute relational chaos ensues:

This made my dad my son-in-law
And changed my very life.
My daughter was my mother,
‘Cause she was my father’s wife.

That’s just the beginning. It gets much, much worse from there.

The key question, canonically, is can The Singer’s father (a.k.a., The Father) marry The Daughter?

At one time under Church law the answer was no. The affinity that existed between The Singer and his wife’s family was held to apply also to the rest of The Singer’s family (or at least significant portions of it). Thus The Daughter was not only reckoned as The Singer’s Step-Daughter but as The Father’s Step-Granddaughter, and he couldn’t marry her.

But then the Fourth Lateran Council happened in the year 1215, and that council decreed the following:

CANON 50

It must not be deemed reprehensible if human statutes change sometimes with the change of time, especially when urgent necessity or common interest demands it, since God himself has changed in the New Testament some things that He had decreed in the Old. Since, therefore, the prohibition against the contracting of marriage in secundo et tertio genere affinitatis ["in the second and third degree of affinity"] and that against the union of the offspring from second marriages to a relative of the first husband, frequently constitute a source of difficulty and sometimes are a cause of danger to souls, that by a cessation of the proibition the effect may cease also, we, with the approval of the holy council, revoking previous enactments in this matter, decree in the resent statute that such persons may in the future contract marriage without hindrance. . . .

So Fourth Lateran wiped out the prohibition on people marrying who were in the second and third degree of affinity.

Without dwelling on what these degrees consisted in (the concept is a little hard to explain, and it’s not relevant to current law on the matter), this would have permitted The Father to marry The Daughter.

Now let’s jump forward to current law. According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law:

Can. 109 §1. Affinity arises from a valid marriage, even if not consummated, and exists between a man and the blood relatives of the woman and between the woman and the blood relatives of the man.

Can.  1092 Affinity in the direct line in any degree invalidates a marriage.

When one puts these two canons together, one discovers who in the song can’t marry whom.

Affinity exists between The Singer and the blood relatives of The Widow, which would include The Daughter. So The Singer can’t marry anyone in a "direct line" relationship to The Widow. Those relatives are off limits to him.

The direct line is anybody you are descended from and anybody who is descended from you. It includes your grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, etc.

Since The Daughter is a blood relative of The Widow and is in her direct line, The Singer can’t marry her (should The Widow die) because of the impediment created by affinity.

Likewise, affinity applies to The Widow and her ability to marry relatives of The Singer. Since The Father is a blood relative in the direct line for The Singer, The Widow can’t marry The Father (should The Singer die).

But The Singer and The Widow are the only two people who have affinity regarding each other’s families. You’ll note that Canon 109 says, "Affinity . . . exists between a man [and his wife’s blood relatives] . . . and a woman [and her husband’s blood relatives]."

It does not say that the relatives in one family have affinity with respect to the relatives in the other family. They only have affinity with the man or the woman. Thus The Singer has affinity with The Daughter and The Father has affinity with The Widow but–and this is the important point–The Father and The Daughter DO NOT HAVE AFFINITY WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER.

Thus there is an old saying in canon law: Affinitas non gignit affinitatem–or "Affinity does not beget affinity."

Just because two people are in a condition of affinity, that doesn’t mean all their relatives are also mutually in this relationship.

Thus–unless there is something else blocking the validity of the marriage–it is perfectly (canonically) legitimate for The Father to marry The Daughter and set the whole cascade of relational chaos in motion.

So at least since 1215, you’ve been able to become your own grandpa.

It sounds funny, I know, but it really is so.

(By the way, kids, don’t try this at home.)

Incidentally, if you’ve never heard this delightful song, it’s available for download from iTunes. Just look up "I’m my own grandpa" or "Lonzo & Oscar."

AND THERE’S A BIG OL’ .WAV OF IT HERE (THE VERSION FROM THE STUPIDS).

BE
SURE TO CHECK OUT THE STUPIDS, TOO–YOU’LL LAUGHT TILL YOU STOP!

LYRICS, WITH HELPFUL DIAGRAMS, HERE.

Perhaps another time we can "prick that annual blister: marriage with deceased wife’s sister."

Would It Be A Sin To Sell St. B16’s Car That You Bought On Ebay?

A reader writes:

When JPII is canonized, will that mean that any faithful Catholic trying to sell something that the pope used (say like a popemobile) would be in a state of sin as it would then be considered a relic?   

Let me change the question just a little bit to sharpen the point: Suppose that our present pontiff, His Most Awesomeness Benedict XVI, one day goes to his reward and is declared a saint.

Since his car was sold on eBay a piece back, it is actually in the hands of someone other than the Church (I don’t know that to be the case for the popemobiles JP2 used, which is why I make the change in the question).

Should such a canonization occur, would selling B16’s former 1999 Volkswagen Golf be a sin?

Well, canon law provides the following:

Canon 1190

§1. It is absolutely forbidden to sell sacred relics.

The question is thus whether something like this would count as a relic in the sense that canon law is using the term. If it is then, since traffic in sacred things is sinful, it would be sinful to sell it.

Well . . . this canon has not received an authentic interpretation from the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts, so we don’t have much guidance on that front of what the Code considers a relic.

None of the commentaries I have at hand dwell on this question either. Both the Code and the commentators tend to assume that you already know what the law intends to count as a relic. This would suggest that one should fall back on what is traditionally called a relic, which would include first-class, second-class, and third-class relics. (More on those distinctions below.)

The most official treatment of the subject that I’ve been able to find comes from the Directory on Popular Piety, which defines relics as follows:

The Relics of the Saints

236. The Second Vatican Council recalls that "the Saints have been
traditionally honoured in the Church, and their authentic relics and
images held in veneration". The term "relics of the Saints" [a] principally signifies the bodies – or notable parts of the bodies – of the
Saints who, as distinguished members of Christ’s mystical Body and as
Temples of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 3, 16; 6, 19; 2 Cor 6, 16) in
virtue of their heroic sanctity, now dwell in Heaven, but who once lived on earth. [b] Objects which belonged to the Saints, such as personal objects,
clothes and manuscripts are also considered relics, as are [c] objects which
have touched their bodies or tombs such as oils, cloths, and images.

The blue letters I’ve inserted into this treatment correspond to what are commonly (in English, anyway) called first-, second-, and third-class relics. First-class relics are principally bodies or parts of bodies. Second-class relics are former belongings of the saints. And third-class relics are things touched to their bodies (after death) or their tombs.

Now, the Directory for Popular Piety is not a legal document. It’s an instructional document. And the body that issued it–the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments–is not empowered to make authentic interpretations of canon law. Nevertheless, what it has to say may shed light on Rome’s thinking at least in a general way.

So now having established how the directory uses the term "relic," let’s go on to see what it has to say about the treatment of relics:

237. The Missale Romanum reaffirms the validity "of placing
the relics of the Saints under an altar that is to be dedicated, even when
not those of the martyrs". This usage signifies that the
sacrifice of the members has its origin in the Sacrifice of the
altar, as well as symbolising the communion with the Sacrifice of
Christ of the entire Church, which is called to witness, event to the
point of death, fidelity to her Lord and Spouse.

Many popular usages have been associated with this eminently liturgical cultic expression. The faithful deeply revere the relics of the Saints. An adequate pastoral instruction of the faithful about the use of relics will not overlook:

  • ensuring the authenticity of the relics exposed for the veneration
    of the faithful; where doubtful relics have been exposed for the veneration of the faithful, they should be discreetly withdrawn with due pastoral prudence;
          
  • preventing undue dispersal of relics into small pieces, since such practice is not consonant with due respect for the human body; the liturgical norms stipulate that relics must be "of a sufficient size as make clear that they are parts of the human body";
          
          
  • admonishing the faithful to resist the temptation to form collections of relics; in the past this practise has had some deplorable consequences;
          
  • preventing any possibility of fraud, trafficking, or superstition.
       

The various forms of popular veneration of the relics of the Saints, such as kissing, decorations with lights and flowers, bearing them in processions, in no way exclude the possibility of taking the relics of the Saints to the sick and dying, to comfort them or use the intercession of the Saint to ask for healing. Such should be conducted with great dignity and be motivated by faith. The relics of the Saints should not be exposed on the mensa of the altar, since this is reserved for the Body and Blood of the King of Martyrs.

So as the highlighted phrase from paragraph 237 indicates, trafficking in relics is to be forbidden, and since the preceding paragraph (236) just defined relics for purposes of this discussion as including first-, second-, and third-class relics, it would seem that the Congregation for Divine Worship doesn’t want people selling them–even third class relics.

And I can see the logic behind that. My own sensibilities regarding piety do suggest to me that we shouldn’t have people running up to a saint’s tomb, pressing cloths to it, and then selling them on the ground that they are now holy relics. If you’re going to have the idea of third-class relics at all then it seems to me you shouldn’t be selling them.

(NOTE: I also am not impressed with the theory I’ve heard that you can sell a third-class relic for the intrinsic value of the relic–thus if you pressed a handkerchief to the tomb of St. Pius V, you could sell it for the value of the handkerchief. I don’t think things have determinable intrinsic economic values–the market has to determine value, and you’ll never be able to properly untangle the "third-class relic" factor from a third-class relic. This is just a back-door way for people wanting to sell such relics to rationalize it. The mere fact that something has become a third-class relic changes its value. The "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief comes from the fact I can blow my nose on it. If I can’t blow my nose on a third-class relic handkerchief then I no longer am receiving an object with the "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief. How much would you pay for a handkerchief you can’t blow your nose on or wipe your brow with? And why would you want to buy one in the first place if it wasn’t for it being a third-class relic? That’s its real value to you. A "cost of materials" rationale would be better here–i.e., "I paid 50 cents for this handkerchief at Wal-Mart, so you can reimburse me for that much now that it’s a third-class relic," but this exception isn’t present in the law, or in the commentaries I have to hand, or in the Directory of Popular Piety.)

I also understand the rationale behind not selling first-class relics. That clashes with my sensibilities regarding piety, too.

But what about second-class relics? The way the Directory presents matters, selling them would also be prohibited. But is every paperclip ever owned by Joseph Ratzinger really a second-class relic once he becomes a saint?

One theory I’ve heard floated is that not all legal property of a saint should be counted as a second-class relic. Perhaps only things that are especially "personal" should be–things like his clothes, his reading glasses, his Breviary, his Bible, his Rosary, etc.. By that standard, someone might judge that a saint’s paperclips or automobile are not sufficiently personal to get counted as relics (unless, perhaps, his heroic virtue was displayed by his tireless efforts on behalf of ministries like Meals on Wheels or Clips for the Clipless).

That’s not what the Directory for Popular Piety says, of course. It simply speaks of objects owned by the saints being relics. But the fact that it feels the need to go on and name examples could be taken as an indication that there is something of this concept lurking in the back of the Congregation’s mind.

It thus strikes me that we have an ambiguity here, and we may (don’t hold your breath) get clarification on it at some point in the future. At least, that’s what we’d really need to settle it.

Milingo Update: Excommunication

UPDATE: The Vatican has apparently confirmed Milingo’s automatic excommunication.

GET THE STORY.
Further updates to come.

SECOND UPDATE: Here is the text of the Communique issued by the Holy See’s press office (NOTE: Since the press office does not have the authority to declare excommunications, I suspect there will be further documentation following from a competent dicastery):

   "With great concern, the Holy See has followed the recent activities of
Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo, emeritus of Lusaka, Zambia, with his new
association of married priests, spreading division and confusion among the
faithful.

  "Church representatives of various levels have tried in vain to contact
Archbishop Milingo in order to dissuade him from persisting in actions that
provoke scandal, especially among the faithful who followed his pastoral
ministry in favor of the poor and the sick.

  "Bearing in mind the understanding shown, also recently, by Peter’s
Successor towards this aged pastor of the Church, the Holy See has awaited
with vigilant patience the evolution of events which, unfortunately, have led
Archbishop Milingo to a position of irregularity and of progressively open
rupture of communion with the Church, first with his attempted marriage and
then with the ordination of four bishops on Sunday, September 24, in
Washington D.C., U.S.A.

  "For this public act both Archbishop Milingo and the four ordinands have
incurred excommunication ‘latae sententiae,’ as laid down in Canon 1382 of the
Code of Canon Law. Moreover, the Church does not recognize, nor does she
intend to recognize in the future, these ordinations and all ordinations
deriving from them; and she considers the canonical status of the four
supposed-bishops as being that they held prior to this ordination.

  The Apostolic See, attentive to the unity and peace of the flock of Christ,
had hoped that the fraternal influence of people close to Archbishop Milingo
would cause him to rethink and return to full communion with the Pope.
Unfortunately the latest developments have made these hopes more unlikely.

  "At times of ecclesial suffering such as these, may prayers intensify among
all the community of the faithful."

Is The Schism Beginning?

Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo apparently consecrated four men as bishops on Sunday.

In so doing, as Ed Peters points out,

HE INCURRED THE PENALTY OF AUTOMATIC EXCOMMUNICATION RESERED TO THE HOLY SEE.

So did any of the men he ordained if they were still in communion with the Church.

MORE FROM CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS.

As tragic as that situation is, I fear that an even greater tragedy may be about to unfold.

Since the debacle following Vatican II, the Holy See has been terrified of a major schism occurring that would involve modernist dissidents. For that to take place, a number of conditions would need to exist:

1) There would need to be a large number of laity willing to go along with the schism.
2) There would need to be a large number of priests available.
3) There would need to be bishops available.
4) There would need to be infrastructure available (churches, financing, etc.)

Thus far the right combination of factors has not combined to create a major modernist schism (in the proper sense of the term). There are always lots of tiny little schisms occurring–even personal ones (i.e., individual people going into schism)–but the largest we have had since the Council was that of the traditionalist dissidents in the Lefebvrist movement. The number of traditionalist dissidents, however, pales in comparison to the number of modernist dissidents. There are far more laity, priests, and even bishops with modernist than with traditionalist tendencies.

As painful as the Lefebvrist schism has been, the potential for a major schism on the part of modernists is thus far more frightening to Rome.

Thus far it hasn’t happened, and my guess is that one of the major reasons is the non-fulfillment of condition 4 above. I think a lot of individuals don’t want to face the financial and logistical hardship of trying to set up a major modernist dissident church. They’re too comfortable where they are and are content to serve out their time spreading dissent in their already secure positions of influence. Why should a modernist priest leave the financially secure and respectable position and brave the rigors of an insecure startup venture?

If you want to know part of the reason that the Holy See has been so soft on individuals with this tendency, the desire to avoid a schism is a big part of it. If the people in question are made too uncomfortable then they might decide that pulling up stakes would be worth it, so Rome has cut them substantial slack (far more than in the old days) in hope that the problem can be solved on a generational basis by cooking the frog of dissent slowly, gently reigning them in in a step-wise manner and waiting for the current group to pass from the scene.

Thus we’ve had incremental improvements, like the release of the Catechism of the Catholic Church to promote authentic Catholic teaching (instead of doing something like the anti-modernist measures popes took in the early 20th century) or revising the GIRM and insisting on new, better translations of the liturgy (instead of just jumping back to the old order of Mass).

But the situation may not last, and what Milingo just did may have made it much, much worse.

At least two of the conditions needed for a major modernist schism are now concretely fulfilled. There are thousands of former priests who have left the priesthood to get "married" (in fact, they are not married due to the impediment of holy orders, but they have discounted this fact), and by apparently elevating some of these men to the episcopate, there are now bishops who are not just sympathetic to this movement but who are part of it and who are not tied to the existing episcopal structure in the Catholic Church. (I.e., they are not occupying positions that Rome appointed them to and which they have reasons to want to retain.)

These men could turn around and start ordaining their own priests–and I assume that this was the purpose of elevating them to the episcopate since they could already perform all the other sacraments–and they could draw upon the pool of modernist ex-priests and, one way or the other, have a large number of clergy for their movement in fairly short order.

The question would then turn to consideration of condition 1: How many laity would be willing to go along with them?

There certainly are a large number of laity who have modernist inclinations, though a lot of these are non-churchgoers. (When you hear reports that frighteningly high numbers of Catholics hold heterodox views, those numbers generally do not distinguish between cultural Catholics and those who actively practice their faith. Regular churchgoers, while they have suffered under decades of heterodox preaching and religious education, are still far more orthodox than the non-churchgoers are.) Non-churchgoers aren’t likely to start going to the local breakaway church just because it has a married priest saying Mass. A few will, but most are too comfortable where they are in bed or watching their TV sets (or both) on Sunday morning.

The number who would go, however, is not inconsiderable. It would still be a smallish minority of Catholics, but enough to produce a larger schism than the SSPX and similar groups have.

If the schismatic bishops can get the infrastructure they need.

Right now the only people who would go to their services are the hardcore dissidents, and while there are plenty of them, in order to have a major schism you really need parishes all over the place. "Location! Location! Location!" as they say. The schism would be able to attract far more of the faithful to it if there were dissident parishes all over the place that looked at least somewhat like Catholic churches and held themselves out as such.

It thus seems to me that the major barrier is thus still the financial/logistical one, but the potential for a larger-than-Lefebvre schism of a modernist dissident type exists, and what Archbishop Milingo has just done has made the situation an order of magnitude worse.

As you might guess, I think that this is a situation that clearly calls for prayer.

I also think that Rome should give serious consideration to establishing the consecration of a bishop without papal mandate as of itself a schismatic act. Thus far it has not done so. (The reason Lefebvre went into schism was that he consecrated bishops not just without a papal mandate but against papal mandate.) The way the law is written right now, one could be consecrated a bishop without papal mandate and still remain a Catholic, though one would be subject to the censure of excommunication. But having rogue bishops who are still in some sense Catholic will gravely harm the pastoral good of the faithful, and it strikes me that Rome may need to make it clear that no such bishops are in any sense Catholic so that the faithful will not be confused. To do that, Rome should consider revising or authentically interpreting the law in such a way that any unmandated episcopal consecration is itself schismatic.

Celebrating Vs. Assisting

A reader writes:

The other day I was reading through some back blogs and I came across an
answer you gave to someone asking about forgotten mortal sins. This person
quoted canon 916 which said:

A person who is conscious of grave sin is not to celebrate Mass or receive
the body of the Lord without previous sacramental confession unless there is
a grave reason and there is no opportunity to confess; in this case the
person is to remember the obligation to make an act of perfect contrition
which includes the resolution of confessing as soon as possible.

I don’t think I am understanding this correctly. If you are conscious of
grave sin you should not celebrate Mass? It has always been encouraged that
someone who is unable to receive communion should at least attend Mass but
not go to receive. As someone who suffers from scruples I always feel I am
in grave sin for some reason or another but I still attend Mass even though
I don’t receve. Can you explain this for me please.

I’m very sorry to hear about your problem with scruples, and I hope that you will be able to overcome it and begin receiving the Eucharist on a regular basis. I encourage you to investigate groups like Scrupulous Anonymous and ask my readers to pray for you and others who have this condition.

The above canon does not mean that you cannot attend Mass without making an act of perfect contrition. When it refers to "celebrating" Mass, it is referring specifically to what priests do when they celebrate or concelebrate the Mass.

The reason that this clause is included in the canon is because priests are required to take Communion if they celebrate Mass, and the Code doesn’t want them thinking, "Well, maybe I can celebrate Mass and just not take Communion."

By putting the celebration clause into the canon dealing with acts of perfect contrition, it prevents priest from saying to themselves "Maybe the requirement that I receive Communion doesn’t apply if I’m in mortal sin when I celebrate Mass." The inclusion of the celebration clause tells them, in effect, "No, it does apply. You as a priest have to receive Communion every time you celebrate (or concelebrate) Mass, so if you’re going to celebrate, make sure that you are in a state of grace first, either by going to confession or, if you can’t do that, by making na act of perfect contrition."

The laity, however, do not celebrate Mass (at least not the way this canon is using the term). The correct term for what the laity do at Mass is "assist."

Some priest or DREs or what have you might sometimes use loose language about the people "celebrating" Mass, but this is not using the term in its proper liturgical or canonical sense. Priests celebrate Mass; laity assist at Mass.

We laity are, in fact, required to attend Mass whether we are in a state of grace or not. So are priests for that matter. If a priest were not in a state of grace, he would still have to fulfill his Sunday obligation just like the rest of us–he just wouldn’t be able to celebrate whatever Mass he attended.

You therefore need not worry that you are doing something wrong if you attend Mass and have not made an act of perfect contrition. You are not violating the law, and the Church not only encourages but requires Mass attendance in such a case.

It is, of course, a good thing to make an act of perfect contrition prior to going to confession. Pefect contrition is a good thing. But the law does not require that one be made–either before confession or before Mass if all you are doing is assisting at it.

Since you’ve mentioned that you have difficulty with scrupulosity, I’ll also mention two points that may be pastorally useful:

1) There is absolutely ZERO DOUBT among canonists about what I said regarding what "celebrating Mass" means in this context.

2) In the case of a person with a scrupulous conscience, the person should not refuse to receive Communion if he merely thinks he may have an unconfessed mortal sin. He should only refrain on grounds of sin if he is CERTAIN that he has an unconfessed mortal sin. If there are doubts, he should go ahead and receive. This can be difficult at first, but it is considered an important step in helping to get over the barrier that scrupulosity creates in leading a normal sacramental life.

Schism And Mortal Sin

A reader writes:

Are Sedevacantists excommunicated, outside the grace of the Church?  What I’m asking, I guess, are followers of the schismatic doctrine of Sedevacantism (and to a lesser extent, I suppose, that of SSPX) in mortal sin?

Excommunication is an ecclesiastical censure that has specific effects that are defined by canon law. These effects are found in Canon 1331, which can be read HERE. The effects listed do not include being "outside the grace of the Church." The latter could be interpreted in several ways, and I’m not entirely sure what is intended, but I can say that excommunication neither places a person outside the Church nor does it deprive him of grace.

It does, however, presuppose that the individual has committed a grave sin. That is why, as an excommunicate, he is not allowed to receive the sacraments until he repents, for it would be sacrilege for him to do so in what must be presumed to be a state of mortal sin.

The grave sin that sedevacanists (and those who have formally adhered to the schism of the SSPX) have committed is the sin of schism. Schism is both a sin and a canonical crime, and its definition as a canonical crime is as follows:

Can. 751 Heresy is the obstinate denial or obstinate doubt after the reception of baptism of some truth which is to be believed by divine and Catholic faith; apostasy is the total repudiation of the Christian faith; schism is the refusal of submission to the Supreme Pontiff or of communion with the members of the Church subject to him.

If a person commits the canonical crime of schism, as defined above, then he is liable for the penalty of excommunication:

Can. 1364 §1. Without prejudice to the prescript of can. 194, §1, n. 2, an apostate from the faith, a heretic, or a schismatic incurs a latae sententiae excommunication; in addition, a cleric can be punished with the penalties mentioned in can. 1336, §1, nn. 1, 2, and 3.

The fact that it is latae sententiae means that the excommunication doesn’t have to be declared by an ecclesiastical authority. It occurs automatically when the person commits the crime of schism.

But the way canon law is written, it is not enough to note that a person has outwardly committed a schismatic act and then conclude that he is necessarily excommunicated. Canon law contains a number of provisions that could keep the excommunication from taking its effect, or at least from taking effect automatically. Many of these are listed in canons 1323 and 1324.

You’ll note that one of these provisions is that a person is not subject to the penalty if they committed their offense through innocent ignorance, inadvertence, or error (1323 no. 2). This means that if a person (sedevacantist or otherwise) committed a schismatic act in one of these conditions then he would not be automatically excommunicated.

It is thus possible for one to commit an objectively schismatic act without incurring excommunication.

But assume that a sedevacantist can’t get out based on one of these exceptions in the law (either the three I named or the others), would he then incur excommunication?

Yes.

If a person maintains that the current Roman Pontiff (Benedict XVI) is not a valid pope then he thereby refuses submission to the Roman Pontiff. It is not enough to say, "I’m loyal to the office, I just don’t think that guy occupies it." You have to be in submission to the actual pontiff. You can’t be in submission to an office. If there is presently a Roman Pontiff (and there always is except in interregnums) and you ain’t in submission to him then you’re a schismatic.

You can also fail to be in submission to the Roman Pontiff in other ways, as the leaders of the SSPX were when they participated in episcopal ordinations contrary to a specific papal order–see John Paul II’s motu proprio, Ecclesia Dei. As the pontiff warned in this same document, those who formally adhere to this schism also incurred excommunication.

All of this deals with the canonical censure of excommunication, but we still have to look at the moral (as opposed to canonical) question: Are sedevacantists and other schismatics in mortal sin?

It depends. Any time anyone commits an objectively grave sin (and schism is one such sin) then they are potentially in mortal sin. Whether they are actually in mortal sin depends on whether they committed their offense with sufficient knowledge of its moral character and whether they gave it deliberate consent.

If a schismatic lacked sufficient knowledge of the moral character of what they were doing (e.g., they didn’t realize that being a Catholic was important or they didn’t realize that what they were doing was actually schimatic) or if they didn’t give deliberate consent to the act (e.g., because they were suffering from a severe psychological illness that prevented them from deliberately consenting to any of their actions) then they would not be in mortal sin. They would still have sinned gravely, but the sin would not be mortal.

On the other hand, if they had sufficient knowledge of the character of their act (and they have sufficient knowledge as long as they had enough knowledge that they should have known what they were doing was gravely sinful, so their ignorance wasn’t innocent) and they just up and did it anyway then their actions were mortally sinful and they will not go to heaven unless they repent.

As always, we can’t judge whether any particular person is in mortal sin, but those are the underlying principles.

The Species Of Angels

Note that the title of this blog post is ambiguous since the word "species" in English can be either singular or plural.

There’s a good reason for using such an ambiguous title.

A reader writes:

I had a Priest tell me that every angel is it’s own species rather than angels as a whole being a single species.  Where would he have got that?

Probably from Thomas Aquinas, for it’s a notable theme in the history of Catholic theology.

YOU CAN READ ONE OF AQUINAS’S DEFENSES OF IT HERE.

The reasoning Aquinas uses is based on his Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics, according to which (among other things) matter is regarded as "the principle of individuation"–the thing that allows two things to belong to the same species and yet be different from each other. Since angels don’t have matter, they thus can’t be the same species, for there would be nothing (no matter) to differentiate angels within a particular species.

(WARNING: Aquinas’ understanding of matter is obviously somewhat different than the modern one. Don’t assume that he’s using the word in the same way we would. His use of the word "form" is also different.)

Aquinas also has an argument that even if angels had matter they would still have to be of different species, which he explains in the above link.

Unfortunately, his reasoning on some points connected with this view is not entirely clear, and commentators have struggled to figure out some of what he means.

THIS ARTICLE TAKES NOTE OF SOME OF THE ISSUES.

I should point out that the reasoning Aquinas uses is tied to a particular theory of metaphysics in such a way that the Church does not require one to agree with his conclusion. The Church does not endorse any particular system of metaphysics, and some individuals (whether they are differentiated by matter or not) have liberty of opinion here. (His Most Awesomeness B16, for example, is known to generally favor approaching things from an Augustinian rather than a Thomistic perspective.)

Personally, I am open to Aquinas’s view on this but am not presently convinced by the reasoning he uses on this point. I tend to think that we just don’t know enough about how the supernatural world works to be able to say with confidence that, for example, there is no second principle of individuation that would allow there to be multiple angels within a given species.

Scripturre makes it clear that angels are all part of some common kind of being (otherwise they wouldn’t be referred to by the common name of "angel") and that there are multiple individuals within this kind. My own inclination is to note these facts and then not worry about whether this kind is a species or a genus or what have you. There may be multiple angelic species or only one. I’m not persuaded that we know enough about the supernatural world to settle this question, and so I’d prefer to stick with the data of revelation on this point and not try to get too definitive about what metaphysical theory best explains the data.

But that’s just me. You’re free to take whatever view you feel is best supported by the evidence.

Which on this point is how the Church would have it.