Category: Theology

The last two days I had a couple of posts responding to reader queries regarding non-infallible papal teachings and, in particular the fact that Ordinatio sacerdotalis is a non-infallible confirmation of what is, in fact, an infallible doctrine proclaimed by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church.

The response has been so voluminous that I simply cannot continue these discussions at present, and so–congruent to Rule 2–I am closing these discussions for now. As I mention in Rule 2, though, I am sure the topic will come up again in the future.

We all come to places in our lives where we simply do not have the resources to continue a particular matter, and I am at one of those places presently. I spend a great deal of time, energy, and resources attempting to make this blog an interesting and informative place for those who visit it. Frankly, I spend more time on it than I should. But I simply do not have the resources at present to continue that discussion.

I have closed the comboxes on those two posts because I deem that it would be irresponsible of me to simply retire from the discussion and allow contary arguments to pile up without responding to them. Folks visiting those two posts in the future would see the contrary arguments without responses and conclude–wrongly–that there are no answers to the claims being made.

In fact, there are rejoinders, I simply do not have the resources at present to conduct the kind of thorogoing review of basic principles that would be needed.

Allow me to therefore make a concluding basic summary even though I know that I am not able at present to conduct the kind of detailed response that would be required to address individually all the points folks might wish.

1. There is today a standard way for popes to make dogmatic defintions and thus engage their infallibility. This way involves the use of the verb "I define."
2. This method has not always existed in Church history and there are other ways in which a papal definition can be done. This is why I expressly alluded to the pope using other language that would make it "manifestly evident" that *he* was defining something even though he didn’t use the verb "I define."
3. The pope did not use such equivalent language. While he did use very strong language, he deliberately backed off rom the language that he himself–John Paul II–typically used in making both prior and subsequent definitions (i.e., his canonization of saints).
4. It is simply not accurate to portray the verb "I declare" as a substitute for "I define." The fact that they both begin with the letters D and E do not make the verbs equivalent in meaning or in force. "I declare" is a much weaker verb that simply does not indicate the presence of a papal definition.
5. I’m regret it if some individuals are disappointed, confused, or incredulous regarding this, but such papal utterances are very carefully worded, and their wording presupposes a basic (and, indeed, a technical) knowledge of the way in which ecclesiastical vocabulary is used. One cannot read one’s own preferences into these things. One has to honor the meanings and usages that have been adopted for these terms, and the fact is that "I declare" simply does not carry the same meaning or force as "I define." If one wishes to dispute this, one is simply in error.
6. John Paul II did indeed use very strong language in this and simlar utterances (i.e., the ones found in Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae). In these instances he ran right up to the edge of a papal definition–and then stopped. He put all of the elements one would typically expect in a definition on the table–except for "I define."
7. His purpose in doing this, apparently, was to affirm the truths in question in the most solemn manner possible short of making a definition.
8. He presumably did this because each time a pope makes a dogmatic definition (a definition of a dogma, as opposed to the canonization of a saint), it results in a convulsion for the Church, and in the present fractious environment, he wanted to try to send the strongest signal he could to kill the relevant debates without putting the Church through the agony of six or seven dogmatic definitions in the span of a few years. You can imagine the danger that this could have posed of open schism and mass defections from the faith.
9. In short, the by using the solemn language he did, the pope was trying to sail the bark of Peter between the Scylla of schism and the Charybdis of error. If he had used stronger language (i.e., if he had made new dogmatic definitions) he would have risked many members of the Church sliding into the former. If he had used weaker language, he would have risked further members of the Church sliding into the latter.
10. He also may well have been sending the message: "If y’all don’t knock it off on these subjects, the next step will be a definition."
11. The fact remains, though, that he did stop short of issuing definitions. If you take an utterance that sounds exactly like a definition except for the fact that you snip out "I define," you make it clear that you are running right up to the brink of a definition and then stopping just short of it.
12. This is clear from the established usages of language in these matters.
13. If you don’t want to take that from me, take it from the current pope, who repeatedly commented on ths fact–in one case in a Responsum approved by John Paul II himself.

Now, to clear up one additional item of confusion that seems to have troubled some:

1. I believe that the teaching that priestly ordination is reserved to men is a doctrine that has been infallibly taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church, just as JPII indicated.
2. An infallible statement is one that cannot be wrong, it can only be right. A fallible statement is one that could be right or could be wrong.
3. If I take a geometry test and get every question correct, that doesn’t stop my answers from being fallible in that I (not being gifted with infallibility in geometry) could have been wrong on them. I just wasn’t.
4. JPII’s statement in OS, however, was not an ex cathedra statement.
   It thus was not a definition. It thus was not infallible. Since this
   statement was not protected by the charism of infallibility, it was
   therefore a fallible statement.
5. Because it was a fallible statement, it could have been wrong, hypothetically speaking. It simply wasn’t.
6. Popes have indeed said erroneous things when not engaging their gift of infallibility, as when Pope Zachary condemned the idea that there were people living at the antipodes "with their feet turned toward ours." (Heads up: We today in North and South America are people living at the antipodes, as are the folks in Australia and the Pacific islands–all lands that were inhabited in Zachary’s day.)
7. The mere fact that, in this case, the pope was confirming a fact already infallibly proposed by the Magisterium does not make his confirmation of it a new exercise in infallibility.
8. For example: If you went up to the pope and you say, "Is Jesus Christ God?" and he says "Sure," that is not a new exercise in infallibility. It doesn’t matter if he adds, " . . . that was defined by the First Council of Nicaea" or "that was defined by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church" or even "I most solemnly assure and declare to you . . ."
9. Unless he adds "I define" or other language making it "manifestly evident" that he himself is issuing a new definition then he isn’t doing so.

I hope that is of assistance.

Ho-okay, folks! Yesterday’s post on non-infallible teachings set the cat among the pidgeons in a bigger way than I anticipated in regard to Ordinatio sacerdotalis (OS). I figgered some folks would take exception to what I said (I always figger that), but I didn’t anticipate the lengthy combox smash-’em-up derby that resulted.

In fact, I haven’t been able to read the whole thing, so I may miss addressing some points that folks have raised, in which case I’m sure I’ll get (nice and polite) emails asking for clarification.

Let’s start with the basics in approaching Ordinatio sacerdotalis. The basic presumption, on any Magisterial teaching, is that it isn’t taught with the charism of infallibility engaged until the contrary is shown. The Code of Canon Law provides:

No doctrine is understood as defined infallibly unless this is manifestly evident [Can. 749 §3].

That means that, if you want to claim that OS defined a doctrine (as opposed to affirming that a doctrine had already been infallibly defined by the ordinary Magisterium) then it needs to be "manifestly evident" that OS defines it. Not "maybe, kinda, sorta, perhaps, boy-o-boy-I’d-sure-like-it-to-be" evident. Manifestly evident.

So how do we know when that’s the case? Well, some folks immediately head for Vatican II or even the Code of Canon Law to tell us when the pope engages his infallibility, but neither of these contain definitions of when the pope’s exercise of infallibility is engaged. The Code of Canon Law isn’t infallible, and neither are the documents of Vatican II since they attempted no new definitions, and certainly no new definition on this point. (His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI will back me up on that.) While what the Code and Vatican II have to say on infallibility can be useful, it is not itself infallibly defined on this point.

I therefore prefer to go to Vatican I, which does contain an infallible definition of when the pope’s infallibility is engaged. To wit:

[W]e teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that when the Roman Pontiff speaks EX CATHEDRA, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, he possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals [Pastor aeternus 4].

Let’s pull this apart. What we have is three nested statements here:

[W]e teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that

when the Roman Pontiff speaks EX CATHEDRA,

that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church,

he possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals [Pastor aeternus 4].

The words in bold black are the council’s set-up to tell us what points they’re defining. The basic definition is in bold blue: "When the Roman Pontiff speaks EX CATHEDRA . . . he possesses . . . that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals."

Okay, so how do we know when he speaks ex cathedra? The answer is in bold red: He speaks ex cathedra "when, (1) in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, (2) in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, (3) he defines (4) a doctrine concerning faith or morals (5) to be held by the whole Church."

Now let’s match that up to what JPII of happy memory said in OS:

Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great importance, a matter which pertains to the Church’s divine constitution itself, in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk 22:32) I declare that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the Church’s faithful [OS 4].

How are the conditions laid out by Vatican I fulfilled or not fulfilled by this statement?

The easiest to get out of the way is condition 5. It is clear that JPII intended this "to be held by the whole Church" since he says the teaching on women’s ordination "is to be definitively held by all the Church’s faithful." Nuff said. Condition 5 fulfilled.

So are conditions 1 and 2. JPII said that he was undertaking this action "in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren," which is a direct allusion to a Petrine text (Luke 22:32), meaning that he’s invoking his supreme apostolic authority (condition 2), which means that he’s also acting in his capacity as shepherd and teacher of all Christians (condition 1).

That condition 4 is fulfilled is (a) obvious on its face and (b) was confirmed by the Responsum ad dubium issued by the CDF a year after OS and approved by JPII. Thus the Responsum affirmed that the teaching on the ordination of women "is to be understood as belonging to the deposit of faith."

That leaves us with condition 3: "he defines."

Did John Paul II define the doctrine concerning women’s ordination in OS 4? No, he didn’t. He did say that the doctrine "is to be definitively held" but this phrase fails to specify why it is to be definitively held. It could be because he himself is defining it or because a prior pope defined it or because an ecumenical council defined it orbecause the ordinary and universal Magisterium has defined it. The basis on which the teaching is definitive is thus not locked in by the mere appearance of the word "definitive" in a papal text. It doesn’t mean that this pope is defining it this time.

The phrase that he would be expected to use to signal that he is making a definitive act would be the verb "I define." We would expect him to say "I declare and define," but he doesn’t say that. He simply says "I declare." Those aren’t the same thing.

Despite the desire some may have to equate them, they simply do not mean the same thing in ecclesiastical usage. Nor can "I declare" be construed as merely an "updating" of "I define." John Paul II said "I declare and define" more throughout his career–both before and after OS–than any other pope in history, because this is the formula used in canonizing saints. If JPII then avoided the verb "define" it wasn’t because he was shy of using it or wanted it updated to a new verb. It was because he didn’t intend to make his act a definition.

In fact, unless the pope accompanies a phrase like "is to be definitively held" by the phrase "I define" (as in "I define . . . therefore it is to be held definitively") then it would suggest that the basis for the definitive holding is something other than what he has just said.

Thus, despite conditions 1-2 and 4-5 being fulfilled, condition 3 simply is not. The pope avoided using the expected phrasing form making a definition, nor did he substitute new phrasing that made it "manifestly evident" that he did so.

Therefore, while the teaching on women’s ordination is infallible and definitively to be held, it wasn’t because John Paul II engaged his infallibilit in OS. The Church’s infallibility had already been engaged on this point, and he did now engage his own here.

Now maybe it’s just Jimmy Akin who says that.

‘Cept it’s not.

Y’know who else says that?

The pope!

Then-Cardinal Ratzinger, now His Holiness Benedict XVI, addressed this subject more than once. In the Responsum ad dubium, he wrote in his official capacity as head of the CDF (and the response being approved by JPII himself–and in 1995 no less, when he was still quite healthy, so no appealing to his later illness as meaning he was "out of it" when he approved this):

This teaching requires definitive assent, since, founded on the written Word of God, and from the beginning constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of the Church, it has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium (cf. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium 25, 2). Thus, in the present circumstances, the Roman Pontiff, exercising his proper office of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk 22:32), has handed on this same teaching by a formal declaration, explicitly stating what is to be held always, everywhere, and by all, as belonging to the deposit of the faith.

Now, I know giving a careful reading to Vatican documents can be tedious, so I’ve highlighted the main portions of what is here said. Ratzinger holds for the basis of definitive assent as the doctrine having "been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium." In referring to John Paul II’s action, he refers to it as "a formal declaration"–not a definition.

Not clear enough for ‘ya?

Fine enough. Let’s look at the Reflections on OS that were published by Ratzinger at the same time the Responsum was released. In this document he says:

In the Letter [Ordinatio sacerdotalis], as the Reply of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith also explains, the Roman Pontiff, having taken account of present circumstances, has confirmed the same teaching by a formal declaration, giving expression once again to "quod semper, quad ubique et quod ab omnibus tenendum est, utpote ad fidei depositum pertinens." In this case, an act of the ordinary papal Magisterium, in itself not infallible, witnesses to the infallibility of the teaching of a doctrine already possessed by the Church.

Want more? Gotcha covered! In the Ratzinger-written CDF Doctrinal Commentary On The Concluding Formula Of The Professio Fidei, he says:

A similar process can be observed in the more recent teaching regarding the doctrine that priestly ordination is reserved only to men. The Supreme Pontiff, while not wishing to proceed to a dogmatic definition, intended to reaffirm that this doctrine is to be held definitively, since, founded on the written Word of God, constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of the Church, it has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.

So. It ain’ just Jimmy Akin who interprets OS as a non-definitive act. It’s the pope. (Unless he’s had a change of heart since he wrote these things–a supposition for which we have no evidence.)

There are no "contortions"involved in coming to this conclusion. The pope simply didn’t use the word that he normally used in making definitions and he didn’t use other language making it "manifestly evident" that this is what he was doing. Therefore, he didn’t do it. I would have loved it if he did, but he didn’t, and it’s my job to be straight with folks about this fact.

A reader writes:

Is there such a thing as non-infallible church teaching?

Yes. In fact, as Cardinal Dulles points out in his book The Splendor Of Faith, most of the Church’s teachings are proposed non-infallibly.

If the Holy Father makes a statement in an encyclical or an apostolic letter is that considered infallible (for instance, the ordination of women is not possible).

Okay, this one isn’t so much a question as a sentence fragment. However, lemme answer what I think you’re asking: John Paul II’s statement in Ordinatio sacerdotalis that it has already been definitively settled that the Church has no authority to ordain women to the priesthood is not itself an infallible statement. That means that he could be wrong about it since he didn’t say it under the protection of inallibility. I don’t think that he was wrong. I think he was right and that it has been definitively (and thus infallibly) settled by the ordinary Magisterium, but the pope’s mention of this fact without engaging his infallibility–by definition–does not a mount to an infallible exercise of his Magisterium.

How about everything contained in the Catechism… is that all infallible teaching of the Church?

Nope. SEE HERE.

This question comes about because I read an article in Commonweal magazine written by Charles Curran. He stated that it’s ok to disagree with non-infallible Church teaching. I’m not really sure what would fall into that category. From time to time I like to annoy myself by reading articles from these liberal "Catholic" publications. It also helps me to prepare my arguments in defense of the Magesterium.

Okay, Charlie Curran ain’t a reliable guide to what is and is not theologically "okay." That’s why he was stripped of his ability to teach Catholic theology.

The Second Vatican Council noted that

In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking [Lumen Gentium 25].

There can, however, be circumstances in which a church man (even the pope) speaks in a way that does not engage his Magisterial authority, in which case the faithful are not bound to adhere to what he says because he is not engaging his authority and thus not making what he says authoritative.

There are also cases in which a non-infallible utterance can be found so problematic that a theologian (or a member of the faithful) may find himself unable to give assent to it, in which case a different set of conditions kick in. These are most fully articulated in THIS INSTRUCTION FROM THE CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH AND SIGNED BY THEN-CARDINAL RATZINGER.

These facts indicate that it is not simply "okay" to dissent from non-infallible (but still authoritative) teachings of the Church.

As far as finding out what falls in the infallible category, I generally recomment getting a copy of Ludwig Ott’s FUNDAMENTALS OF CATHOLIC DOMA. Anything he lists with a theological note of sent. certa or above is probably infallible.

Catholic New Service is reporting that

THE COMPENDIUM OF THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH WILL BE READY BY WORLD YOUTH DAY, WHICH TAKES PLACE IN AUGUST.

For those who may not have heard of it, the Compendium is an abridgement and synthesis of the Catechism of the Catholic Church to make the Church’s teaching more accessible to those who might be frightened off by the monster-thick Catechism.

Benedict XVI–then Cardinal Ratzinger–was entrusted with the task of overseeing the creation of the Compendium.

It’s near-release has been reported before. CNS reported that it was going to be published in April . . . but then the Church kinda had other things on its mind in April. Now it’s reporting that the work will be ready by World Youth Day (90 days from now).

CNS also has some info on the nature of the work:

Sources told CNA the Compendium is “more of a synthesis than a simplification,” that is, “the theological language used in the Catechism of the Catholic Church will be almost completely retained.”

However, sources said the Compendium “balances this continuity in the language with the simplification of some concepts to make them more accessible to the reader.”

A reader writes:

I was wondering if you could help me with a question about Church

teaching and destiny or the end of ones life. I hope this doesn’t come

off sounding stupid but… what does the Church teach, if anything, on

when we die.

If I am eating cold pizza for breakfast on Wednesday, May 18, 2005 at

7:57am, choke on a pepperoni and die. Did I die because I chose the path

to eat cold pizza this morning? Could I have gone on another day if I

had eaten Fruit Loops?

Or, was Wednesday, May 18, 2005 at 7:57am it was my TIME to go? So, if I

hadn’t eaten the cold pizza, at that exact time, I would have had a

heart attack, choked on a Fruit Loop, or an anvil could have dropped on

my head because my number was up and my choices in life had nothing to

do with my death.

Obviously the "choices" I am speaking of do not include actual dangerous

activities, smoking or anything like that.

If the Church doesn’t have a position on things like this, would you

please give me your opinion?

This is one where the Church has not formally advanced a teaching. The issue seems to involve two questions:

1) Does God predestine the deaths of individuals? and

2) Does God predestine particular ends or does he predestine the end with the means leading to it.

In regard to the first question, the whole subject of divine predestination is up in the air at the moment. We know that God does predestine things, but which things and the manner in which he predestines them is quite disputed.

Scripture uses language that at time seems to ascribe a greater role to God’s activity in predestining events, as if he were actively causing the event to take place, while other times it seems to ascribe a larger role to the choices of individuals, with God foreknowing and allowing the event and thus predestining it in a more passive sense.

In the Middle Ages the more active interpretation of predestination was assumed to be true. This was the position of Augustine & Aquinas, for example. While this view is still quite permitted, of late both theologians and the Magisterium seem to have been inclining more toward that more passive understanding of predestination. John Paul II and Benedict XVI (when he was a cardinal) have both said things that place strong emphasis on human freedom and responsibility and that suggest a view of God as allowing humans to make their choices rather than causing them to make their choices.

How that shakes out, only time will tell, but I don’t expect it to be resolved in my lifetime. The pressure to get a definitive settlement of how predestination works ain’t there at present (though this was a HUGE controversy a few hundred years back).

If one takes the more passive view then if you don’t eat the cold pizza (mmmmm . . . cold pizza)–or if you eat it more carefully than in your hypothetical–then you don’t end up dying.

But what if you take the more active view of predestination? Here is where the second question kicks in.

A number of years ago, back when I was a Presbyterian (and thus in a church that mandated an active view of predestination), I was once having a discussion with the pastor of the Church and its minister to college students. There were a number of really good theological minds in the congregation, and we often had discussions of a fairly theoretical nature. In this discussion the pastor was mentioning an idea that he’d heard from someone who suggested that if a particular person failed to preach the gospel to you then you wouldn’t have become a Christian.

He was very dismissive of this idea. Since certain people are, in the Presbyterian view, "the elect" (meaning that they are actively predestined from all eternity to come to God and be saved), it seemed to the pastor that it was inconceivable that someone not preaching the gospel to you would affect your salvation. Instead, somebody else would end up preaching the gospel to you so that you’d be saved.

The pastor was quite certain of this conclusion, but the college minister and I both instantly had a negative reaction to it.

On our view, the pastor was taking an unduly simplistic view of how divine predestination operates: Not only does God predestine particular ends (like your salvation) but also with those ends he predestines the means to their accomplishment (like Person X preaching the gospel to you).

Therefore, if God had chosen differently with regard to the means then the end is no longer guaranteed. If he hadn’t chosen to predestine Person X to preach the gospel to you, you can’t assume that he’d predestine somebody else to do so. Maybe he would, but maybe not. Your membership in the elect is not known to be a first-order divine decree around which other, more contingent events in the universe must arrange themselves.

It may be that it’s the other way around–that God has predestined the means that lead to your becoming one of the elect (e.g., someone preaching the gospel to you, you having the efficacious grace required to respond positively to it), and if you change those means then you change your status as a member of the elect.

It strikes me that the same would apply to the question of when one dies. Even on the more active theory of predestination, if God predestines you to die at a certain point then that might be a first-order divine decree that other, more contingent matters must adjust for (so that if the cold pizza doesn’t kill you, the fruit loops or something else will) or it may be that God predestines your-death-at-a-particular-time-and-by-a-particular-means, so that if you throw the means up in the air it takes the time of death with it.

On balance, since on the more passive view of predestination your not eating the pizza leads to you not dying, and since on the more active view of predestination your not eating the pizza may lead to you not dying, I suspect that if you don’t eat the pizza, you don’t die.

A reader writes:

I was wondering if you could help me with a question about Church
teaching and destiny or the end of ones life. I hope this doesn’t come
off sounding stupid but… what does the Church teach, if anything, on
when we die.

If I am eating cold pizza for breakfast on Wednesday, May 18, 2005 at
7:57am, choke on a pepperoni and die. Did I die because I chose the path
to eat cold pizza this morning? Could I have gone on another day if I
had eaten Fruit Loops?

Or, was Wednesday, May 18, 2005 at 7:57am it was my TIME to go? So, if I
hadn’t eaten the cold pizza, at that exact time, I would have had a
heart attack, choked on a Fruit Loop, or an anvil could have dropped on
my head because my number was up and my choices in life had nothing to
do with my death.

Obviously the "choices" I am speaking of do not include actual dangerous
activities, smoking or anything like that.

If the Church doesn’t have a position on things like this, would you
please give me your opinion?

This is one where the Church has not formally advanced a teaching. The issue seems to involve two questions:

1) Does God predestine the deaths of individuals? and

2) Does God predestine particular ends or does he predestine the end with the means leading to it.

In regard to the first question, the whole subject of divine predestination is up in the air at the moment. We know that God does predestine things, but which things and the manner in which he predestines them is quite disputed.

Scripture uses language that at time seems to ascribe a greater role to God’s activity in predestining events, as if he were actively causing the event to take place, while other times it seems to ascribe a larger role to the choices of individuals, with God foreknowing and allowing the event and thus predestining it in a more passive sense.

In the Middle Ages the more active interpretation of predestination was assumed to be true. This was the position of Augustine & Aquinas, for example. While this view is still quite permitted, of late both theologians and the Magisterium seem to have been inclining more toward that more passive understanding of predestination. John Paul II and Benedict XVI (when he was a cardinal) have both said things that place strong emphasis on human freedom and responsibility and that suggest a view of God as allowing humans to make their choices rather than causing them to make their choices.

How that shakes out, only time will tell, but I don’t expect it to be resolved in my lifetime. The pressure to get a definitive settlement of how predestination works ain’t there at present (though this was a HUGE controversy a few hundred years back).

If one takes the more passive view then if you don’t eat the cold pizza (mmmmm . . . cold pizza)–or if you eat it more carefully than in your hypothetical–then you don’t end up dying.

But what if you take the more active view of predestination? Here is where the second question kicks in.

A number of years ago, back when I was a Presbyterian (and thus in a church that mandated an active view of predestination), I was once having a discussion with the pastor of the Church and its minister to college students. There were a number of really good theological minds in the congregation, and we often had discussions of a fairly theoretical nature. In this discussion the pastor was mentioning an idea that he’d heard from someone who suggested that if a particular person failed to preach the gospel to you then you wouldn’t have become a Christian.

He was very dismissive of this idea. Since certain people are, in the Presbyterian view, "the elect" (meaning that they are actively predestined from all eternity to come to God and be saved), it seemed to the pastor that it was inconceivable that someone not preaching the gospel to you would affect your salvation. Instead, somebody else would end up preaching the gospel to you so that you’d be saved.

The pastor was quite certain of this conclusion, but the college minister and I both instantly had a negative reaction to it.

On our view, the pastor was taking an unduly simplistic view of how divine predestination operates: Not only does God predestine particular ends (like your salvation) but also with those ends he predestines the means to their accomplishment (like Person X preaching the gospel to you).

Therefore, if God had chosen differently with regard to the means then the end is no longer guaranteed. If he hadn’t chosen to predestine Person X to preach the gospel to you, you can’t assume that he’d predestine somebody else to do so. Maybe he would, but maybe not. Your membership in the elect is not known to be a first-order divine decree around which other, more contingent events in the universe must arrange themselves.

It may be that it’s the other way around–that God has predestined the means that lead to your becoming one of the elect (e.g., someone preaching the gospel to you, you having the efficacious grace required to respond positively to it), and if you change those means then you change your status as a member of the elect.

It strikes me that the same would apply to the question of when one dies. Even on the more active theory of predestination, if God predestines you to die at a certain point then that might be a first-order divine decree that other, more contingent matters must adjust for (so that if the cold pizza doesn’t kill you, the fruit loops or something else will) or it may be that God predestines your-death-at-a-particular-time-and-by-a-particular-means, so that if you throw the means up in the air it takes the time of death with it.

On balance, since on the more passive view of predestination your not eating the pizza leads to you not dying, and since on the more active view of predestination your not eating the pizza may lead to you not dying, I suspect that if you don’t eat the pizza, you don’t die.

Down yonder some folk ask some interesting questions about the post I did on using a space warp analogy to help understand the Real Presence.

One question was what, precisely, we are touching when we touch the Eucharist. In my post, I spoke of touching the accidents of bread and wine, which led folks to wonder whether accidents are things that can be touched.

Good question! The answer is: I don’t know. Probably not.

If I’m holding a piece of chalk in my hand, we could say that I’m touching a white thing, but not that I’m touching whiteness (whiteness being an accident). In the same way, the physical properties of bread and wine are probably not things that are beind independently touched–at least normally.

The problem here is that the substance of bread and wine–the thing that those properties normally adhere in–has dropped out of existence, and that may affect the way we’d normally talk about this.

The original questioner had spoken of us touching Jesus when we touch the Eucharist, but I’m not quite comfortable saying that, which may only reflect a limitation of my knowledge at the present moment since Catholic theology may have already settled this matter (or at least developed a common opinion about it).

I may be wrong but, if the accidents of bread and wine are between me and Jesus, and if those accidents are not inhering in him (they’re not), then they seem to be a barrier or something analogous to a barrier and thus I might not be touching Jesus even though he is present (the same way that if the Incredible Shrinking Man gets inside a plastic Easter egg and I pick up the Easter egg then I’m not touching the Incredible Shrinking Man).

In any event, it was to account for this concern that I used the languge I did regarding "touching" accidents.

Other folks were wondering about something else I said: That Jesus’ body may not be extended in space in heaven. Some questioned whether bodies can exist without spatial extension.

It would seem that they can. All of the matter in the universe was originally compressed into a body that was a zero-dimensional (non-extended) singularity, or so they tell us.

The reason I said that is that we don’t know whether heaven has spatial extension or not. Recent theologians (like that thar Rapsinger feller) and recent popes (like that thar J.P. 2 gent) have said things calling into question the dimensionality of heaven both in terms of time and space.

Fact is, we just don’t know that much about how time and space work in heaven. What I think we can say is this:

1. Heaven is at least capable of receiving a body. Whether, while it’s in heaven, that body is extended in space or transposed into some other kind of medium that preserves its integrity without spatial extension, I couldn’t tell you.
2. There is at least some kind of sequentiality in heaven whereby bodies can enter heaven, stay there a while, leave heaven to return to Earth, etc. Whether this sequentiality is expressed over time or not, I couldn’t tell you.

Heaven thus may have both time and space . . . or it may not, but it at least has things analogous to them and capable of interacting with bodies from spacetime.

Finally, some folks were wondering about whether Jesus is "physically" present in the Eucharist.

The Church does not use this language. Phusis means "nature" in Greek, and so the claim that Jesus is "physically" present in the Eucharist would get parsed as a claim that he is "naturally" present in the Eucharist, which is clearly false. He is neither present there in the manner of a natural body (in which case transubstantiation would cause the host into a full-size, human-appearing Jesus) nor is he there by the working of nature.

As a result, the Church uses other language to express the way he is there: He is there really, truly, substantially, and sacramentally.

I haven’t seen Church docs using this term, but it seems to me that we can also safely say that he is present somatically or bodily (they mean the same thing), which are terms that get at what folks mean when they want to say that Jesus is "physically" present. I suggest them as substitutes for that term.

Hope this helps!

A reader asks:

1) What is the simplest way to define existentialism?

I don’t know that I can tell you the simplest way, but I can give you a one sentence definition:

Existentialism is a philosophical school of thought that asserts that the existence of the individual is primary rather than the essence of the individual, meaning that individuals have a form of radical freedom to define themselves.

I’d add that existentialism started in the 19th century and was common in 20th century Continental philosophy (meaning: on the continent of Europe, not in England or America, where analytic philosophy has been dominant). Though there were Christian existentialists (e.g., Kierkegaard), existentialism tends to be associated with atheism and a gloomy world view.

MORE HERE.

2) Regarding the Fatima apparitions, it was reported that the seers received Holy Communion from the angel. Aren’t priests the only individuals who have the gift to confect the Sacrament?

Anyone with the power to confect the Eucharist is by definition a priest since the confection of the Eucharist is a sacrifice. We know that God has ordained that there be human priests, and Revelation may well signal that there are angel priests as well since angels are there depicted offering incense and performing other liturgical functions in heaven. What do we not know is, if there are angelic priests, are they an order capable of confecting the Eucharist. That is knowledge that, for now, we don’t have access to.

That being said the Fatima children did not report that the angel celebrated Mass in front of them. They said that he brought Communion to them. Where he got the consecrated elements (a church? heaven?) we don’t know.

It also is not certain what the status of this incident was in terms of outward reality. It may have been a visionary experience rather than one with Communion being offered in the normal, outward manner as in a Church. In other words, it may have been a visionary spiritual Communion.

MORE HERE.

3) Is it morally licit for someone to consult a psychic for the purpose of solving a murder?

Presumptively, no, and for several reasons:

• Psychics are notoriously unreliable, and injecting a case with information from a notoriously unreliable source is very bad idea. It clouds one’s vision and may lead one to misweigh evidence or go down rabbit trails that are not productive.
• To the extent psychics come up with accurate info, it may be from an evil, occult source that we should have no dealings with.
• There is the potential for scandal in the proper sense: That is, folks may be tempted to give credence to psychics and occult ideas if they think psychics are sufficiently credible for the police to use them.

That being said, speaking hypothetically, I can’t rule out all possibility that science might one day prove that humans (or some humans) have a purely natural (i.e., not supernatural) sensing ability that would have sufficient reliability to make it useful and that could be deployed in a way not giving rise to moral scandal. Until such time as that would happen, though, the above considerations apply.

A reader writes:

How do you respond when someone says to you something like: "Country X is a predominantly Catholic country, but that country is rife with crime, violence, corruption, etc., etc. So being Catholic doesn’t seem to do anything for helping to produce morally upright people. This fact detracts from your claim that the Catholic Church is the true Church."

It does detract from the claim but does not neutralize it. Sin is a scandal, but looking at the perceived moral life of a nation does not tell one whether the majority religion of its inhabitants is true or not.

Look at the history of Israel prior to the time of Christ and all the sins that were committed in it. Did that stop Israel from being the chosen people? Did it stop Judaism from being the true religion? Yet the Old Testament is filled with condemnations of the Jewish people’s sins and even accuses them of sinning worse than the gentiles.

Further, look at countries today that have no experience of Christianity. They’re not exactly filled with moral goodness either. Neither are historically Protestant countries (like America) where abortion and stem cell research are legal and gay marriage is actually under discussion.

It’s simply impossible to establish the kind of correlations between different Christian religious affiliations and moral practice that the person wants to make.

Which is why Jesus didn’t propose this to us as a test of the true religion. He said we can spot false teachers by their bad behavior, but we can’t spot false religions by the behavior of there adherents.

When I was becoming a Catholic, I often reminded myself that I must not judge Catholicism by the behavior of Catholics. If I had, in pre-Christian times, judge Judaism by the behavior of Jews, I would have missed the true religion.

A reader writes:

I was hoping you could help me with a question I received from my JW brother.

He asked ……..”Before Jesus came, What happened to good people when they died? What happened to bad people when they died?”

My belief was that the gates of heaven were open when Jesus died on the cross. However, where then did Elijah go when he was “taken up into heaven”….or Moses for that matter?

Any help would be appreciated.

The state of the typical soul before the time of Christ is not as clear as we would like since the Old Testament is not fully explicit about the matter and the New Testament sometimes says cryptical things about such souls.

It is clear that there was a belief in an afterlife among the Jewish people (contrary to what you hear from some folks today). This belief appears to be reflected in the oft-repeated formula used when someone died “and he was gathered to his people.” The belief in the afterlife was so strong that God had to repeatedly warn the Jewish people not to go in for mediumship and necromancy (the channelling or calling up of the dead; cf. Deuteronomy 18).

Nevertheless, if God allowed, such things could happen, as in the famous incident in which Saul consults a medium (“the witch of Endor”–which later gave us the name “Endora” on the Bewitched show) who is able to successfully call up the dead prophet Samuel (who then tells Saul he’s doomed–DOOMED, I TELL YOU!!! So don’t mess with the dead–or Texas–unless you want to be doomed).

The place that the dead are referred to as going is called sh’ol (*not* “shee-oll”), but the meaning of the term is not entirely clear. It may just mean “the grave” but it also may mean “the netherworld.” The dead are depicted as being conscious in sh’ol, but their lives there seem rather gloomy. In the Septuagint when hadEs (i.e., hades) is encountered it is normally representing sh’ol in the original Hebrew.

There is not the prospect of being united with God in heaven except in the case of certain rare individuals who are assumed directly into heaven, such as Enoch and Elijah (and maybe Moses). In their cases, the ordinary Hebrew word for “heaven”–sh’mayim–is used to describe where they went. They thus seem to be exceptions to the general rule that most folks didn’t get to go to heaven before Jesus.

(Why people find that concept hard to grasp, I don’t know, but I find myself having to repeatedly tell resistant callers on the radio that Enoch, Elijah, and maybe Moses are “exceptions.”)

In any event, they seemed to get in early in anticipation of what Jesus would do on the cross whereas the rest of us get in afterward looking back at what he did. It’s the credit card/debit card difference.

Later in the Old Testament, as progressive revelation continues, we have the expectation of the resurrection come more to the fore (e.g., Dan 12:2). We also get more detail about what the intermediate state before the resurrection is like. For example, in 2 Maccabees Judah Maccabee has a vision of Jeremiah the prophet, who is praying for the people of Israel in the afterlife.

The most direct description of what the intermediate state we have at this time is actually found in the New Testament, when Jesus tells the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. In that parable Lazarus and Abraham are in a condition described as being one of comfort, while there is a gulf between them and the rich man, who is in torment. Thus the dead of this period seemed to occupy a position in sh’ol in which they enjoyed comfort but did not have the full beatific vision that they would enjoy after Christ.

Now a couple of tips since you mention your brother is a JW:

1) The book of Revelation describes what is going on in heaven now, in the age following Christ, and it repeatedly shows us folks who are conscious and praying and worshipping in heaven (e.g., the martyrs who have been killed).

2) JWs have a misperception of what Christians think heaven is. They have the idea that we think that after the resurrection we’ll leave earth in order to be in God’s presence up yonder. No. At the end of Revelation it is made clear that the new heavens and the new earth will be united, with the city of God coming down from heaven onto earth, so the heavenly, presence-of-God experience and the earthly paradisaical existence will both be enjoyed by the blessed at the same time for “the dwelling place of God [will be] with men.” Here’s the text:

Revelation 21

2: And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband;
3: and I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, “Behold, the dwelling of God is with men. He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them;
4: he will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any more, for the former things have passed away.”

The reader also writes:

On another note, a protestant friend of mine suggested we watch the movie “Martin Luther” together. Have you seen this movie? I am a cradle catholic but hadn’t really embraced it until this past year but I am strong in my faith. Can anything good come of a situation like this?

Not much except maybe a good opportunity for you to evangelize your friend by showing him the way the film whitewashes Luther and distorts what really happened.

MORE INFO HERE.