Category: Canon Law

Remember this guy?

If you were politically conscious in the 1970s, you may.

It’s the man who introduced a resolution for the impeachement against Richard Nixon.

But how could a priest do that? Don’t you have to be a member of the House of Representatives to introduce a resolution for impeachment?

Well, this man is a priest and was–at the time–a member of the House of Representatives.

He was a Democratic representative from Massachusetts, a Jesuit, and his name is Fr. Robert Drinan.

He was also vocally anti-war and vocally pro-abortion–at least in terms of the legality of abortion (he claimed to be privately opposed to it with one of those "personally opposed but . . . " rationalizations of babykilling).

And Drinan’s disgraceful performance is one of the reasons that, when the 1983 Code of Canon Law was released, it was made absolutely clear that priests are not to hold such offices. Already, under the 1917 Code, there were severe limitations on what kind of political offices priests could hold, and the Drinan scandal was so shocking that John Paul II took steps to get him out of office (Drinan eventually complied by not running for re-election to a fifth term) and to ensure that in the future priests would not follow in his footsteps. Thus the current Code of Canon Law provides:

Canon 285 §3

Clerics are forbidden to assume public offices
which entail a participation in the exercise of civil power.

So why are there now reports of a Canadian priest trying to become the Robert Drinan of the Great White North?

ED PETERS POINTS OUT HOW CANONICALLY SUSPECT THIS ALL IS.

MORE ON DRINAN.

MORE ON THE DRINAN SCANDAL.

PREDICTION: This dog won’t hunt. The Holy See will become involved in the question and order the Canadian priest not to hold elective office if he doesn’t back off on his own.

A reader writes:

I have a question that arose in a discussion of Brideshead Revisited,
but I suppose the answer has practical application today too. You’re
probably familiar with the fictional scene, but to summarise, in BR, the
dying Lord Marchmain has been persisting in manifest grave sin for quite
a long time, and when lucid, refuses the sacrament of anointing of the
sick. Soon, when he is almost gone and unable to protest, members of his
family bring in the priest again, Lord Marchmain is anointed and makes
the sign of the Cross.

Lord Marchmain’s family and the priest seem to be violating Canon Law as
currently set out (although obviously the book is set in the 1930s), as

Can.  1006 This sacrament is to be conferred on the sick who at least
implicitly requested it when they were in control of their faculties.

Can.  1007 The anointing of the sick is not to be conferred upon those
who persevere obstinately in manifest grave sin.

Has canon law / Catholic practice changed, or are they violating
something?  What ought to be the position of Catholics today in a
similar situation with a lapsed, dying relative?

In the story (and I’m going from my memories of the DVDs, here), Lord Marchmain was living in an illicit sexual relationship with a woman after he left his wife. When near death, he came home and his family urged him to receive the sacrament of extreme unction. At the time, he protested, saying that he was not in extremis (basically, at the point of death itself). This then became a point of argument in the family: Was he rejecting the sacrament or was he rejecting it now, with the expectation that he would receive it when actually at the point of death? When he reached that point and was unable to speak, the family had the sacrament conferred on him, and he made the sign of the cross, signaling that he accepted what was done for him.

Now let’s deal with the canonical aspects of the situation.

Let’s deal with the situation in the 1930s first, because canon law has changed.At the time the story is set, the 1917 Code of Canon Law as in effect, and according to that Code:

Canon 942
This sacrament is not to be conferred on those who are impenitent,
persevering contumaciously in manifest mortal sin; if there is doubt
about this, it should be conferred under condition.

Canon 943
Nevertheless, [the sacrament] should be absolutely conferred on those
who, when they were in possession of their faculties, had at least
implicitly asked [for it] or who seemed to ask [for it], even if they
later lost their senses or the use of reason.

BUY
THE OLD CODE (IN ENGLISH) HERE.

It seems to me that the fact pattern in the story (as I remember it) allows for Lord Marchmain to have received the sacrament under the 1917 Code. It was not clear at the time of his reception that Lord Marchmain was impenitent regarding his illicit sexual relationship. The relationship had clearly ended (he wasn’t engaging in illicit sexual activity from his deathbed), and his objection to receiving the sacrament on the grounds that he wasn’t in extremis could be construed as a sign that he wished to receive the sacrament when he was at the point of death. That would be taken as an indicator of a desire to get right with God before dying and thus of not being impenitent. At least there was doubt about this, which would have allowed the sacrament to be conferred conditionally under canon 942.

But 942 isn’t the whole story, because there was still 943. According to this canon, even if there is doubt about whether the person is penitent (note that it begins "Nevertheless," presumably setting aside what the preceding canon had just said in the case it is about to examine), the sacrament is to be administered unconditionally if the person requested it. The request for the sacrament thus seems to be taken of itself as at least enough of a token of penitence that it can be administered absolutely, even in cases of doubtful penitence.

Lord Marchmain’s objection to receiving the sacrament when he wasn’t in extremis could reasonably be taken as an implicit request for the sacrament, triggering 943 and allowing the sacrament to be administered absolutely.

Either way, under 942 or 943, it seems to me that his reception of it was licit, and the fact that he made the sign of the cross signalled that those around him had guessed right: At least by the point of his death, he did want to receive it and the graces it offers, allowing us to reasonably infer the salvation of his soul, notwithstanding his prior illicit sexual relationship.

Now, let’s flash forward to today. How would the law handle the same situation under the 1983 Code of Canon Law that is presently in force?

It seems to me that it would handle it in basically the same way. Given the right of the faithful to receive the sacraments unless specifically prohibited by law (Can. 843), and the requirement to subject laws that restrict the exercise of rights to a strict interpretation (Can. 18), there is a duty to read canons 1006 and 1007 (which the reader quoted) in a strict fashion, meaning: In cases of doubt, you err on the side of the faithful’s ability to receive the sacrament.

It is reasonably arguable that Lord Marchmain implicitly requested the sacrament, and as long as this is reasonably arguable then canon 1006 would allow him to receive it.

Canon 1007 would not block him from receiving it because it was at least reasonably arguable that he had repented of his illicit sexual relationship sufficiently that he did not "persevere obstinately in manifest grave sin." Once again, as long as it’s arguable, you have to read the law in favor of administering the sacrament.

So while this is an extreme case–which is what Evelyn Waugh meant it to be as part of his exploration of the human condition in Brideshead–it seems to me that both under former and current law it would be licit to administer the sacrament to him.

Fortunately for the reader, Waugh also included him making the sign of the cross, telling us that giving him the sacrament was the right thing to do and allowing us to–at least in terms of the story–infer his salvation.

Regarding situations in which a person has not made an in extremis statement like Lord Marchmain’s, it should be pointed out that it is fairly easy to satisfy the requirement for making an implicit request. On this point the most informative official discussion is found in the document "Pastoral Care of the Sick: Anointing and Viaticum" (found in The Rites, vol. 1), which contains the official texts for the celebration of the sacrament. According to its introduction,

14. The sacrament of anointing is to be conferred on sick people who, although they have lost consciousness or the use of reason, would, as Christian believers, have at least implicitly asked for it when they were in control of their faculties.

The way I read that (notice it says "would" not "did"), for practical purposes (and given the requirement to err on the side of administering the sacrament), if you’ve got a person who is about to die and can’t speak for himself (or who is otherwise gravely ill and can’t speak for himself) then the fact that the person was a Catholic and maintained some kind of Catholic identity (even if he didn’t practice his faith regularly) can of itself be taken as evidence that the person would want the sacrament in these circumstances unless the person specifically indicated otherwise. Thus in the case of most dying relatives, even if they weren’t active in their Catholicism, their desire is to be presumed unless they said that they don’t want the sacrament on their deathbed.

In other words, there doesn’t have to be a distinct, overt action whereby a person requests or hints that he wants the sacrament. If he’s a Catholic then, since this is what Catholics are supposed to have done for them, you presume it’s what he wanted unless you know for a fact otherwise. The mere maintenance of some form of Catholic identity is to be taken as an implicit request for what Catholics should have done for them unless he said he didn’t want it.

BTW, on a related note, I’m looking forward to going to Rome next year as part of Catholic Answers’ 2007 pilgrimage/cruise. I hope to send back photos of all the sacred monkeys in the Vatican.

Ed Peters has periodically noted that it is often private individuals who begin worthwhile initiatives that the Church may eventually take up. For example, the first efforts at codifying canon law were private initiatives, and eventually the Church came out with the first Code of Canon Law (1917).

Now Ed has come up with such an initiative himself. A decade ago, he predicted that excommunications would become more common in the Church, and there certainly have been more public reports of excommunication in recent years.

But there’s a problem: We’re now living in an age of global travel and communications, and unless steps are taken to allow the faithful to know who is and is  not subject to excommunication, the rapid travel and instantaneous communicatoin that now exist can thwart the disciplinary force of excommunication.

If there’s an excommunicated person from a distant country who’s taken up residence in your town and become involved in the local Catholic community, how are the faithful supposed to check out whether or not he’s been excommunicated? Figure out what his home diocese was and then call a chancery in a country where you don’t speak the language? Or what if the excommunicated person stays in his home country and sets up a web site that people from your parish are reading? How are you supposed to learn of his excommunication? He won’t want to advertise it on his site, and he may even have technical-sounding arguments for why he’s not excommunicated.

There needs to be a central, Internet-accessible registry of excommunicated persons just like there are such registries for sex offenders.

Ideally, this would be hosted on the Vatican’s web site.

But the Holy See hasn’t started such a registry (yet), so Ed has begun one.

CHECK IT OUT.

And, hey, if someone in the Vatican is reading this, Ed’s onto a good idea here. Y’all start one soon! It would really help clear up a lot of confusion if individuals could simply point to a registry entry to prove which people are excommunicated and thus should be regarded with caution by the faithful.

A reader writes:

If the parent of an adult knew his son was going to confession,
and told the priest in advance, instructing the priest what kind of
advice to give his adult son, and if the priest cooperated in
giving that advice, does that violate the seal of confession in some
way? 

Given only the facts that you mention, the answer is that this would not violate the seal of confession.

For a violation of the seal to occur the priest must, in one way or another, disclose both the identity of the penitent and the sin that was confessed. It is not sufficient for a violation of the seal to simply say merely "John Smith came to me for confession" or merely "Someone confessed to me the sin of adultery." However, if the identity of the penitent can be linked with the sin confessed then there is a violation, even if the linkage is accomplished in a roundabout way (e.g., "’John Smith came to me for confession and someone–wink, wink, nudge, nudge–confessed the sin of adultery").

N.B.: While saying "John Smith came to me for confession" does not violate the seal, the disclosure of even this amount of information would give Rome the willies in most circumstances.

From the above it is clear that no violation of the seal occurs if a priest merely listens to advice regarding what he ought to say to a penitent. As long as he (directly or indirectly) discloses no information about the penitent that can be linked to what the penitent confesses then the seal is not violated.

This is a very dangerous situation, however, because a priest listening to such advice might even inadvertently disclose such information–e.g., by thoughtlessly saying, "Good idea; I’ll mention that next time," or even too enthusiastically saying "Thanks!" or just nodding at the wrong moment or appearing too interested in the advice or even just listening to it for long enough that the mere fact of listening sends the signal that the advice is relevant to what he experiences in the confessional with the penitent. Any of these–if the advice concerned a sin that the penitent was likely to confess–would allow the identity of the penitent and the nature of the sins confessed to be linked, and thus some form of violation would occur.

The safest thing for a priest to do if offered such advice by a parent (or anybody else) would be to refuse to listen to it.

Failing that, the priest would need to set up clear and explicit hedges to block the inference that the parent’s advice was relevant–e.g., "I have to inform you that I can in no way confirm anything that your child may confess to me. I will listen to what you have to say, and I will hear you out regardless of whether what you say is relevant to your child’s confessions or not. Nothing about the fact that I listen to you or how I respond can be construed as an endorsement of the idea that you are saying anything at all that is relevant. In fact, I may deliberately assume facial expressions that would be misleading on this point, just to keep the matter confused."

That, however, is a very unsafe course, and it would be better for the priest to refuse to listen to the advice.

The above deals with situations in which the priest could only have learned about the sin confessed in the sacramental forum. If the same sin was known to be known to the priest from independent sources, the situation would be different.

For example (and to use an uncommonly clear example for purposes of illustration), suppose the priest was in a bookstore with the parent and the child. While there, the priest and the parent mutually witness the child take a book off the shelf, slip it under his shirt, and walk out of the store without paying. So both the parent and the priest unambiguously know about the sin without the sacrament being involved. If the parent then turns to the priest and says, "You should know that Johnny suffers from kleptomania. He’s receiving psychological treatment for it and often feels very guilty afterwards about what he has done. If this comes up in confession then you ought to tell him to listen to what his therapist is telling him to help him get over the problem" then the priest wouldn’t need to go through the elaborate rigamarole I described above. In this situation saying, "Okay; good idea" wouldn’t betray anything that the priest had learned in confession. Indeed, the confession wouldn’t have occurred yet.

Between these extremes is a spectrum. In drawing a line on the spectrum regarding what the priest can’t do without violating the seal, the line is to be drawn at the priest doing something that discloses information about what the penitent has told him in past confessions. This can happen either directly (e.g., "Thanks! Johnny confesses that to me all the time!") or indirectly (e.g., implying that Johnny may well confess this in the future, when the only ground the priest may be thought to have for supposing this is likely to be past confessions). In evaluating where the line is to be drawn in practical terms, the priest must err on the side of caution and do all that he can to not reveal information about past confessions, either directly or indirectly. In practice, refusing to listen to parental advice is likely to be the best way to do that.

However, if he has listened to the advice then the fact that he acts on it does not violate the seal. The seal protects information from going out of the confessional, not into it. If a priest hears good advice, from whatever source, that may be useful to him in confession (whether it is reading a moral theology manual or listening to an overly-intrusive parent) then there is no violation of the seal if he acts on that advice.

Would the priest not at least be under obligation to inform the
penitent that he had spoken to his parents?

There is no canonical obligation in this regard. A priest is not bound to disclose to the penitent the sources that inform whatever advice he gives in the sacramental forum. Just as he isn’t canonically obligated to tell the penitent what moral theology manual his advice comes from, he also isn’t obligated to say whether a particular person (parent or otherwise) gave him the advice that he chooses to pass on.

One might argue that there is a moral or prudential obligation to tell the penitent that a parent has been talking to him–lest this fact come out later and cause a family ruction–but the same argument could be made that he should not reveal this on moral/prudential grounds (i.e., a family ruction would be more likely if he told on the parent).

A reader writes:

Our parish’s confirmation program includes two years of worthless
("exploring your dreams") classes, and then an unnegotiably mandatory
weekend sleep-over retreat. My son went on the retreat and had to deal with
a room full of teenage boys at night telling dirty stories and teasing him
for not wanting to look at photos of women in a car magazine. Also, the
girls in their pajamas (do you know what teenage girls wear for pajamas?!)
were mixing with the boys.

Actually, I don’t know what teenage girls wear for pajamas these days, but I gather from the implication that it is not at all modest.

When I complained to the DRE, she accused me of being "judgmental," and
didn’t see anything wrong with what went on–the stories were "mild" and the
models in the magazine weren’t naked. When the girls and boys were together,
they were supervised. So she doesn’t think there was a problem–I’m
over-reacting to something that was harmless and innocent. She and the
pastor will not budge on the mandatory nature of the weekend retreat: if you
don’t go, you can’t be confirmed.

This is a violation of the parents’ natural law rights as the primary educators–including religious educators–of their children. The idea that a sleepover of any kind could be so essential to preparation for confirmation that those who do not participate iin it sould be denied one of the sacraments of Christian initiation, and thus be denied the fullness of Christian initiation, is unconscionable. This is a raw exercise of power in denying the sacraments to those who will not toe the line on a matter that is trivial at best and those involved in it sin gravely by denying the sacrament on this pretext.

This is like saying that you can’t have baptism or the Eucharist or confession if you don’t attend the sleepover.

Rome will agree with me on this point, by the way.

 

Next up for confirmation is my daughter, who’s homeschooled. She is not used
to this atmosphere. Like my son, she recognizes evil for what it is, no
matter how "mild" it is compared to the stuff most teens are into. I cannot
in conscience allow her to go on the retreat. I have every reason to expect
the problems she encounters will be similar, and probably worse, because she
spent half of a year in our parish school.

I will have to defer to you on this point. There are times in which, for the sake of the greater good, one must hold one’s nose and do somehting unpleasant or even potentially risky. When children are born they are totally helpless and have to be shielded from countless risks, but since they will one day have to function as adults in society, they have to be eased into situations involving risks that in progressively greater ways approximate those they will face as adults. Whether the risks posed in this instance are unacceptable for your daughter is a serious question that should be given thoughtful consideration, but it is something that you would know far better than I, as you know both what has happened in the previous classes and what risks and situations your daughter can handle far better than I.

 

I do not want to switch parishes, because the others in the area aren’t
orthodox. In my parish, the pastor doesn’t mess with the liturgy, and never
intentionally preaches heresy.

My question: can I bring my daughter to my home state, where my parents have
a pastor who would understand all of this, so that she can be confirmed
along with the candidates in that parish? I would see that she is properly
prepared (my husband is a Catholic high school religion teacher and well
qualified to oversee her preparation). Is there any rule in canon law about
being confirmed in your own parish? Would she need permission from anyone
besides the pastor of my parents’ parish?

In the Latin Church, canon law regarding who can administer the sacrament of confirmation is unusually complex. Frankly, the law is a mess, and I hope that a future edition of the Code of Canon Law will rectify the matter, both in terms of simplifying who can confirm and in establishing a mandatory age for confirmation (the patchwork of ages we have in the United States–ages which vary from one diocese to another and allow confirmation to be treated as a "coming of age" sacrament that leads to nonsense like co-ed sleepovers–is just set up to cause problems).

The short answer to your question is that it is possible that you could have your daughter confirmed by the pastor of your parent’s parish. The law allows for that if certain conditions are met. Here are the relevant canons:

Can.  882 The ordinary minister of confir-mation is
a bishop; a presbyter provided with this faculty in virtue of universal law or
the special grant of the competent authority also confers this sacrament
validly.

Can.  885 §2. A presbyter who possesses this faculty must use
it for the sake of those in whose favor the faculty was granted.

Can.  887 A presbyter who possesses the faculty of
administering confirmation also confers this sacrament licitly on externs in
the territory assigned to him unless their proper ordinary prohibits it; . . .

If you put the highlighted clauses together, they sketch the framework under which the pastor of your parents’ parish could confirm your daughter. He will not have the faculty by law to confirm her, so he would need a special grant from his own bishop (can. 882) to confirm either your daughter specifically or a group of people including your daughter (can. 885) and the fact that she is not a resident of his diocese would not be a barrier unless the bishop of your diocese prohibits it (can. 887).

If you’re trying to get your parents’ pastor to confirm her based on a mandate to confirm a group of people, you will need to make sure that the mandate he has includes your daughter. For example, if he is empowered to conduct confirmations for those who live in his parish then your daughter won’t be included in the mandate since she doesn’t live there but the the mandate is phrased more generally, such that he can perform confirmations within the territory of his parish then, if your daughter is in it at the time of the confirmation, she would fall within the scope of the mandate.

You’ll also note that nothing here requires the permission of anyone in your parish or diocese, though it is required that your bishop not have prohibit your daughter from being confirmed in this way.

The problem with problematic pre-confirmation programs that you are encountering is a widespread one, and the faithful have tried a variety of means in dealing with it. I have also known of cases where people took their children down to Mexico to be confirmed by a bishop there. There have also been cases where they took their children to be confirmed by an SSPX bishop, and Rome ruled that doing this was not a schismatic act. The Code of Canons for the Eastern Churches also provides for the possibility of having Latin children confirmed by an Eastern priest.

There is a question in my mind, however, whether you should be exploring this kind of matter or whether you should take an entirely different approach. While the law allows for such things, in view of the signal that could be sent to your daughter by pursuing them and in view of the fact that you will have Rome on your side in avoiding the sleepover–and even the worthless classes themselves–a different potential course of action recommends itself.

According to the Code of Canon Law,

Can.  843 §1. Sacred ministers cannot deny the
sacraments to those who seek them at appropriate times, are properly disposed,
and are not prohibited by law from receiving them.

The Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments has interpreted this canon in such a way that diocesan policy is subordinated to the right of the faithful to receive the sacraments if they are otherwise qualified to receive it. Diocesan policy is then regarded as a template for ensuring the orderly administration of the sacraments, but exceptions must be made to it if sacramentally qualified members of the faithful insist on exercising their right to receive the sacrament.

Thus there was a case a few years ago in which the parents of an eleven year old girl wanted their child confirmed in a diocese which did not ordinarily perform confirmation until some time later. The matter was appealed to the CDW and the response came back that

As has been stated before, the Code of Canon Law legislates that Sacred Ministers may not deny the Sacraments to those who opportunely ask for them, are properly disposed and are not prohibited by law from receiving them (cf. can. 843 §1). Since it has been demonstrated that the girl possesses these requisite qualities, any other considerations, even those contained in the Diocesan Policy, need to be understood in subordination to the general norms governing the reception of the Sacraments.

The Congregation considers it useful to point out that it is the role of the parents as the primary educators of their children and then of the Sacred Pastors to see that candidates for the reception of the Sacrament of Confirmation are properly instructed to receive the Sacrament and come to it at the opportune time (cf. can. 890). Consequently, when a member of the faithful wishes to receive this Sacrament, even though not satisfying one or more elements of the local legislation (e.g., being younger than the designated age for administration of the Sacrament), those elements must give way to the fundamental right of the faithful to receive the Sacraments. Indeed, the longer the conferral of the Sacrament is delayed after the age of reason, the greater will be the number of candidates who are prepared for its reception but are deprived of its grace for a considerable period of time.

In conclusion, this Congregation for Divine Worship must insist, given the concrete circumstances of the case under consideration, that the opportunity to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation be extended to the girl as soon as is conveniently possible [SOURCE].

It therefore occurs to me that, rather than seeking confirmation for your daughter through an alternative means that the law provides for, it may be best to simply prepare your daughter for confirmation yourself and the inform your parish that you have done so and will be presenting your daughter for confirmation, omitting some or all of the parish’s problematic confirmation program. I would say all this as graciously as possible and offer to demonstrate that the daughter has been suitably instructed. I would act as if it is assumed that this will not be a problem. If resistance is met, I would then show them the CDW letter linked above and explain how the principles in it relate to this situation. If resistance continues, I would elevate the matter to the attention of the bishop, and if a satisfactory solution is still not reached, I would elevate the matter to the attention of the CDW, at all times showing proper respect and politeness to the parties involved.

Whether you do this or pursue the plan you originally outlined or allow your daughter to go thorugh the problematic program and make up for its deficiences as best you can at home is a matter that you will ultimately have to decide based on your knowledge of the situation, and it is a judgement call, but I wanted to call your attention to another possibility that you may not have considered.

20

I recently read an article that appeared in the current (Aug/Sept 2006) issue of Homiletic and Pastoral Review by Dr. David Carlin, professor of philosophy and sociology at the Community College of Rhode Island, that I thought was worthy of comment.

IT’S ONLINE HERE.

The article begins okay, like this:

I suppose all Catholics would agree that it would be totally inappropriate for a Catholic priest presiding over a wedding to conclude the ceremony by saying: "You have just entered into one of the most important of all human relationships — but I would caution you not to think of it as being necessarily a permanent relationship. It is only as permanent as you would like to make it. If either of you would like to end your marriage tomorrow, you have a perfect right to do so. If you would like to remain married until death, you can do that too. It’s all up to you. Don’t feel constrained by the vows you have just taken. The vows are expressed in traditional language, and this respect for tradition is a lovely thing; but the vows don’t really mean anything."

So far so good. All Catholics should agree that it would be totally inappropriate for a Catholic priest to say this at a wedding.

Unfortunately, the article then drives over a cliff:

Yet this is exactly what priests do say, at least by implication. 

What is the ground Dr. Carlin offers for this astonishing assertion?

In the United States, despite its famous separation of church and
state, priests perform two wedding ceremonies at the same time, a
religious ceremony and a civil ceremony. The laws of the Church give
the priest the power to perform a sacramental marriage, while the laws
of our states give Catholic priests (as well as clergypersons from
other denominations) the power to perform a civil marriage.

Dr. Carlin here makes several mistakes, and he ought to know better, because one of them pertains to his own field of study: philosophy. It is simply false that priests "perform two wedding ceremonies at the same time." Unless the priest is bilocating or pausing every few seconds to read a line from two different texts for wedding ceremonies, it is clear that he is only participating in one ceremony. That is an ontological fact, and as someone trained in philosophy, Dr. Carlin ought to recognize this fact.

It is this initial mistake that causes the rest of his argument to go over the cliff, though that is not the only mistake he makes. Just in the paragraph quoted above, he also mistakenly says that the laws of the Church "give the priest the power to perform a sacramental marriage." Not only is it not the priest who performs a sacramental marriage (the laws of Christ empower the baptized couple itself to do that; the priest is just the Church’s facilitator of the sacrament; he "assists" at the wedding but does not perform it). He also ignores the facts that priests also assist at valid but non-sacramental weddings (as when a baptized person marries an unbaptized person) and that deacons and even lay people can assist at Catholic weddings.

We’re already off to a very rocky start, but the main problem that causes Dr. Carlin’s article to go so disastrously wrong is that he does not have his head wrapped around the fact that there is, in reality, one marriage that is taking place when a priest assists at a Catholic wedding ceremony. The couple do not have two marriages with each other–one sacramental and one civil, or even one valid and one civil. This is a category mistake. They have one marriage that is being celebrated according to the Catholic form of marriage and, if we’re lucky, also recognized by the state.

It’s not that way everywhere. In some countries the state does not recognize marriages performed in the Catholic Church, and they require the couple to have a separate, civil ceremony. The effects of this civil ceremony, in terms of bringing about a valid marriage, are precisely nil under most circumstances. If either party is a Catholic then they are bound to observe the Catholic form of marriage unless very unusual circumstances obtain, and as a result the civil marriage ceremony that their government forces them to go through does absolutely nothing with respect to bringing a valid marriage into existence. In such circumstances, the civil ceremony results in a legal fiction whereby the civil law comes to regard the couple as married even though, in reality, they are not.

This results in enormous confusion in these societies because the situation sends the message to couples that they are already married and can act accordingly. It increases the temptations against chastity that couples experience before they are actually married in the religious ceremony, and if they are poorly catechized it can lead them to see the religious ceremony as an optional add-on that they can get around to if they feel like it. They will be especially prone to this idea if they grow up seeing couples who are only civilly married and if they have friends who have just never gotten around to having it done. There can even be temptations to indefinitely delay the religious ceremony specifically so that the couple can get divorced later in case it doesn’t "work out" and then marry somebody else. In other words, it encourages couples to shack-up in civil "trial marriages" before they decide if they want to get married to each other for real.

Because marriage is a unitary thing–you’re either married or you’re not–it gravely harms society, the institution of marriage, and the family if the government refuses to recognize where actual marriages are taking place (in the religious ceremony) and insists on the couple going through an invalid civil ceremony that pretends to render them married when in fact it doesn’t. Adding that fictitious overlay to the situation can only bring confusion and grave harm, both to the society at large and in particular to the individuals who are led into grave sin by the temptations and confusion that is created.

We are fortunate here in America that state law recognizes it when valid marriages are brought into existence in the Catholic Church. In our situation the civil law is in these cases in harmony with the reality of the situation, and that sends the right message to the couple: You are now married–for real.

That civil law also has provisions that are contrary to reality (e.g., that the couple can sever their bond by divorce and then marry someone else, when in reality they can’t) is a sad thing–which itself is one of the reasons that the institution of marriage has been so weakened in our country. If civil law tells people that they’re divorced with the right to remarry then many of them will tend to act that way and, under the influence of their passions, they will act in defiance of what their Church teaches.

Long experience has shown that people take their cues from civil law as well as Church law. That’s one of the reasons that social acceptance of divorce is so common. It’s one of the reasons that social acceptance of abortion is so common. And it’s one of the reasons that social acceptance of homosexuality is so common. Before the law changed on these points, social acceptance of all of them was far smaller than it is now. The farther out of line civil law gets with reality, the more people are led astray from reality.

As a result, it is jaw-dropping that in his article Dr. Carlin urges that the situation should be pushed even further out of line with reality by having Catholic priests "abandon their practice of performing civil marriages" and instead have the dual religious/civil marriage system that has been so detrimental to some countries.

Dr. Carlin is not clear on whether he wants priests to do this on their own initiative or whether the wants the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops–with the proper Vatican approvals–to pass norms requiring priests to "abandon the practice of performing civil marriages," though he makes no call for the latter.

His ground for this is that he thinks it would more sharply underline the differences between the Catholic idea of marriage and the distorted one that civil society has.

I can have some degree of sympathy for this argument. There can come a point when it is better for the Church to refuse to participate in civil institutions, but experience has shown that the situation of the Church and its members is worsened when this happens with the institution of marriage, for the reasons cited above.

The better strategy, as long as the Church is going to require Catholics to observe the Catholic form of marriage (which it does precisely so that it can control the content of the marriage preparation and ensure the validity of the celebration of the sacrament itself), is to say "What we are doing in our churches is marriage–real marriage, the only kind of marriage that counts. If the state recognizes that fact, great. If not, that harms society and the good of souls."

If the state were requiring that the Church import into its marriage preparation or marriage ceremonies material that is at variance with the Catholic understanding of marriage–for example, if California required that for the state to recognize Catholic marriages that the priest must explain to the couple their options regarding divorce and remarriage without annulment–then I would agree that the Church would have no choice but to defy civil law and perform marriages without them being recognized by the state.

But California has not yet done that, and as long as that is the case, Dr. Carlin’s statement that Catholic priests are implicitly preaching the secular idea of marriage to the couples at whose weddings they preside is simply false.

The priest–if he is doing his job as a priest–performs his duties in accord with the mind of the Church–not just omitting information about the secular view of marriage but specifically warning couples against it.

It is false and defamatory to accuse priests of fostering the secular idea of marriage if they are doing precisely the opposite.

Even if a particular priest is lax in his duties in this regard, it remains false that by presiding at a wedding ceremony according to the laws of the Church that a priest is simultaneously performing a second ceremony that is out of accord with Church teaching. As the evidence of our senses clearly attests, he is participating in one ceremony–a Catholic one–that the laws of the state happen to recognize as having legal force.

One final note: If Dr. Carlin’s suggestion is that priests should refuse on their own initiative to perform their role regarding the civil recognition of Catholic marriages (e.g., signing wedding licenses brought to him by the couple) then Dr. Carlin is urging the priest to violate canon law. The faithful have a right to the sacraments (can. 843), including marriage, and canon law requires that "Except in a case of necessity, a
person [e.g., a priest] is not to assist without the permission of the local ordinary at . . . a marriage which cannot be recognized or
celebrated according to the norm of civil law" (can. 1071 §1, no. 2). So a pastor can’t simply refuse to perform his duties regarding the civil recognition of the marriage on his own initiative. He’d have to get the bishop’s permission.

I trust that the priests reading Dr. Carlin’s stunningly bad article know that.

MORE FROM ED PETERS.

A reader writes:

I have been discerning a vocation to the priesthood. Though I’m in college, my home-diocesan vocations director has indicated that the diocese would accept me into the seminary as a candidate for priesthood if I were to apply now (or, presumably, when I’ve graduated). He knows that I experience same-sex attractions; that for about three years I have had a deep and varyingly consuming obsession with a particular male; that my homosexuality has been related to (if not causal of or resulting from, or both) a weak masculine identity and other affective problems; that I am speaking regularly to a NARTH psychiatrist to overcome these problems; etc. But the vocations director has explicitly assured me that the same-sex attraction does not present an impediment to my entering the seminary with a view to being ordained (all else going well).

I understand that even my life-long, exclusive attraction to the priesthood is neither sufficient nor necessary to demonstrate that I do have a vocation. I know that I have no right to be ordained, that the Church must discern with me and make the ultimate decision in the person of the bishop and his assistants, etc. But I am concerned here that the vocations director would be allowing me to do something which the Church universal, traditionally and also most recently in the Instruction issued last year by the Congregation for Catholic Education, has prohibited. The Instruction prohibits the ordination or admission to the seminary of those who (1) practice homosexuality, (2) present deep-seated (or, in what I consider a closer translation of the Italian, deeply rooted) homosexual tendencies, or (3) support the ‘gay’ culture.

Never having been in a sexual relationship with anyone, I don’t meet the first condition. Nor do I meet the third. My question, then, is how precisely to interpret the second condition, and how to differentiate it from the "transitory" tendencies which the Instruction indicates might not disqualify a man, provided he has been chaste for three years before ordination to the diaconate. Because I personally believe that same-sex attraction is in most cases the result of developmental problems, I consider most if not all homosexual tendencies to be in principle transitory (that is, not insuperable). And I’m still quite young; that leaves time for change, natural or induced. But I am also a realist and recognize that my tendencies, which do reveal some degree of affective immaturity and sometimes manifest themselves in difficulties in dealing with men and women (or in asserting myself healthily, or in leading, etc.), may not in fact ever go away because of contingent factors. They are rooted in childhood and early adolescent difficulties that are not easily overcome.

Even if my diocese grants official approval, if the Church has expressed a will that people in my condition not be ordained, I take this alone as sufficient to show that God has not called me. I do not want to take advantage of my diocese’s laxity in this regard if it is indeed illicit laxity, and I consider it my responsibility to discern whether I’m fit to present myself to the diocese. But do I in fact meet the second condition of the Instruction? Or if you do not have sufficient information to determine this in my case, can you explain precisely what you take the second condition to mean? I have read a wide variety of opinions, some of which would exclude me and others not.

I have to say that I have nothing but admiration for the clear-eyed, level-headed way in which the reader is approaching this situation. He is displaying a great deal of personal integrity, and I think he deserves the applause of everyone for the way in which he is conducting himself in this.

In addressing the question, I would suggest several points:

1) Individuals can try to shoulder too much of the burden of discernment. The question of whether the reader’s degree of same-sex attraction would be sufficient to prevent his admission to seminary is not exclusively his own to discern. In principle what the Church would want him to do is present the facts to the relevant officials and then they would have the primary burden of determining whether the degree of SSA is sufficient to meet the criteria in the document that the Holy See issued. In other words, in the ideal, he should be open and honest and submit to their judgment.

2) That being said, it is clear that there are individuals who have tried to minimize the import of the document and to interpret its second clause in manifestly inaccurate ways that would have the effect of gutting its meaning. Thus seminarians in some areas are not in the ideal situation and have some duty to use their own judment in determining whether or not their SSA meets the criteria described in the document.

3) The document itself also does not elaborate its criteria in great detail. As a result, there is some ambiguity in interpreting its meaning. Just what degree of SSA is needed for it to be "deep-seated" (or "deeply-rooted")? This is not altogether clear, and the resulting ambiguity is presumably something that the Holy See intends, so that the issue can be more thoroughly worked out in practice. Perhaps in the future the Holy See will publish more detailed guidance on the subject, but in the meantime there is at least some liberty of interpretation that local officials have in applying the document. It isn’t as if the Holy See said that any SSA–even light and momentary–bars one from the priesthood. The document speaks (see below) of some candidates for the priesthood having overcome a transitory problem with homosexual tendencies, but if one has ever had these, it is likely that they will continue to manifest at least occasionally and in a minor way later in life. How strong that manifestation would have to be to bar a candidate from ordination is something that the Holy See has not yet told us and thus the determination falls to local officials.

4) It therefore seems to me that the reader should seek to make the best determination he can based both on the judgment of local officials and his own understanding. He should not submit uncritically to the judgment of officials if they are unambiguously ignoring the meaning of the document, but neither should he presume to judge what the document requires exclusively according to his own judgment, for the Church has not charged him with that task. He should seek to make the best determination he can through an appraisal of the situation that seeks to incorporate both deference to local officials with his own judgment serving as a back-up if they are manifestly misinterpreting the document.

5) To apply the document to the reader’s own situation, it would be useful to review what it actually says:

In the light of such teaching, this Dicastery, in accord with the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, believes it necessary to state clearly that the Church, while profoundly respecting the persons in question, cannot admit to the seminary or to holy orders those who practise homosexuality, present deep-seated homosexual tendencies or support the so-called "gay culture".

Such persons, in fact, find themselves in a situation that gravely hinders them from relating correctly to men and women. One must in no way overlook the negative consequences that can derive from the ordination of persons with deep-seated homosexual tendencies.

Different, however, would be the case in which one were dealing with homosexual tendencies that were only the expression of a transitory problem – for example, that of an adolescence not yet superseded. Nevertheless, such tendencies must be clearly overcome at least three years before ordination to the diaconate.

The contrast that the document presents between "deep-seated tendencies" and "tendencies that were only the expression of a transitory problem" that is capable of being "clearly overcome" would seem to refer to a contrast between tendencies that are strong and enduring and those that, while they may be strong for a time, are eventually mitigated and thus overcome.

It would be a mistake to read the tendencies as having to be so strong that they actually drive the person to homosexual behavior. That is clearly not required (a) because the word "tendencies" is being used and that word does not imply outward action based on the tendencies, (b) because the commission of homosexual acts is listed as a separate criterion (albeit an ongoing commission), and (c) because the Holy See did not say "tendencies so strong that they lead the individual to commit homosexual acts."

It also would be a mistake to read the the document as saying that once the tendencies have been overcome that the individual never experiences SSA again in his life. Any time one has had a particular sexual temptation for any period of time, human nature is such that this temptation is likely to recur at some point, even if it is just a mild and momentary desire.

Putting these pieces together, it seems to me that the Holy See would find acceptable a candidate who had a period of strong homosexual desires, whether or not they led him to have homosexual sex, who then is able to overcome these to the point that, even if they do not go away entirely, they markedly diminish and remain at their diminished level for a period of years.

In this regard, the document mentions them needing to be overcome for a period of at least three years prior to ordination to the diaconate. That clause seems to be included primarily to cover those who are already in seminary, but it (or a significiant portion of it, like two years) might serve as a useful guide in determining whether one is ready for admission to seminary.

6) As to what the overcoming of the temptations might involve, I can only conjecture here, because the Holy See has not given us criteria on this point, but I would conecture that the temptations have not yet been overcome if one or more of the following conditions obtain:

* An individual finds himself spending a significant amount of time fantasizing about homosexual acts.
* An individual finds himself spending a significant amount of time having romantic but non-sexual fantasies about members of the same sex.
* An individual regularly commits autoerotic acts that have homosexual fantasy content.

In suggesting these criteria, I am not talking about temporary slips but about ongoing, regular patterns of behavior.

7) In applying all of this directly to the case of the reader, it strikes me that at least at one time the reader has had a strong tendency (I’d not the apparently long-standing crush on another individual), but it is not clear to me whether this level of temptation still applies. It may well have moderated or begun to moderate.

There also is the fact that he is seeing a NARTH counsellor and the fact that he is still very young (I have removed his actual age in keeping with my policy of omitting personally identifying information from posts). All of these are positive signs, and I would encourage him to bide his time and see what happens with his SSA. It may mitigate to the point and remain mitigated long enough that the document would not prevent him from persuing a vocation to the priesthood.

If I may also offer one bit of advice from personal experience: When I was in college I once had an enormous crush on a young woman and the crush finally abated when I realized what a jerk she actually was. I’m not suggesting that the reader foster ill-will toward the individual to whom he is attracted, but trying to form a clear-eyed appraisal of the individual, including his faults, may serve to dispel some of the romantic aura that surrounds him.

As always, I would encourage my readers to keep the gentleman who wrote in prayer, as well as all who are in similar conditions. May they handle matters as oustandingly as this gentleman is.

20

"I’m My Own Grandpa," for those few who may not know, was a signature song for country comedy artists (and Grand Ole Opry regulars) Lonzo & Oscar. It has also been recorded by others, including Grandpa Jones, and it makes a memorable appearance in the hilariously stupid movie, The Stupids (which is also remarkably clean, one of the few such comedy films).

The premise of the song is that an unusual pair of marriages result in bizarre relational implications for the character in the song, such that he is now his own grandpa (as you might suppose from the title).

The bizarre relationships that result from this pair of marriages are extensive, and now someone has now gone and done a hypertext version of the song that allows you to keep track of how all the relationships work, complete with diagrams.

With this in mind (and linking the hypertext version), a reader writes:

Would the following be considered licit…   http://gean.wwco.com/grandpa/  from the Church’s perspective? 

Ever one for applying theological and canonical principles to far-out, eXtreme situations (what you might call  X-Canon Law and X-Theology), I’m more than happy to entertain the question.

Let’s start by looking at the opening verse of the song, which sets up the pair of marriages that results in the Me = Grandpa situation:

Now many, many years ago, when I was twenty-three,
I was married to a widow who was pretty as could be.

That’s marriage #1. We’ll refer to the groom in this song as The Singer. To keep things simple, let’s assume that this is a valid marriage and that both The Singer and The Widow are Catholic, so that they will be bound by canon law.

Now a new character enters the picture:

This widow had a grown-up daughter
Who had hair of red.

Okay, so the widow has a daughter, who we’ll creatively call The Daughter. How is she related to The Singer, and how might that affect who she can marry? Well, there are two ways you can be related to someone the become relevant in marriage situations. These are known as consanguinity and affinity.

Consanguinity occurs when you are related by blood. The song does not tell us whether any of the marriage partners are related by blood, but since the issue isn’t raised, it doesn’t seem to be relevant to the situation. We may thus set it aside and assume that The Singer is not related by blood to either The Widow or The Daughter, so issues of consanguinity don’t arise.

Affinity, however, occurs when one is related to someone by marriage. Since The Singer is married to The Widow, he is thereby related to The Daughter by affinity–which is crucial to setting up the bizarre complex of relationships that ensue. Here’s how that happens:

My father fell in love with her [the Daughter],
And soon they, too, were wed.

That’s marriage #2.

Now, absolute relational chaos ensues:

This made my dad my son-in-law
And changed my very life.
My daughter was my mother,
‘Cause she was my father’s wife.

That’s just the beginning. It gets much, much worse from there.

The key question, canonically, is can The Singer’s father (a.k.a., The Father) marry The Daughter?

At one time under Church law the answer was no. The affinity that existed between The Singer and his wife’s family was held to apply also to the rest of The Singer’s family (or at least significant portions of it). Thus The Daughter was not only reckoned as The Singer’s Step-Daughter but as The Father’s Step-Granddaughter, and he couldn’t marry her.

But then the Fourth Lateran Council happened in the year 1215, and that council decreed the following:

CANON 50

It must not be deemed reprehensible if human statutes change sometimes with the change of time, especially when urgent necessity or common interest demands it, since God himself has changed in the New Testament some things that He had decreed in the Old. Since, therefore, the prohibition against the contracting of marriage in secundo et tertio genere affinitatis ["in the second and third degree of affinity"] and that against the union of the offspring from second marriages to a relative of the first husband, frequently constitute a source of difficulty and sometimes are a cause of danger to souls, that by a cessation of the proibition the effect may cease also, we, with the approval of the holy council, revoking previous enactments in this matter, decree in the resent statute that such persons may in the future contract marriage without hindrance. . . .

So Fourth Lateran wiped out the prohibition on people marrying who were in the second and third degree of affinity.

Without dwelling on what these degrees consisted in (the concept is a little hard to explain, and it’s not relevant to current law on the matter), this would have permitted The Father to marry The Daughter.

Now let’s jump forward to current law. According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law:

Can. 109 §1. Affinity arises from a valid marriage, even if not consummated, and exists between a man and the blood relatives of the woman and between the woman and the blood relatives of the man.

Can.  1092 Affinity in the direct line in any degree invalidates a marriage.

When one puts these two canons together, one discovers who in the song can’t marry whom.

Affinity exists between The Singer and the blood relatives of The Widow, which would include The Daughter. So The Singer can’t marry anyone in a "direct line" relationship to The Widow. Those relatives are off limits to him.

The direct line is anybody you are descended from and anybody who is descended from you. It includes your grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, etc.

Since The Daughter is a blood relative of The Widow and is in her direct line, The Singer can’t marry her (should The Widow die) because of the impediment created by affinity.

Likewise, affinity applies to The Widow and her ability to marry relatives of The Singer. Since The Father is a blood relative in the direct line for The Singer, The Widow can’t marry The Father (should The Singer die).

But The Singer and The Widow are the only two people who have affinity regarding each other’s families. You’ll note that Canon 109 says, "Affinity . . . exists between a man [and his wife’s blood relatives] . . . and a woman [and her husband’s blood relatives]."

It does not say that the relatives in one family have affinity with respect to the relatives in the other family. They only have affinity with the man or the woman. Thus The Singer has affinity with The Daughter and The Father has affinity with The Widow but–and this is the important point–The Father and The Daughter DO NOT HAVE AFFINITY WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER.

Thus there is an old saying in canon law: Affinitas non gignit affinitatem–or "Affinity does not beget affinity."

Just because two people are in a condition of affinity, that doesn’t mean all their relatives are also mutually in this relationship.

Thus–unless there is something else blocking the validity of the marriage–it is perfectly (canonically) legitimate for The Father to marry The Daughter and set the whole cascade of relational chaos in motion.

So at least since 1215, you’ve been able to become your own grandpa.

It sounds funny, I know, but it really is so.

(By the way, kids, don’t try this at home.)

Incidentally, if you’ve never heard this delightful song, it’s available for download from iTunes. Just look up "I’m my own grandpa" or "Lonzo & Oscar."

AND THERE’S A BIG OL’ .WAV OF IT HERE (THE VERSION FROM THE STUPIDS).

BE
SURE TO CHECK OUT THE STUPIDS, TOO–YOU’LL LAUGHT TILL YOU STOP!

LYRICS, WITH HELPFUL DIAGRAMS, HERE.

Perhaps another time we can "prick that annual blister: marriage with deceased wife’s sister."

A reader writes:

When JPII is canonized, will that mean that any faithful Catholic trying to sell something that the pope used (say like a popemobile) would be in a state of sin as it would then be considered a relic?   

Let me change the question just a little bit to sharpen the point: Suppose that our present pontiff, His Most Awesomeness Benedict XVI, one day goes to his reward and is declared a saint.

Since his car was sold on eBay a piece back, it is actually in the hands of someone other than the Church (I don’t know that to be the case for the popemobiles JP2 used, which is why I make the change in the question).

Should such a canonization occur, would selling B16’s former 1999 Volkswagen Golf be a sin?

Well, canon law provides the following:

Canon 1190

§1. It is absolutely forbidden to sell sacred relics.

The question is thus whether something like this would count as a relic in the sense that canon law is using the term. If it is then, since traffic in sacred things is sinful, it would be sinful to sell it.

Well . . . this canon has not received an authentic interpretation from the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts, so we don’t have much guidance on that front of what the Code considers a relic.

None of the commentaries I have at hand dwell on this question either. Both the Code and the commentators tend to assume that you already know what the law intends to count as a relic. This would suggest that one should fall back on what is traditionally called a relic, which would include first-class, second-class, and third-class relics. (More on those distinctions below.)

The most official treatment of the subject that I’ve been able to find comes from the Directory on Popular Piety, which defines relics as follows:

The Relics of the Saints

236. The Second Vatican Council recalls that "the Saints have been
traditionally honoured in the Church, and their authentic relics and
images held in veneration". The term "relics of the Saints" [a] principally signifies the bodies – or notable parts of the bodies – of the
Saints who, as distinguished members of Christ’s mystical Body and as
Temples of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 3, 16; 6, 19; 2 Cor 6, 16) in
virtue of their heroic sanctity, now dwell in Heaven, but who once lived on earth. [b] Objects which belonged to the Saints, such as personal objects,
clothes and manuscripts are also considered relics, as are [c] objects which
have touched their bodies or tombs such as oils, cloths, and images.

The blue letters I’ve inserted into this treatment correspond to what are commonly (in English, anyway) called first-, second-, and third-class relics. First-class relics are principally bodies or parts of bodies. Second-class relics are former belongings of the saints. And third-class relics are things touched to their bodies (after death) or their tombs.

Now, the Directory for Popular Piety is not a legal document. It’s an instructional document. And the body that issued it–the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments–is not empowered to make authentic interpretations of canon law. Nevertheless, what it has to say may shed light on Rome’s thinking at least in a general way.

So now having established how the directory uses the term "relic," let’s go on to see what it has to say about the treatment of relics:

237. The Missale Romanum reaffirms the validity "of placing
the relics of the Saints under an altar that is to be dedicated, even when
not those of the martyrs". This usage signifies that the
sacrifice of the members has its origin in the Sacrifice of the
altar, as well as symbolising the communion with the Sacrifice of
Christ of the entire Church, which is called to witness, event to the
point of death, fidelity to her Lord and Spouse.

Many popular usages have been associated with this eminently liturgical cultic expression. The faithful deeply revere the relics of the Saints. An adequate pastoral instruction of the faithful about the use of relics will not overlook:

• ensuring the authenticity of the relics exposed for the veneration
  of the faithful; where doubtful relics have been exposed for the veneration of the faithful, they should be discreetly withdrawn with due pastoral prudence;
        
• preventing undue dispersal of relics into small pieces, since such practice is not consonant with due respect for the human body; the liturgical norms stipulate that relics must be "of a sufficient size as make clear that they are parts of the human body";
        
        
• admonishing the faithful to resist the temptation to form collections of relics; in the past this practise has had some deplorable consequences;
        
• preventing any possibility of fraud, trafficking, or superstition.
     

The various forms of popular veneration of the relics of the Saints, such as kissing, decorations with lights and flowers, bearing them in processions, in no way exclude the possibility of taking the relics of the Saints to the sick and dying, to comfort them or use the intercession of the Saint to ask for healing. Such should be conducted with great dignity and be motivated by faith. The relics of the Saints should not be exposed on the mensa of the altar, since this is reserved for the Body and Blood of the King of Martyrs.

So as the highlighted phrase from paragraph 237 indicates, trafficking in relics is to be forbidden, and since the preceding paragraph (236) just defined relics for purposes of this discussion as including first-, second-, and third-class relics, it would seem that the Congregation for Divine Worship doesn’t want people selling them–even third class relics.

And I can see the logic behind that. My own sensibilities regarding piety do suggest to me that we shouldn’t have people running up to a saint’s tomb, pressing cloths to it, and then selling them on the ground that they are now holy relics. If you’re going to have the idea of third-class relics at all then it seems to me you shouldn’t be selling them.

(NOTE: I also am not impressed with the theory I’ve heard that you can sell a third-class relic for the intrinsic value of the relic–thus if you pressed a handkerchief to the tomb of St. Pius V, you could sell it for the value of the handkerchief. I don’t think things have determinable intrinsic economic values–the market has to determine value, and you’ll never be able to properly untangle the "third-class relic" factor from a third-class relic. This is just a back-door way for people wanting to sell such relics to rationalize it. The mere fact that something has become a third-class relic changes its value. The "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief comes from the fact I can blow my nose on it. If I can’t blow my nose on a third-class relic handkerchief then I no longer am receiving an object with the "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief. How much would you pay for a handkerchief you can’t blow your nose on or wipe your brow with? And why would you want to buy one in the first place if it wasn’t for it being a third-class relic? That’s its real value to you. A "cost of materials" rationale would be better here–i.e., "I paid 50 cents for this handkerchief at Wal-Mart, so you can reimburse me for that much now that it’s a third-class relic," but this exception isn’t present in the law, or in the commentaries I have to hand, or in the Directory of Popular Piety.)

I also understand the rationale behind not selling first-class relics. That clashes with my sensibilities regarding piety, too.

But what about second-class relics? The way the Directory presents matters, selling them would also be prohibited. But is every paperclip ever owned by Joseph Ratzinger really a second-class relic once he becomes a saint?

One theory I’ve heard floated is that not all legal property of a saint should be counted as a second-class relic. Perhaps only things that are especially "personal" should be–things like his clothes, his reading glasses, his Breviary, his Bible, his Rosary, etc.. By that standard, someone might judge that a saint’s paperclips or automobile are not sufficiently personal to get counted as relics (unless, perhaps, his heroic virtue was displayed by his tireless efforts on behalf of ministries like Meals on Wheels or Clips for the Clipless).

That’s not what the Directory for Popular Piety says, of course. It simply speaks of objects owned by the saints being relics. But the fact that it feels the need to go on and name examples could be taken as an indication that there is something of this concept lurking in the back of the Congregation’s mind.

It thus strikes me that we have an ambiguity here, and we may (don’t hold your breath) get clarification on it at some point in the future. At least, that’s what we’d really need to settle it.

A reader writes:

The other day I was reading through some back blogs and I came across an
answer you gave to someone asking about forgotten mortal sins. This person
quoted canon 916 which said:

A person who is conscious of grave sin is not to celebrate Mass or receive
the body of the Lord without previous sacramental confession unless there is
a grave reason and there is no opportunity to confess; in this case the
person is to remember the obligation to make an act of perfect contrition
which includes the resolution of confessing as soon as possible.

I don’t think I am understanding this correctly. If you are conscious of
grave sin you should not celebrate Mass? It has always been encouraged that
someone who is unable to receive communion should at least attend Mass but
not go to receive. As someone who suffers from scruples I always feel I am
in grave sin for some reason or another but I still attend Mass even though
I don’t receve. Can you explain this for me please.

I’m very sorry to hear about your problem with scruples, and I hope that you will be able to overcome it and begin receiving the Eucharist on a regular basis. I encourage you to investigate groups like Scrupulous Anonymous and ask my readers to pray for you and others who have this condition.

The above canon does not mean that you cannot attend Mass without making an act of perfect contrition. When it refers to "celebrating" Mass, it is referring specifically to what priests do when they celebrate or concelebrate the Mass.

The reason that this clause is included in the canon is because priests are required to take Communion if they celebrate Mass, and the Code doesn’t want them thinking, "Well, maybe I can celebrate Mass and just not take Communion."

By putting the celebration clause into the canon dealing with acts of perfect contrition, it prevents priest from saying to themselves "Maybe the requirement that I receive Communion doesn’t apply if I’m in mortal sin when I celebrate Mass." The inclusion of the celebration clause tells them, in effect, "No, it does apply. You as a priest have to receive Communion every time you celebrate (or concelebrate) Mass, so if you’re going to celebrate, make sure that you are in a state of grace first, either by going to confession or, if you can’t do that, by making na act of perfect contrition."

The laity, however, do not celebrate Mass (at least not the way this canon is using the term). The correct term for what the laity do at Mass is "assist."

Some priest or DREs or what have you might sometimes use loose language about the people "celebrating" Mass, but this is not using the term in its proper liturgical or canonical sense. Priests celebrate Mass; laity assist at Mass.

We laity are, in fact, required to attend Mass whether we are in a state of grace or not. So are priests for that matter. If a priest were not in a state of grace, he would still have to fulfill his Sunday obligation just like the rest of us–he just wouldn’t be able to celebrate whatever Mass he attended.

You therefore need not worry that you are doing something wrong if you attend Mass and have not made an act of perfect contrition. You are not violating the law, and the Church not only encourages but requires Mass attendance in such a case.

It is, of course, a good thing to make an act of perfect contrition prior to going to confession. Pefect contrition is a good thing. But the law does not require that one be made–either before confession or before Mass if all you are doing is assisting at it.

Since you’ve mentioned that you have difficulty with scrupulosity, I’ll also mention two points that may be pastorally useful:

1) There is absolutely ZERO DOUBT among canonists about what I said regarding what "celebrating Mass" means in this context.

2) In the case of a person with a scrupulous conscience, the person should not refuse to receive Communion if he merely thinks he may have an unconfessed mortal sin. He should only refrain on grounds of sin if he is CERTAIN that he has an unconfessed mortal sin. If there are doubts, he should go ahead and receive. This can be difficult at first, but it is considered an important step in helping to get over the barrier that scrupulosity creates in leading a normal sacramental life.