Author: Jimmy Akin

Jimmy was born in Texas, grew up nominally Protestant, but at age 20 experienced a profound conversion to Christ. Planning on becoming a Protestant seminary professor, he started an intensive study of the Bible. But the more he immersed himself in Scripture the more he found to support the Catholic faith, and in 1992 he entered the Catholic Church. His conversion story, "A Triumph and a Tragedy," is published in Surprised by Truth. Besides being an author, Jimmy is the Senior Apologist at Catholic Answers, a contributing editor to Catholic Answers Magazine, and a weekly guest on "Catholic Answers Live."

Benedict’s Mystery Book

Okay, this is odd . . .

Joaquin Navarro-Valls, Vatican spokesman [said that] Pope Benedict was using his mountain retreat to finish a book he began writing three years ago, the spokesman said.

Navarro-Valls refused to tell reporters what the book is about, but said, "You will find out when it arrives in the bookstores."

However, several Italian papers have written that the book is about the "battle of ideas" and finding a proper balance between faith and reason, truth and freedom, and religion and ethics.

Navarro-Valls said the pope also was working on the speeches he will give during his Aug. 18-21 visit to Germany for World Youth Day and on a first draft of an encyclical that "will come out later." [SOURCE]

It’s interesting that they’d be this cagey about the book B16 is penning. It’s also interesting that he appears to be finishing it before getting his first encyclical out.

It’ll also be interesting to determine what level of authority is to be ascribed to the book. It may not be a papal document and thus may not share in papal authority but instead be a composition of the pope in his private capacity as a theologian.

This would be odd, though not completely without precedent. John Paul II wrote several books in private capacities during his reign. For example, books of poetry.

The situation brings to mind something I was reading about in Ratzinger’s excellent and easy-to-read interview book SALT OF THE EARTH. He revealed that when he was named head of the CDF, he told JPII that he felt the need to retain the right to continue to write theology in his own name (i.e., to produce private theological works separate from his capacity as head of the CDF). At first JPII wasn’t sure about this, but they checked and found that it had been done before, so JPII told him that it wouldn’t be a problem.

Perhaps now that he’s pope, B16 intends to do something similar: To continue to write the theology books he’s wanted to write for so long but keep them as personal, non-papal works distinct from the official documents he will be responsible for as pope.

Time will tell.

Doctors, Patrons, & Infallibility

A reader writes:

You have remarked before that the Pope’s infallibility is invoked when he declares someone a saint.  Is there any similar invocation of infallibility when someone is declared a Doctors of the Church?

No, there’s not. This may be illustrated by comparing the formula used in canonization with, for example, the declaration of St. Therese of Lisieux as a doctor of the Church.

As Vatican I and II point out, a pope triggers the Church’s charism of infallibility when he makes a definition, and so popes conventionally do this by using the verb "We (or I) define . . . "

In the case of a typical saint canonization, the formula used is as follows (this particular one being the canonization of Josemaria Escriva):

In honor of the Blessed and Undivided Trinity, for the uplifting of Catholic faith and the increase of Christian life, by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ and that of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul and our own, after careful deliberation, having called frequently upon God’s help, and with the advice of many of our brother Bishops, We declare and define Blessed Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer to be a Saint, and We inscribe his name in the catalogue of the Saints, ordaining that, throughout the universal Church, he be devoutly honored among the Saints. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit [SOURCE].

You’ll note the bolded verbs: "We declare and define." The money verb is "We define." That’s what triggers the Church’s infallibility. It’s the traditional verb used by popes in engaging the charism of infallibility.

You’ll note that this verb is absent from proclamations that someone is a doctor. For example, when St. Therese of Lisieux was declared a doctor of the Church, this was the form of words used by John Paul II:

Fulfilling the wishes of many Brothers in the Episcopate and of a great number of the faithful throughout the world, after consulting the Congregation for the Causes of Saints and hearing the opinion of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding her eminent doctrine, with certain knowledge and after lengthy reflection, with the fullness of Our apostolic authority We declare Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus and the Holy Face, virgin, to be a Doctor of the Universal Church. In the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit [SOURCE].

There’s no "We define" in that. Therefore, the pope is not making a definition and so is not triggering infallibility.

The same goes for the proclamation of other titles among saints. For example, here is the form of words used to proclaim St. Thomas More the patron of statemen and politicians:

Therefore, after due consideration and willingly acceding to the petitions addressed to me, I establish and declare Saint Thomas More the heavenly Patron of Statesmen and Politicians, and I decree that he be ascribed all the liturgical honours and privileges which, according to law, belong to the Patrons of categories of people [SOURCE].

Again, no "I define."

Now, I’ve answered the question so far on textualist grounds–pointing out that the texts do not use the language popes conventionally use in triggering infallibility. I haven’t pointed out why.

The basic reason is that the status of being a doctor is different than being a saint. If someone is a saint, that means that the person is in heaven. That’s a binary, on/off thing that can be the subject of a definition more easily than what is at issue when the title of "doctor" is bestowed. Someone either is in heaven or he isn’t. But in the case of a doctor the Church is honoring someone for being a really good teacher. The quality of someone’s teaching isn’t an on/off, binary kind of thing, though. The quality of teaching is something that exists on a continuum, and one that cannot be measured except impressionistically. As a result, it would be less clear what is being defined if a pope attempted to define that someone "is a really good teacher" (whatever words this might be put in) rather than that someone "is in heaven."

Now, in the case of both saints and doctors there are ancillary concepts associated with the Church’s bestowal of these titles. In both cases there is the idea that the person was holy and a good example for the faithful to emulate, but these are slippery concepts that also exist on continua.

The core of sainthood is still a binary, on/off condition: being heaven.

Something similar applies in the case of patrons. Here there is also the idea that the person was holy and worthy of emulating but the core of patronage is different: The patron is a person from whom the faithful (or certain groups of the faithful) ask intercession, either in general or concerning a particular matter. The proclamation of a patron thus is more a directive to the faithful–a directive to look to this guy for intercession and to emulate his example.

Thus when John Paul II proclaimed Thomas More the patron of statesmen and politicians he used the verb "I establish" rather than just "I declare." In establishing him as a patron of certain individuals, the pope thereby directed those individuals to seek his intercession and emulate his example.

Thus there is no attempt to engage the Church’s infallibility here either since no matter is being defined; rather an exhortation or directive is being given.

Doctors, Patrons, & Infallibility

A reader writes:

You have remarked before that the Pope’s infallibility is invoked when he declares someone a saint.  Is there any similar invocation of infallibility when someone is declared a Doctors of the Church?

No, there’s not. This may be illustrated by comparing the formula used in canonization with, for example, the declaration of St. Therese of Lisieux as a doctor of the Church.

As Vatican I and II point out, a pope triggers the Church’s charism of infallibility when he makes a definition, and so popes conventionally do this by using the verb "We (or I) define . . . "

In the case of a typical saint canonization, the formula used is as follows (this particular one being the canonization of Josemaria Escriva):

In honor of the Blessed and Undivided Trinity, for the uplifting of Catholic faith and the increase of Christian life, by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ and that of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul and our own, after careful deliberation, having called frequently upon God’s help, and with the advice of many of our brother Bishops, We declare and define Blessed Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer to be a Saint, and We inscribe his name in the catalogue of the Saints, ordaining that, throughout the universal Church, he be devoutly honored among the Saints. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit [SOURCE].

You’ll note the bolded verbs: "We declare and define." The money verb is "We define." That’s what triggers the Church’s infallibility. It’s the traditional verb used by popes in engaging the charism of infallibility.

You’ll note that this verb is absent from proclamations that someone is a doctor. For example, when St. Therese of Lisieux was declared a doctor of the Church, this was the form of words used by John Paul II:

Fulfilling the wishes of many Brothers in the Episcopate and of a great number of the faithful throughout the world, after consulting the Congregation for the Causes of Saints and hearing the opinion of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding her eminent doctrine, with certain knowledge and after lengthy reflection, with the fullness of Our apostolic authority We declare Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus and the Holy Face, virgin, to be a Doctor of the Universal Church. In the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit [SOURCE].

There’s no "We define" in that. Therefore, the pope is not making a definition and so is not triggering infallibility.

The same goes for the proclamation of other titles among saints. For example, here is the form of words used to proclaim St. Thomas More the patron of statemen and politicians:

Therefore, after due consideration and willingly acceding to the petitions addressed to me, I establish and declare Saint Thomas More the heavenly Patron of Statesmen and Politicians, and I decree that he be ascribed all the liturgical honours and privileges which, according to law, belong to the Patrons of categories of people [SOURCE].

Again, no "I define."

Now, I’ve answered the question so far on textualist grounds–pointing out that the texts do not use the language popes conventionally use in triggering infallibility. I haven’t pointed out why.

The basic reason is that the status of being a doctor is different than being a saint. If someone is a saint, that means that the person is in heaven. That’s a binary, on/off thing that can be the subject of a definition more easily than what is at issue when the title of "doctor" is bestowed. Someone either is in heaven or he isn’t. But in the case of a doctor the Church is honoring someone for being a really good teacher. The quality of someone’s teaching isn’t an on/off, binary kind of thing, though. The quality of teaching is something that exists on a continuum, and one that cannot be measured except impressionistically. As a result, it would be less clear what is being defined if a pope attempted to define that someone "is a really good teacher" (whatever words this might be put in) rather than that someone "is in heaven."

Now, in the case of both saints and doctors there are ancillary concepts associated with the Church’s bestowal of these titles. In both cases there is the idea that the person was holy and a good example for the faithful to emulate, but these are slippery concepts that also exist on continua.

The core of sainthood is still a binary, on/off condition: being heaven.

Something similar applies in the case of patrons. Here there is also the idea that the person was holy and worthy of emulating but the core of patronage is different: The patron is a person from whom the faithful (or certain groups of the faithful) ask intercession, either in general or concerning a particular matter. The proclamation of a patron thus is more a directive to the faithful–a directive to look to this guy for intercession and to emulate his example.

Thus when John Paul II proclaimed Thomas More the patron of statesmen and politicians he used the verb "I establish" rather than just "I declare." In establishing him as a patron of certain individuals, the pope thereby directed those individuals to seek his intercession and emulate his example.

Thus there is no attempt to engage the Church’s infallibility here either since no matter is being defined; rather an exhortation or directive is being given.

Annulments & Infallibility

A reader writes:

Thanks for your blog, I enjoy it a lot — and I’m a So. Baptist!

A question I’ve wondered about:  Are pronouncements of annulment infallible (perhaps "inherently efficacious" would be a better term) regardless of the truthfulness of the testimony the judgement is based on?

For example, a couple divorces and one spouse files for and recieves an annulment based on objectively false testimony.  (E.g., he claims he was drunkor under duress.)  Leaving aside the one partner’s grave sin of perjury, would the other spouse be free to remarry assuming she knows that the judgement of the court is in error?

We’d have to distinguish at this point between legally free and actually free.

Legally, if the marriage was annuled by the proper authority then the parties are legally free to marry someone else, assuming there are no other impediments affecting the situation (e.g., if the partner wishes to marry someone who is a priest or is under age or is another woman then that’s a no-go because the other party is not legally free to marry her).

In terms of actual freedom, the situation is more complex. At issue is whether the tribunal’s judgment was erroneous. For this to be the case, the following conditions would need to obtain:

  1. Some of the evidence presented to the tribunal was fraudulent,
  2. The tribunal’s decision was based on this evidence (rather than other, non-fraudulent evidence they may also have), and
  3. There are no other solid grounds for the marriage to be null.

In your example, you have stipulated that condition (1) applies: The husband lied in presenting some of the evidence to the tribunal. But presumably not all of the evidence before the tribunal is fraudulent. If that is the case then the decision to annul might have been based on non-fraudulent evidence and thus be correct, in which case condition (2) does not apply.

Further, even if the tribunal did base its judgment on the fraudulent evidence such that without this evidence it would not have issued a decree of nullity then there could still be other factors rendering the marriage null that never came to the tribunal’s attention. If that’s the case then condition (3) does not apply. It thus could be that the tribunal’s decision to annul was correct in spite of the fact that it was based on fraudulent evidence.

If the decision was correct–either because it was based on non-fraudulent evidence or because there was a hidden reason for nullity that never came to the tribunal’s attention–then the woman is actually free to marry someone else as well as legally free.

What she is morally free to do depends on her awareness of her actual freedom. If she is actually free but has no reason to believe that she is free and simply thinks that she got an annulment because her ex-husband lied then she is not morally free to marry a new person. She is actually free to do so because she is not really married to her first husband, but he is not morally free to act on this because as far as she knows, the two of them are hitched.

On the other hand, it could happen that she is actually free to marry and she knows it even though she also knows that her ex lied to the tribunal. It could be, for example, that she is aware of the fact that either conditions (2) or (3) do not apply. For example, she might be aware of a hidden but unprovable ground for nullity that was never submitted to the tribunal. (Let’s also suppose that she is a qualified canonist so that she knows with great thoroughness what are and aren’t grounds for nullity.) In that case she is legally free to marry (because she has an annulment) and she is actually free (because the marriage really was null) and she knows it, making her morally free.

Such cases would likely be very rare, and no one in such a situation should rapidly conclude that they were morally free to marry. (The chances of self-deception on the question of whether one is actually free are quite substantial.) But it is possible in principle.

However, this is not because the tribunal has the ability to dissolve the marriage.

I guess the answer would depend on if "binding and loosing" authority is exercised, or if the court is claiming only to recognize that a marriage never existed.

It’s the latter. Valid, consummated marriages between baptized people can never be dissolved by anything except death, and so tribunals can’t dissolve them. They can, however, issue findings of fact about whether such a marriage ever existed.

Such findings are not protected by infallibility. (They could be if the pope were to intervene and infallibly define the status of a particular marriage, but that never happens.) The law is written  to err on the side of caution in these matters (thus whenever a tribunal issues a finding of nullity then it is automatically appealed for a second examination). Error is possible, but the system is designed to produce more false positives (i.e., findings that a couple is validly married when they are not) than false negatives (i.e., findings that a couple is not validly married when they are).

PS — The question above is purely theoretical.  My wife and I are happily married lifelong Baptists.  I just greatly appreciate the intellectual rigor RC’s bring to moral questions.

Thanks for asking! Hope this helps!

Annulments & Infallibility

A reader writes:

Thanks for your blog, I enjoy it a lot — and I’m a So. Baptist!

A question I’ve wondered about:  Are pronouncements of annulment infallible (perhaps "inherently efficacious" would be a better term) regardless of the truthfulness of the testimony the judgement is based on?

For example, a couple divorces and one spouse files for and recieves an annulment based on objectively false testimony.  (E.g., he claims he was drunkor under duress.)  Leaving aside the one partner’s grave sin of perjury, would the other spouse be free to remarry assuming she knows that the judgement of the court is in error?

We’d have to distinguish at this point between legally free and actually free.

Legally, if the marriage was annuled by the proper authority then the parties are legally free to marry someone else, assuming there are no other impediments affecting the situation (e.g., if the partner wishes to marry someone who is a priest or is under age or is another woman then that’s a no-go because the other party is not legally free to marry her).

In terms of actual freedom, the situation is more complex. At issue is whether the tribunal’s judgment was erroneous. For this to be the case, the following conditions would need to obtain:

  1. Some of the evidence presented to the tribunal was fraudulent,
  2. The tribunal’s decision was based on this evidence (rather than other, non-fraudulent evidence they may also have), and
  3. There are no other solid grounds for the marriage to be null.

In your example, you have stipulated that condition (1) applies: The husband lied in presenting some of the evidence to the tribunal. But presumably not all of the evidence before the tribunal is fraudulent. If that is the case then the decision to annul might have been based on non-fraudulent evidence and thus be correct, in which case condition (2) does not apply.

Further, even if the tribunal did base its judgment on the fraudulent evidence such that without this evidence it would not have issued a decree of nullity then there could still be other factors rendering the marriage null that never came to the tribunal’s attention. If that’s the case then condition (3) does not apply. It thus could be that the tribunal’s decision to annul was correct in spite of the fact that it was based on fraudulent evidence.

If the decision was correct–either because it was based on non-fraudulent evidence or because there was a hidden reason for nullity that never came to the tribunal’s attention–then the woman is actually free to marry someone else as well as legally free.

What she is morally free to do depends on her awareness of her actual freedom. If she is actually free but has no reason to believe that she is free and simply thinks that she got an annulment because her ex-husband lied then she is not morally free to marry a new person. She is actually free to do so because she is not really married to her first husband, but he is not morally free to act on this because as far as she knows, the two of them are hitched.

On the other hand, it could happen that she is actually free to marry and she knows it even though she also knows that her ex lied to the tribunal. It could be, for example, that she is aware of the fact that either conditions (2) or (3) do not apply. For example, she might be aware of a hidden but unprovable ground for nullity that was never submitted to the tribunal. (Let’s also suppose that she is a qualified canonist so that she knows with great thoroughness what are and aren’t grounds for nullity.) In that case she is legally free to marry (because she has an annulment) and she is actually free (because the marriage really was null) and she knows it, making her morally free.

Such cases would likely be very rare, and no one in such a situation should rapidly conclude that they were morally free to marry. (The chances of self-deception on the question of whether one is actually free are quite substantial.) But it is possible in principle.

However, this is not because the tribunal has the ability to dissolve the marriage.

I guess the answer would depend on if "binding and loosing" authority is exercised, or if the court is claiming only to recognize that a marriage never existed.

It’s the latter. Valid, consummated marriages between baptized people can never be dissolved by anything except death, and so tribunals can’t dissolve them. They can, however, issue findings of fact about whether such a marriage ever existed.

Such findings are not protected by infallibility. (They could be if the pope were to intervene and infallibly define the status of a particular marriage, but that never happens.) The law is written  to err on the side of caution in these matters (thus whenever a tribunal issues a finding of nullity then it is automatically appealed for a second examination). Error is possible, but the system is designed to produce more false positives (i.e., findings that a couple is validly married when they are not) than false negatives (i.e., findings that a couple is not validly married when they are).

PS — The question above is purely theoretical.  My wife and I are happily married lifelong Baptists.  I just greatly appreciate the intellectual rigor RC’s bring to moral questions.

Thanks for asking! Hope this helps!

The End Of The Diet?

Today I’ve been writing in response to a gentleman who weighs 175 lbs and wants to lose 20 lbs. Compared to many folks, he’s quite close to his weight goal, which is great! But it also brings up a note of caution that I’d have for him:

One
thing I need to warn you about, though, is what happens when you get to
your weight goal. If you approach dieting with the idea that as soon as
you hit your desired weight you can go back to eating exactly the way
you used to then your diet will do you no good at all. It may even harm
you.

When you get to your weight goal you can modify your eating habits somewhat so that you stop losing weight, but you can’t just go back to eating the way you are now or all the weight (and likely then some) will come back.

This is important to know when you are as close to your weight goal as
you are. If you had a hundred pounds to lose then the idea of making a
permanent change in your eating habits would set in long before you got
to the target weight. With only twenty pounds, though, (ten of which is
likely water weight that will come off in the first two weeks) you may
get to your weight goal so quickly that you are tempted to think of a
diet as just a temporary change of eating habits.

But the thing is: You body is used to weighting 175 lbs. That is where
you "set point" is right now. You can get away from the set point by
changing your eating habits, but if–as soon as you hit 155 lbs.–you
completely stop dieting then your body will try to trick you into
getting back to 175, because that’s where it’s used to being. It will
treat 175 as your normal weight and 155 as some kind of temporary
famine weight that it wants to get away from as quick as it can. You
have to stay at 155 for long enough for your body to establish a new
set point, for your body to think 155 as the "new" normal, and that
means a longer commitment to new eating habits than just the effort
needed to get down to 155.

Both Atkins and South Beach have modified, longer-term variants
(described in their respective books) to help you keep the weight off,
but you’re so close to your goal that you need to be aware of these up
front or you may think that you don’t need the diet any more and stop
as soon as you hit your weight goal (in which case five to ten pounts
of water weight will come back within a matter of days upon resuming
your previous eating habits, and fat weight will start accumulating
again also).

Hope this helps, and happy dieting!

His & Hers Dieting

Earlier I was answering a reader who was asking about whether to go on the Atkins or South Beach diet. Here’s another consideration I’d raise for him to think about:

One thing that you don’t mention in your list but that may be

important is the fact that you are a guy. After reading lots of diet

books, it has become clear to me that certain diets are better suited

to "guy psychology" and others to "gal psychology." In other words,

guys and gals will find certain diets easier to do than others. For

example, diets that require more complicated cooking tend to be easier

for women than men on average, since women are more comfortable doing

complicated cooking on average.

The most extreme "gal" diet I’ve yet encountered is the Fat Flush diet,

which is so female-centered that the author doesn’t even bother writing

the book for both sexes. Instead, the author writes exclusively on the

assumption that the person doing the diet is female and then, at the

back of the book, has a single question devoted to "Can guys do

this diet?" It’s also clear from the nature of the diet why the writes so exclusively for

women. It’s not just that most dieters are women, it’s that the diet is

so micro-regimented that very few guys doing their own cooking would be willing to attempt it .

Guy dieters tend to have more of a "Just tell me what I need to know

and let me get on with it" attitude and don’t want to have to deal with

complicated menu plans or cooking.

Judged by that standard, Atkins is

more of a "guy" diet, and South Beach is more of a "gal" diet (though

nowhere near as much as Fat Flush).

Don’t get me wrong: Both genders can do perfectly well on both

diets. Many men may even prefer South Beach to Atkins (particularly if

they aren’t doing all of their own cooking), and many women may prefer Atkins

to South Beach (particularly if they are cooking for just themselves

and don’t want to make a lot of speciality dishes for just one person).

I’m simply saying that, on average, I suspect Atkins fits a little

better with guy diet psychology and South Beach fits a bit better with

gal diet psychology.

You mileage may vary.

His & Hers Dieting

Earlier I was answering a reader who was asking about whether to go on the Atkins or South Beach diet. Here’s another consideration I’d raise for him to think about:

One thing that you don’t mention in your list but that may be
important is the fact that you are a guy. After reading lots of diet
books, it has become clear to me that certain diets are better suited
to "guy psychology" and others to "gal psychology." In other words,
guys and gals will find certain diets easier to do than others. For
example, diets that require more complicated cooking tend to be easier
for women than men on average, since women are more comfortable doing
complicated cooking on average.

The most extreme "gal" diet I’ve yet encountered is the Fat Flush diet,
which is so female-centered that the author doesn’t even bother writing
the book for both sexes. Instead, the author writes exclusively on the
assumption that the person doing the diet is female and then, at the
back of the book, has a single question devoted to "Can guys do
this diet?" It’s also clear from the nature of the diet why the writes so exclusively for
women. It’s not just that most dieters are women, it’s that the diet is
so micro-regimented that very few guys doing their own cooking would be willing to attempt it .

Guy dieters tend to have more of a "Just tell me what I need to know
and let me get on with it" attitude and don’t want to have to deal with
complicated menu plans or cooking.

Judged by that standard, Atkins is
more of a "guy" diet, and South Beach is more of a "gal" diet (though
nowhere near as much as Fat Flush).

Don’t get me wrong: Both genders can do perfectly well on both
diets. Many men may even prefer South Beach to Atkins (particularly if
they aren’t doing all of their own cooking), and many women may prefer Atkins
to South Beach (particularly if they are cooking for just themselves
and don’t want to make a lot of speciality dishes for just one person).
I’m simply saying that, on average, I suspect Atkins fits a little
better with guy diet psychology and South Beach fits a bit better with
gal diet psychology.

You mileage may vary.

Atkins Vs. South Beach

A reader writes:

So could you answer a quick question for me?

I’d like your opinion on which diet to do: South Beach v. Atkins. 

Different diets work better for different people, so instead of simply telling you which to try, let me interact with the conditions you feel are important to making the decision and give you my impression of which way a particular consideration tips.

Impacting this decision:

– I’m 5’6", about 175 lbs., looking to drop about 20.

Okay, the good news is that your weight loss goals/needs are modest enough that probably either one of the diets will work for you. It’s not like you have 100 or more pounds you need to lose. If you did then you’d likely need to consider a more intensive strategy than you do.

– I currently have very little idea what I’m allowed to eat or not
eat with either diet, but really only have the time to read up on one.

If time is a consideration then that probably tips toward Atkins. The Atkins diet is built around a few simple principles that are easy to learn and that you then apply yourself to come up with your own menu. South Beach’s principles are "fuzzier" and it relies more heavily on telling you what you can and can’t eat. One of the things that South Beach does not do is give you a formula that you can go out and apply for yourself. It relies more on giving you lists of approved and disapproved menu plans and foods. This means that you have to rely more on the book and less on your self.

To put the contrast crisply: I could take two minutes and tell you the principles you need to know to do Atkins, but there’s no way to do that with South Beach because the author never comes out and gives you a concise list of principles to follow. He doesn’t offer a concise "formula" the way Atkins does.

– I more or less have my wife’s support.

That probably tips toward Atkins, too. Because of the way South Beach works, it involves a lot more specialty cooking. A typical man will need more spousal support for South Beach than for Atkins. The cooking is (or can be) simpler in Atkins than in South Beach.

– I really don’t like vegetables; the only ones I eat are corn, potatoes, and baby spinach, and not much of those.  The spinach I can do once a day, but I don’t particularly like it, and eat the leaves raw.  I’ve tried to change this behavior toward veggies, but by now it’s so ingrained I can’t avoid the gag reflex.

Corn and potatoes will be a problem under either diet. Baby spinach will be fine under both.

Both diets will want you to eat veggies, but it’s easier to ignore this if you’re doing Atkins than if you’re doing South Beach.

 

– I do eat most fruits.

If you really want to eat fruits then that would tip towards South Beach. Fruit options are more limited under Atkins. If you can take or leave fruits then it doesn’t really matter.

 

– I eat all kinds of meat, but am also currently a carb addict.

As far as meat goes, this tips slightly toward Akins. Both allow meat, but Atkins allows a bit more diversity in kind and quantity than South Beach.

As far as being a carb addict, this is less of a concern than it used to be as there are so many low carb alternatives on the market now (e.g., low carb tortillas are in all of the grocery stores–at least out here–and they can be used not only for the obvious purposes but also for things like making sandwiches and pizza; Dreamfields pasta is also in all the supermarkets out here).

Atkins is stricter on carbs in the first two weeks of the diet, but after that there’s really not much of a difference as after the first two weeks Atkins will let you eat as many carbs as you want as long as your weight loss doesn’t stop.

 

– We’re not poor, but we also don’t have a lot of money to spend on diet foods, vitamins, etc., although I do plan to try your fiber supplement idea.

Neither diet requires you to buy speciality foods, though they are there if you want them (particularly when you want a treat, like low carb candy or ice cream).

Neither diet requires nutritional supplements, though Atkins talks them up more. Your goals are modest enough that you can probably get by with just a good multivitamin (which you ought to be taken anyway). If you had more weight to lose then supplementation would be more of a priority.

 

– I drink a LOT of diet soda.

Neither diet prohibits this, though both will tell you to avoid taking in huge amounts of caffeine since caffeine stimulates insulin production and that will inhibit weight loss. When I first went on Atkins (before South Beach was on the market), I lost a very large amount of weight while drinking diet cokes like crazy (though a good chunk of that was Diet Rite brand since this kind has neither caffeine nor NutraSweet). Both diets will allow diet coke, and even moderate caffeine.

That deals with the list of considerations you mention, but there are a couple more things I’d like to offer that may be helpful. Since this post is getting lengthy, though, I’ll spin them off into new posts.