A reader writes:
Thanks for your blog, I enjoy it a lot — and I’m a So. Baptist!
A question I’ve wondered about: Are pronouncements of annulment infallible (perhaps "inherently efficacious" would be a better term) regardless of the truthfulness of the testimony the judgement is based on?
For example, a couple divorces and one spouse files for and recieves an annulment based on objectively false testimony. (E.g., he claims he was drunkor under duress.) Leaving aside the one partner’s grave sin of perjury, would the other spouse be free to remarry assuming she knows that the judgement of the court is in error?
We’d have to distinguish at this point between legally free and actually free.
Legally, if the marriage was annuled by the proper authority then the parties are legally free to marry someone else, assuming there are no other impediments affecting the situation (e.g., if the partner wishes to marry someone who is a priest or is under age or is another woman then that’s a no-go because the other party is not legally free to marry her).
In terms of actual freedom, the situation is more complex. At issue is whether the tribunal’s judgment was erroneous. For this to be the case, the following conditions would need to obtain:
- Some of the evidence presented to the tribunal was fraudulent,
- The tribunal’s decision was based on this evidence (rather than other, non-fraudulent evidence they may also have), and
- There are no other solid grounds for the marriage to be null.
In your example, you have stipulated that condition (1) applies: The husband lied in presenting some of the evidence to the tribunal. But presumably not all of the evidence before the tribunal is fraudulent. If that is the case then the decision to annul might have been based on non-fraudulent evidence and thus be correct, in which case condition (2) does not apply.
Further, even if the tribunal did base its judgment on the fraudulent evidence such that without this evidence it would not have issued a decree of nullity then there could still be other factors rendering the marriage null that never came to the tribunal’s attention. If that’s the case then condition (3) does not apply. It thus could be that the tribunal’s decision to annul was correct in spite of the fact that it was based on fraudulent evidence.
If the decision was correct–either because it was based on non-fraudulent evidence or because there was a hidden reason for nullity that never came to the tribunal’s attention–then the woman is actually free to marry someone else as well as legally free.
What she is morally free to do depends on her awareness of her actual freedom. If she is actually free but has no reason to believe that she is free and simply thinks that she got an annulment because her ex-husband lied then she is not morally free to marry a new person. She is actually free to do so because she is not really married to her first husband, but he is not morally free to act on this because as far as she knows, the two of them are hitched.
On the other hand, it could happen that she is actually free to marry and she knows it even though she also knows that her ex lied to the tribunal. It could be, for example, that she is aware of the fact that either conditions (2) or (3) do not apply. For example, she might be aware of a hidden but unprovable ground for nullity that was never submitted to the tribunal. (Let’s also suppose that she is a qualified canonist so that she knows with great thoroughness what are and aren’t grounds for nullity.) In that case she is legally free to marry (because she has an annulment) and she is actually free (because the marriage really was null) and she knows it, making her morally free.
Such cases would likely be very rare, and no one in such a situation should rapidly conclude that they were morally free to marry. (The chances of self-deception on the question of whether one is actually free are quite substantial.) But it is possible in principle.
However, this is not because the tribunal has the ability to dissolve the marriage.
I guess the answer would depend on if "binding and loosing" authority is exercised, or if the court is claiming only to recognize that a marriage never existed.
It’s the latter. Valid, consummated marriages between baptized people can never be dissolved by anything except death, and so tribunals can’t dissolve them. They can, however, issue findings of fact about whether such a marriage ever existed.
Such findings are not protected by infallibility. (They could be if the pope were to intervene and infallibly define the status of a particular marriage, but that never happens.) The law is written to err on the side of caution in these matters (thus whenever a tribunal issues a finding of nullity then it is automatically appealed for a second examination). Error is possible, but the system is designed to produce more false positives (i.e., findings that a couple is validly married when they are not) than false negatives (i.e., findings that a couple is not validly married when they are).
PS — The question above is purely theoretical. My wife and I are happily married lifelong Baptists. I just greatly appreciate the intellectual rigor RC’s bring to moral questions.
Thanks for asking! Hope this helps!
Such findings are not protected by infallibility. (They could be if the pope were to intervene and infallibly define the status of a particular marriage, but that never happens.)
Jimmy, are you sure about this? I thought papal infallibility required the subject matter to be a question of faith or morals. For example, if a pope made an ex-cathedra statement that the earth was flat, it wouldn’t be infallible, would it? It seems to me whether Joe and Mary Smith’s marriage is valid is not a question of faith or morals, rather a finding of fact.
Help me out here.
The Church’s infallibility covers not only matters of faith and morals per se (the primary object of infallibility) but also ancillary matters needed to explain and apply the deposite of faith (the secondary object of infallibility).
Within the secondary object of infallibility are “dogmatic facts,” such as “X was a valid ecumenical council,” “Y is a person who is in heaven,” “Z included an infallible proclamation,” and–hypothetically–“U and V are person who are validly married.”
Within the secondary object of infallibility are “dogmatic facts,” such as . . . “U and V are person who are validly married.”
Would that same protection of infallibility apply to “negative” dogmatic facts, such as “U and V are persons who are not validly married” or “Y is a person who is not in heaven”?
Such findings are not protected by infallibility.
So it’s possible to get an annulment (declaration of nullity) where a true sacramental marriage really exists?
Oh the horror! What does that mean for those who may marry such annulled people? Are they are committing adultery with every marital act?
How many people lie to get annulments? The number must be enormous.
I think this is another argument for why Christianity is not a dispositive life, e.g. avoid these things and you are saved. In contemplating God’s perfect justice and perfect mercy, two seemingly opposed concepts, one I think should seek strong spiritual direction before going down the road BillyHW describes. This seemed to be one of the topics that grieved John Paul II greatly.
Billy, the case is as if someone married after receiving false news of their spouse’s death. If they honestly believed the spouse to be dead, they are not sinning. If they have reason to believe the spouse alive, they are sinning.
I’ve wondered, though, suppose a spouse gets an anullment or is told that their spouse is died, then, after remarrying, they learn that their spouse is still alive or that their anullment was based on false information and that their are no valid grounds for an anullment. Aren’t they then obligated to leave the second spouse and return to the first?
We’d like to think this never happens, but I do recall Pope John Paul II issuing a warning to marriage tribunals that they need to be very careful and assume that the marriage is valid unless the reverse is proven. The fact that he did this makes me wonder if tribunals sometimes, in a misguided attempt to be merciful, grant annulments when they really shouldn’t.
Cease to have marital relationships with the second spouse, to be sure.