Darth Ginsburgh recently gave a speech in South Africa that has received a great deal of comment. In it, she showed herself to be a very petty, spiteful woman who is willing to take cheap and manifestly unjust shots at those who disagree with her judicial philosophy. It really knocked her down several rungs in my book, which I was kind of surprised by considering how low she already was in my book. It turns out that my ladder of respect has more rungs on its lower end than I was previously aware of. (It gets kinda dim down there, and my eyes aren’t so good, y’know.)
As part of the speech, she defended the indefensible way in which recent SCOTUS cases have relied on foreign law, which I think constitute grounds for impeachment for her and the other justices who drew on foreign law sources to overrule the will of the American people as expressed through the laws that had been democratically established in this country.
Jeremy Rabkin has an interesting look at Ginsburgh’s defense of the indefensible, which is quite insightful.
In part he point out:
In her South Africa speech, Justice Ginsburg tried to frame such practices as looking to foreign law to "add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions." It is much closer to the truth to say that what the Court is doing is shifting its perspective from America to the world at large, so that positions with less support in the United States can still be viewed–in a global context–as majority or dominant positions. Rather than looking to thoughtful analysis of "trying questions," the Court, in effect, takes a poll–on an international basis.
In all three recent cases where foreign opinion was cited, the Court faced the difficulty of explaining why it was abandoning contrary constitutional rulings from as recently as the 1980s. The Court tried to say that opinion had since changed, as some states had changed their laws on such questions as whether tests of mental deficiency would be relevant to imposition of the death penalty. Not enough states had actually changed their laws, so the Court, in effect, enlarged the count to include foreign jurisdictions. Red states and blue states might be evenly balanced at home but 25 nation-states of the European Union could tip the balance, if counted.
In one of its capital punishment cases, as Justice Ginsburg noted, the Court had received amicus briefs from Nobel Prize winners such as Jimmy Carter. What has this to do with legal analysis? It is simply a way of appealing from the views of American voters to those of electors for the Nobel Prize–the sort of people who regard President Bush as a reckless cowboy and Jimmy Carter as a distinguished statesman.
He also illustrates the problem in a way that may be of special interest to JA.O readers, considering how often the topic of canon law comes up here:
To see the partisan character of appeals to foreign authorities in this setting, one need only think of a close analogy. If foreign law, why not religious law? Why not the canon law of the Catholic Church? As it happens, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited "canon law" in more than two dozen cases over the past 200 years. Most of the references are entirely incidental, but a few cases in the early 20th century actually engaged with Church sources, among others, in wrestling with the meaning of "due process." More recent cases have insisted that secular courts cannot enter into disputed questions of church law when asked to determine claims about ownership of church property or tenure in religious office.
Suppose that Catholic or conservative justices began to regularly cite canon law on the most controversial constitutional disputes–on such matters as family law or medical ethics. These justices could insist, as Justice Ginsburg does, that such "foreign opinions are not authoritative" and "set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge" but simply "add to the store of knowledge." In today’s world, the protests from liberals would be deafening, because such soothing abstractions would be seen as disingenuous. To treat canon law as any sort of "persuasive authority" would be intensely divisive. The "foreign opinion" that liberals prefer has no more inherent relevance or authority, however. We could save a lot of needless dispute by agreeing in advance that all sides will play by American rules.
One can imagine the howl that would go up from liberals if the Court took this path, and it does indeed illustrate the circumvention of the will of the American people by drawing substance from law sources that the American people have not voted for.
But this is just one of the problems that Rabkin brings out in his essay, so
GET THE STORY.