A reader writes:
In Exodus 1, God blessed some women for lying, because their lies saved the first born Hebrews. There are other examples of people lying in the Old Testament and it being a good thing.
So, can morality be relative depending on circumstances? I know sin can change from grave to venial depending on circumstances, but in that example I used, God blessed them, not just excused their lies as venial sins.
Thanks!
Let’s look at the passage:
15: Then the king of Egypt said to the Hebrew midwives, one of whom was named Shiph’rah and the other Pu’ah,
16: "When you serve as midwife to the Hebrew women, and see them upon the birthstool, if it is a son, you shall kill him; but if it is a daughter, she shall live."
17: But the midwives feared God, and did not do as the king of Egypt commanded them, but let the male children live.
18: So the king of Egypt called the midwives, and said to them, "Why have you done this, and let the male children live?"
19: The midwives said to Pharaoh, "Because the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian women; for they are vigorous and are delivered before the midwife comes to them."
20: So God dealt well with the midwives; and the people multiplied and grew very strong.
21: And because the midwives feared God he gave them families.
While many folks look at this passage and conclude that God blessed the midwives for lying, this conclusion does not seem to be borne out by the text, which expressly states that the reason for the blessing was the midwives’ fear of God. This fear of (reverence for) God was manifest chiefly in the midwives’ refusal to kill the Hebrew baby boys. What they told Pharaoh in their desperation was just a secondary attempt to keep what they had done from being exposed and them from being executed.
The lie thus seems secondary to the main thing, which was their defiance of Pharaoh’s evil order so that they might honor God. It’s a "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). Since they obeyed God, God blessed them, as well as excusing the lie they told.
That being said, when reading the Old Testament one must recognize that due to progressive revelation not everything, in particular not everything regarding God’s will, was as clear at the time as it later came to be. (Indeed, the Ten Commandments hadn’t even been given at the time of Exodus 1; they weren’t given until Exodus 20). The total incompatibility of lying with God’s will thus may not have been as clear to the people of the day as it is to us, and this may have played a role in God treating them as he did (i.e., not holding the lie against them).
See also Aquinas’s brief treatment (obj. 2 and reply) of this story.
Whoops – that was me. Jimmy! Why doesn’t your “Remember personal info” box seem to work for me? (Yes, I have cookies enabled – and it works on other typepad blogs on which I comment.)
Oh, Aquinas also deals with it again in the subsequent article (obj. 4 and reply).
Wouldn’t this be a case where “double effect” applies?
BTW, your “remember personal info” doesn’t work for me either, but then I may not have cookies enabled.
Not to be all techie, but I think the life of the cookie has been shortened. I have been having to retype my info when I first post, but on subsequent posts, I’m remembered.
Well, I had to retype mine each time for the comments above – only a few min. apart. That’s a pretty darn short-lived cookie.
Anyway – double-effect reasoning doesn’t help here. Remember, one of its conditions is that the bad effect not be the means to the good one. When you tell a lie, the falsehood is the means to the good end (e.g., saving lives).
With regard to your comment about all lying being a sin, I was under the impression that the famous hypothetical of telling the Nazis “there are no Jews here” when they show up to find them was ok, even if you were hiding an assortment in your attic. Something about the Nazis not having the right to know meant it was ok. Have I been misled?
Jamie
The “right to know” predicate (for lack of a better word) has seen waxing and waning over time: currently, given the new Catechism, it seems to be in a waning cycle….
Given that, when necessary, it is justifiable to kill in defense of oneself or others, it would seem only logical that it would be justifiable to lie to defend oneself or another from a gross injustice.
More importantly, where exactly is LYING declared intrinsically evil? Of course you will point out that is is “Bearing False Witness”, but a full reading is Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness Against your neighbor”. Which leaves completely open the validity of bearing false witness IN FAVOR of your neighbor. Such is the case with the often cited, “how do you like my dress” quandry.
I would think that dishonesty would come into play more of as a Wisdom teaching or one of charity, under which case, it is certainly dependent on the circumstances.
Otherwise, I can’t think of a case where lying is strictly ruled out in and of itself.
On the other hand, I believe you will find many circumstances where “deception” are used even at God’s command in order to achieve a greater purpose.
Given that God is Truth, naturally He takes a dim view of lying. It also makes things harder for others to find Truth if people who do know Truth keep lying to them.
That said, there are shades of deception. And legitimate stratagems of war aren’t so much deception as an alternate form of beating people over the head with a big stick. Sorta like diplomacy. 🙂
The Catechism (as revised in 1997) does indeed seem to agree with Aquinas in ruling out all lying as at least venially – and often mortally – sinful. Of course, if the person to whom the lie is told doesn’t have a right to the information, that’d be one of the things that’d cut in the direction of the lie’s being venially rather than mortally sinful. Still, we ought not do any evil – even less than grave evil – that good may come of it. (Of course, we may withhold the truth in other ways from those who don’t have a right to it – we may even say things that are objectively true but will likely be misinterpreted.)
And the difference between lying and killing is that killing can be, in Aquinas’s phrase, praeter intentionem. It can be a “double effect.” It’s not clear that lying can.
Well, we have the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” but many instances where God commands killing. And we have the commandment not to bear false witness, but many instances where saints in the Old Testament told lies or used deception or misdirection in order to save lives or defend Israel. Not just the midwives, but also in the cases of Rahab and Judith. Jael as well could be a case of deception, although she didn’t actually utter a falsehood with her tongue, but did it nonverbally — Sisera expected her to take care of him, but she waited until he was asleep and then nailed his head to the floor.
So, if the intent is not to deceive, but to save life, could that be a case of “double effect”? Or rather would it be a venial sin?
Jared, regarding commands to kill: Remember that the 5th commandment, precisely translated, forbids murder, not “killing.” Remember also Jimmy’s point about progressive revelation (the pope notes in Evangelium Vitae that the OT doesn’t go as far as does the Sermon on the Mount).
Regarding deception: Remember that deception can be licit – when the person deceived has no right to the truth – and when it’s not done by lying.
Finally: For “double effect” to work, not only does the ultimate intention have to be something good (to save a life), but also, the means by which one intends to accomplish that end have to be good. The evil has to be truly a “side effect.” If you tell a lie in order to save a life, the lie is intended (as a means).
I admit I’m a little unclear on the distinction between lying and deception. The former, in a literal sense, would be verbal, though I know in a metaphorical sense can be nonverbal. The latter would be either verbal or nonverbal. Why is the one never licit and the other sometimes licit? They seem to belong together, and should then be either licit or illicit. . . .
Well, I’m just going to have to think about this some more. Thanks for your help, Kevin.
Considering the inquisitive murderer. . . .
Would it be right to give someone back a gun when you know he intends to commit murder with it? Even if the gun was his, and you agreed to give it back when he asked for it?
Jared: “Deception” is a broader category than “lying.” Lying involves telling an objective falsehood – rather than, for example, saying something objectively true but likely to be misinterpreted (Soldier: “Do you know where Athanasius is?” Athanasius: “Yes, he is not far from here”).
The reason they’re morally different – lying is never permissible; other forms of deception can be, when the person deceived has no right to the truth – is that lying is a kind of abuse of the faculty of speech.
Mary: No, you shouldn’t give back the gun. Property rights are (as Jimmy has mentioned in another context) relative to someone’s reasonable will. If someone wants a gun to commit murder, his will to have the gun is not reasonable. Finally, breaking a promise is not necessarily the same thing as telling a lie. If you make a flat-out promise while, at that time, already intending to break it, you’re lying. But if you change your mind about keeping a promise because an unforseen situation has arisen, you weren’t and aren’t lying.
The point is, that the only reason that giving back the gun is wrong — as opposed to a duty — is that you know he will commit murder with it.
Withholding the means of a sin from someone is a good deed in itself, and giving them is a sin in itself. Indeed, you are guilty if you give someone a gun believing he will commit murder, but innocent if you do not believe it (and have reasonable grounds to be ignorant of it).
Therefore, “double effect” may indeed apply. The liar is not lying to (indirectly) prevent a murder, but to (directly) avoid helping a murderer.