I was told in a discussion I was having with a fallen away Catholic the following:
There was a respected Cardinal theologian of the Vatican that wrote that the "virgin birth" is an "ontological" story … Not an "historical" one. The church doesn't even believe it. Do you know which Cardinal wrote that tenet of the church? Ratzinger!!!
My questions is the obvious one, has Pope Benedict XVI ever said anything close to this, and if so, I need an explanation.
I've been subsequently told that he did talk on the ontological reality of the Virgin Birth but did not deny the historical fact. However, I was given nothing to reference.
If your friend said that Cardinal Ratzinger contrasted a historical with an ontological Virgin Birth, there has been a misunderstanding somewhere along the line.
In fact, I don't know what it would mean to contrast a historical event with an ontological event. Ontology refers to the study of that which exists (fundamental reality), and if something is an ontological event then it can't be ahistorical (something that never occurred). I suppose one might talk about ontological realities that are outside of time, but I don't know what it would mean to say that the Virgin Birth is one of those.
That being said, there was a statement that Cardinal Ratzinger made in his book Introduction to Christianity which was criticized by Hans urs von Balthasar (not the same person as Gaius Baltar), in which he discussed the conception of Christ and contrasted the biological (not historical) and ontological aspects of the event.
What he said, in essence, was that a virginal conception was not necessary for God to become man. If he wanted to, God could have chosen for Christ to have a human father as well as a heavenly Father.
The ontological reality of the Son of God taking on human nature thus did not require the biological event of a virginal conception. God also could have used the biological event of a nonvirginal conception. The biological aspect of the conception of Christ is thus independent of its ontological dimension (God becoming man).
However, God did choose to use a virginal conception as a way of underscoring the fact that Jesus is the Son of God.
In a Messianic framework: If he has no earthly father, then whose Son is he?
Unfortunately, Cardinal Ratzinger was not–by his own admission–as clear as he meant to be, and some (like von Balthasar) took issue with him, while others outright misrepresented his view.
SDG here. No, I’m not taking a break from my Petrine Fact series, but I won’t be able to finish another installment until next week, so a couple of things I’ve been meaning to blog for awhile.
Let me search my memory. I think — no, I’m positive — this is the first movie I’ve seen where the hero dangles above a chasm lined with razor-sharp peanut brittle while holding onto a red licorice rope held by his girlfriend, who has a peanut allergy, so that when she gets cut by some brittle and goes into anaphylactic shock and her body swells up, she refuses to let go, and so the hero bites through the licorice to save her. You don’t see that every day.
And here’s how I started my review. Note especially the third paragraph:
What’s the last family film you can think of that name-checked Nikola Tesla and Alexander Graham Bell?
When in movie history has the girl ever revealed her true self and become more attractive to the hero by putting on spectacles and pulling back her hair?
And, let’s face it, when’s the last time any of us has seen a former child star wearing a giant roasted chicken battling comestible defense mechanisms while a peanut-allergic weather girl lowers the hero via licorice rappelling rope into a shaft of razor-sharp peanut brittle where the slightest scratch could prove deadly to her?
I just have to say: I love it that not only did we make essentially the same observation about so many of the same elements in our openings, we both used the same phrase “razor-sharp peanut brittle.”
That said, clearly I liked Cloudy better than Ebert (of course, Ebert hates 3‑D, which might have something to do with it), and I think the enjoyment of the film shows in my review, which was fun to write.
Gratifyingly, it looks like a lot of families are sharing the Cloudy love: Not only did it open at #1 a couple of weeks agao, it stayed in the top spot last weekend, sliding less than 20 percent (which is amazing). It’s depressing enough that G-Force, G. I. Joe and Transformers did so well without having families overlook a fun family flick like Cloudy that actually has heart and wit. (Don’t even get me started on Ponyo.)
If you only saw the trailers, Cloudy is a lot better than you think. Trust me.
Oh, and Ebert and I agree on The Informant — a deceptively amusing film for grown-ups.
But before we get to the "not" part, I want to give Mr. Easterbrook his props, because he makes several good points, including often overlooked ones, and he attempts to respond to those with an opposing view by attempting to address their arguments in a fair and evenhanded manner.
So let's take a look at what he has to say and try to sort the wheat from the chaff . . .
Human clones, it is widely assumed, would be monstrous perversions of nature. Yet chances are, you already know one. Indeed, you may know several and even have dated a clone. They walk among us in the form of identical twins: people who share exact sets of DNA.
Yes! This is a point people often overlook. Human clones already exist, and the answer to many of the things people wonder about clones (e.g., would they have souls, can you baptize them, etc.) can be answered just by asking the same question about identical twins. "Clone" just means "genetically identical individual." Clones are not mysterious, alien, science-fictiony creatures. In fact, the thing that makes a clone a clone is its sameness, not its differentness. And for whatever reason (reasons we don't have a good grasp on), human pregnancies sometimes result in two or more genetically identical individuals.
Such twins almost always look alike and often have similar quirks. But their minds, experiences, and personalities are different, and no one supposes they are less than fully human. And if identical twins are fully human, wouldn't cloned people be as well?
Bingo. They would. And therein lies the problem. They are fully human, so you have to treat them with full human dignity.
Suppose scientists could create a clone from an adult human: It would probably be more distinct from its predecessor than most identical twins are from each other. A clone from a grown-up would have the same DNA but would come into the world as a gurgling baby, not an instant adult, as in sci-fi. The clone would go through childhood and adolescence with the same life-shaping unpredictability as any kid.
Yah, though I'm not quite sure what is meant by "more distinct from its predecessor than most identical twins." I suppose what is meant is that a clone would have a life history that is more different from the life history of the original than the life histories of two identical twins. While I agree that that much may be true, I don't see how that results in "more distinct" individuals. Indeed, any time in the near future reproductive cloning will be used by very rich people who want "Mini-Me"s that they can creepily raise to inherit the corporation, and the clones will be steered down paths that nudge them in the direction of being "just like Dad."
Normal people will continue to make babies the old fashioned, two-parent way. Anyone who wants a clone of himself, and is willing to spend large amounts of money to get it . . . there's something wrong there. Something ego-centric–or even ego-maniacal.
The basic dehumanization involved in voluntary, reproductive cloning is the sheer will to power over another person that it represents. It's fully imposing my genetic Me-ness on another individual rather than lovingly combining with a spouse and giving origin to an individual that shares traits of both of us, leaving the mix of those traits up to Providence. It's making a child that says only "Me" rather than "Us."
Anyone who wants to so genetically dominate their offspring suffers from a morbid and inhuman sense of self.
The eminent University of Chicago ethicist Leon Kass has argued that human cloning would be offensive in part because the clone would "not be fully a surprise to the world." True, but what child is? Almost all share physical traits and mannerisms with their parents. By having different experiences than their parents (er, parent) and developing their own personalities, clones would become distinct individuals with the same originality and dignity as identical twins—or anyone else.
I'm not familiar with Leon Kass's work, and despite the conjunction of the words "university" and "ethicist"–which is a high-reliability marker for "rationalizer of dehumanization"–it's heartening to hear of a university ethicist objecting to human cloning.
Nevertheless, I don't find Kass's argument–at least in the micro-form in which Easterbrook presents it–to be persuasive.
On the other hand, while I agree that a normal child is not a total surprise to the world, and that total surprise is not a sine qua non of human reproduction, I don't buy at all the idea that developing one's own personality is needed for one to have human dignity (like "identical twins–or anyone else"). Dignity is something you have by virtue of being human. You don't have to grow or develop to have it. It's one of the standard features we come with from the factory, and mor
al principle requires it to be respected rather than disrespected.
Cloning does the latter by imposing on a child the disordered genetic will to power of a particular individual.
Others argue that cloning is "unnatural."
It is unnatural, but we have to be careful here what we mean by "nature." We've already seen that nature (meaning, the natural world) produces human clones in the form of twins. That's as may be, but the kind of nature we are concerned about in moral discussions is not the physical or empirical world but the moral principles that can be discerned by reflection on human nature. That's what natural law reasoning is all about (cf. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor).
Unfortunately, Easterbrook takes a serious misstep here, and his argument thus goes off track due to an inaccurate or inapplicable conception of nature.
But nature wants us to pass on our genes; if cloning assists in that effort, nature would not be offended.
"Nature" as the physical world doesn't care about anything at all because it's not a person. Easterbrook is certainly aware of this and is presumably speaking of nature "wanting" or being "offended" as a form of literary expression (i.e., personification), but that doesn't mean that the conclusion "nature would not be offended" (translated: "It is not immoral") follows from his premise that "nature wants us to pass on our genes."
The fact that we have a hereditary impulse to pass on our genes doesn't justify any and all means toward that end.
Take rape as an example. Rape occurs sometimes in the human population and very often in some animal populations. But would we countenance the argument that "nature wants us to pass on our genes; if rape assists in that effort, nature would not be offended"?
Nature as the blind, physical world would indeed not be offended, but that doesn't change the fact that for one human to rape another is hideously immoral–precisely because it is contrary to the moral principles embedded in human nature.
In fact, rape is in some ways a good analog for cloning, because in both situations a single individual fully imposes himself (or herself) on another–in one case sexually, in the other case genetically. They both represent, in different ways, the total imposition of Me.
And just as there is something disordered and sick about raping someone, there is something disordered and sick about wanting to genetically dominate another person and have another genetic you walking around.
Moreover, cloning itself isn't new; there have been many species that reproduced clonally and a few that still do.
This is quite true! But these species aren't human beings. The fact that ducks rape ducks does not constitute an argument that humans should rape humans. Think in terms of human nature and what is says about a human who would want a genetic copy of himself.
And there's nothing intrinsically unnatural about human inventions that improve reproductive odds—does anyone think nature is offended by hospital delivery made safe by banks of machines?
Inventions–technology–are just physical objects and thus not subject to being natural or unnatural. They just are. What is subject to being moral or immoral, natural or unnatural, is the use to which technologies are put.
If you have human reproduction being done in a natural, moral manner, technology that helps that (incubators, ultrasound monitors, etc.) is wonderful! Technology most certainly can assist reproduction done in accord with human nature.
But it cannot legitimately assist immoral forms of reproductive behavior. A rapist cannot legitimately use victim-immobilizer technology (a gun, a rope, etc.) or some kind of science fictiony nanotech to help get the gametes to meet to "improve reproductive odds."
Thus one can't use medical high-tech to help a megalomaniac fulfill his genetic dominance of his offspring fantasy.
This does not necessarily make human cloning desirable; there are complicated issues to consider.
Good point! Props to Easterbrook for being willing to explore this aspect of the subject.
Initial mammalian cloning experiments, with sheep and other species, have produced many sickly offspring that die quickly.
A very important point, though a subsidiary one since it doesn't go to the core reason why human cloning is wrong.
Could it ever be ethical to conduct research that produces sick babies in the hope of figuring out how to make healthy clones?
No! No, it could not! This treats human beings as objects, as medical experiments (cf. Nazis, Jews). The only legitimate reason to produce babies is to have babies. Human beings are ends in themselves. You cannot produce babies in order to "conduct research." That dehumanizes human beings (the babies in question), and it is thus contrary to human nature and thus immoral.
And clones might be treated as inferiors, rendering them unhappy.
I'm not sure if "rendering them unhappy" is meant to be humorous, but there's a lot of issues in this sentence. As to whether clones would be treated as inferiors in their post-birth lives, who can say? That depends on a variety of factors, though it is a possibility. Merely by being created they were mistreated since they had someone else's genetic will to power imposed on them at the moment of conception, and all those sick baby clones who got killed while the process was being perfected–they sure were treated as inferiors.
Still, human cloning should not be out of the question. In vitro fertilization was once seen as depraved God-playing and is now embraced, even by many of the devoutly religious.
There are devoutly religious people who will endorse any horror you want (and devoutly irreligious ones who will do exactly the same thing).
The fact that in vitro fertilization–which similarly subverts human nature and the reproductive process appropriate to it (and which also results in numerous abortions due to too many kids surviving the implantation process, and millions more kids kept indefinitely "on ice," contrary to their human dignity)–only shows how accustomed we have become to treating human beings like objects.
Cloning could be a blessing for the infertile, who otherwise could not experience biological parenthood.
As we've seen, this is one of those "ends don't justify the means" things. Experiencing biological parenthood is a good thing, but you can't use any means you want to achieve it, as we saw in our discussion of rape (and, contrary to the claims of some feminists, rape is not simply about power; it is often about pleasure and also about reproduction; this was illustrated by the Bosnian ethnic cleansing rapes of the 1990s in which militants of one ethnic group raped women of another specifically to produce children that would have their own ethnic group's blood),
And . . . anyone having a clone is not really experiencing biological parenthood. Being a biological parent among humans means having your genes intertwined with those of another of the opposite sex. Even identical twins–the human clones that do exist at present–have genes from two biological parents.
And it isn't just biological parenthood that the infertile want. They want the experience of raising a child that is biologically their own–both of theirs.
Cloning doesn't do that, as can be seen if you imagine cloning the context of an infertile couple. If the couple creates a clone of one of them then the other doesn't get the experience of biological parenthood. Instead, they're living in a marriage with a creepy Mini-You running around the house, changing the Mini-You's diapers, making sure that the Mini-You does its homework, etc.
At least IVF, as bad as it is, lets both spouses be biological parents!
So I don't see how cloning is a boon to the infertile–except for creepy infertile millionaires who want identical copies of themselves.
And, of course, it would be a blessing for the clone itself.
No. Life is a blessing to the clone. Cloning was not. Cloning was the immoral means used to create life. One could not rephrase this and say, "of course, rape would be a blessing for the child of a rape." Children born of rape are blessed by being alive, but that doesn't in any way justify the method by which they were conceived.
Suppose a clone is later asked, "Are you glad you exist even though you are physically quite similar to someone else, or do you wish you had never existed?" We all know what the answer would be.
Yes, we do, because the gift of life is so good. Except for the suicidal, nobody who is alive would rather not have been born. That's the survival drive that is also part of human nature, and just as with the other fundamental human drives–the drive to reproduce, the drive to eat, the drive to socialize with other humans, etc.–it represents a good end that cannot be pursued by evil means.
The children of rape also would rather exist than not exist but that isn't an argument for rape. In fact, though the act of rape gave these children life, it also gave them a broken life situation in which they must either be shielded from knowledge of their true origin or they must live under the shadow of the immoral act that led to their conception and that makes their origin different than everyone else's.
The act of reproductive cloning would put the resulting children in an analogous situation.
Let's not put them there.
Beyond what Mr. Easterbrook covers in his piece,
there are other problems with cloning, such as all of the kids who would be created, experimented upon, and then killed as part of "therapeutic cloning."
The bottom line is that you either have to respect the way human nature is set up or decide that we are just walking bags of chemicals that possess no intrinsic dignity or rights–"ugly bags of mostly water"–and that humans therefore can be subject to any form of technological manipulation imaginable.
I'm not dissing the idea of using technology to assist human reproduction (rather than replacing it with something else) or the idea of using technology to help people genetically (gene therapy! woo-hoo!!) or even the idea of technologically augmenting human nature (super powers! bring 'em on!!!).
I am rejecting the idea of treating people as objects which can be manipulated and exploited with no regard for human nature and human dignity.
If that's okay then find the right candidate, trick him out with whatever augments you want, program him to love his work and not be able to conceive any other, and then . . .
Recently I wrote about the case of Fatima al-Mutayri, a young Saudi woman who apparently gave her life to Christ and was then martyred by her family.
In her writings (.pdf), she mentions Arabic Christian satellite television as an influence in helping her find her way to Christ.
In particular, she mentions programs airing on the al-Haya (Life) network. One was the popular program of the Coptic priest Fr. Zakaria Botros. Another was the Daring Question show, which is hosted by two former Muslims who are only referred to by first names: Rashid and Ahmed.
I've found some clips of the Daring Question show that have English subtitles, and I thought they would provide a valuable window into the world of evangelization in the Arabic-speaking world and the kinds of heart wrenching situations that those who engage in it have to face.
Please keep these folks and all in like situations in your prayers.
SDG here with a quick note that I’m doing Catholic Answers Live tonight, so I’ll be preparing for that today. The Petrine Fact series resumes soon, tomorrow probably.
If you have a child (or a nephew, niece, grandchild, etc.) under the age of ten … or an open-minded child of any age … or if you remember childhood well enough to watch films like Bambi and The Many Adventures of Winnie-the-Pooh with five-year-old eyes … there is a movie in theaters you really should see, from a filmmaker whose work you really should know.
Ponyo
It does not have commando guinea pigs or magical museum displays in it — thank goodness. In fact, other than Up, it may be the summer’s highest point for family audiences, if not the only other high point.
Ponyo, from Japanese animation master Hayao Miyazaki, opened modestly this weekend — too modestly for a film this charming and imaginative. That parents are taking their children to the likes of G-Force, Transformers and G.I. Joe at multiplexes where Ponyo is playing right next door is downright depressing.
My Neighbor Totoro
Ponyo is in the tradition of Miyazaki’s 1980s family classics My Neighbor Totoro and Kiki’s Delivery Service — and if you have a child (or a nephew, niece, grandchild, etc.) under ten, etc., you definitely ought to catch those films on DVD. (Recently at Decent Films someone asked me for my top picks for kids under five, and both films made the cut.)
Roger Ebert rightly included My Neighbor Totoro in his first collection of Great Movies, and it’s a close runner-up for my hypothetical all-time top 10 list, if I ever officially drew one up. Kiki’s Delivery Service is also a masterpiece, very similar in spirit — gentle, humane, nearly plotless, full of magic, wonder and humor.
Kiki’s Delivery Service
Ponyo isn’t in the same league as these two films, but how many films are? This weekend I went to see it with eight kids ranging from almost 15 to 3. Everyone enjoyed it, including the two 14-year-olds; the three-year-old was mesmerized (and commented on the action throughout), and the six-year-old loved it.
Miyzaki has also created a number of movies that aren’t this gentle and childlike, but are mostly near-masterpieces in their own right — or better. If you don’t know Miyazaki, trust me, he’s well worth checking out. (There’s a reason that Miyzaki is revered and looked to for inspiration at Pixar.)
Spirited Away
Miyazakis I particularly recommend include the Animated Film Oscar winner Spirited Away (widely — and rightly IMO — considered the director’s masterpiece) and the sci-fi action epics Castle in the Sky / Laputa and Nausicaa of the Valley of the Wind. All of these are favorites in our family, though we haven’t shown Spirited Away to the younger ones.
Castle in the Sky
Other Miyazakis include the critically acclaimed Princess Mononoke (which I’m not as fond of), the (rightly IMO) less acclaimed Howl’s Moving Castle, the comparatively overlooked but enjoyable Porco Rosso, and the offbeat The Castle of Cagliostro, an early effort in an independent series about an adventuring thief (lots of fun, but language warning on this one … and note that it’s the only Miyazaki in this post with a Region 1 DVD distributor other than Disney).
An issue to be aware of is that Miyzaki’s films often express reverence for nature and environmental concerns in imaginative idioms reflecting the filmmaker’s cultural background, i.e., animism and Shinto. Tree spirits, river gods and (in Ponyo) sea-goddesses inhabit many (not all) of his films.
Nausicaa of the Valley of the Wind
I’ve written about the moral issues this raises for Christian viewers in my reviews of My Neighbor Totoro and Spirited Away, among others. FWIW, Miyazaki films that do not raise significant issues along these lines include Castle in the Sky and Kiki’s Delivery Service (see my review for comments about the film’s thirteen-year-old witch protagonist).
I’d like to write up some more Miyzakis when I have some time (I did a DVD Picks column on most of these films for next week’s National Catholic Register), and maybe later this week I’ll do another blog post on Miyzaki’s main themes and things to look for in his movies.
For now, make plans to see Ponyo. You won’t be sorry, I think.
Remember the LifeSiteNews Harry Potter / Pre-16 brouhaha? Jimmy has written about it morethanonce (as has Eastern Orthodox Harry Potter maven John Granger).
Well, the story’s still out there, and recently I got an email asking me about the Ratzinger letters as well as Fr. Amorth’s anti-HP comments, so I’ve offered my own take in a piece facetiously called “Harry Potter vs. the Pope?” (a play on the title of my eight-year-old essay “Harry Potter vs. Gandalf“).
The new essay is a spin-off of my Decent Films Mail column, for which I just posted two new batches, DF Mail #14 and DF Mail #15. In these batches: Watchmen and caveats of an (apparent) atheist-anarchist who objects to associating either label with nihilism; lots and lots on Up and Harry Potter; The Wizard of Oz and Theosophism; and more. If you haven’t read my DF Mail column, you might enjoy perusing the last few installments as well.
Sadly, Disney’s G-Force has nothing to do with this.
P.S. Sadly, G-Force has nothing to do with the much more awesome “Battle of the Planets.” In fact, the more I think about it, the more I suspect that the whole inspiration for G-Force (other than a corporate mandate to sell talking plush toys to children) began with a single family-film-ified pop-culture reference joke (“Yippie kay yay, coffee-maker”), and then the whole plot was constructed around that single line. What else could possibly be the explanation for a plot about robotic household appliances planning to take over the world (or whatever)?
This morning, (Monday, July 20th) Dr. Jack Sites, Academic Vice President of Ave Maria University, flew from Houston, where he was attending a meeting of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, to San Francisco, to inform me personally that I was being dismissed from Ave Maria University. Our meeting was amicable and Dr. Sites, as always, acted as a Christian gentleman.
He said that the reason for my dismissal stemmed from a conversation I had in November of 2008 with Jack Donahue, then chairman of the board of AMU. At that time I felt it an obligation to speak to the board chairman before the upcoming board meeting, to make sure he was aware of the urgency of the university’s financial situation. After I had informed him, using projections based on publicly available documents and statements, he asked me what I thought was the solution. I told him that there were policies being followed that were at the root of the problem, that the present administration was irrevocably wedded to those policies, and that without a change of administration the university was at great risk.
Dr. Sites said that Jack Donahue related this conversation to Tom Monaghan, and it was decided (I don’t know specifically by whom) that the university could not have a faculty member making these criticisms of the administration and thus undermining the university.
Dr. Sites told me that there were unspecified others who had similar substantive concerns that I was undermining the university.
I continue to support the university. I pray for its success. I have great admiration for the faculty, students, and many of the staff. I do disagree with some of the policies of the administration. This seems to be the reason I was fired the first time, in March 2007, since the official explanation was “irreconcilable administrative differences”.
Nevertheless, I think it is an accurate summary to say that I am being dismissed as a faculty member because of a private conversation with the chairman of the board in which I made known my criticisms of the university administration; and because of allegations which have not been made known to me and to which I have not been given an opportunity to respond.
I will continue to recommend AMU to students and parents. And I will continue to think my dismissal is another mistake in a long series of unwise decisions.
