Here’s A Howdeedoo!

Regarding the entry on what names are allowed, a reader writes:

Speaking of naming kids “God,” I’m reminded that Grace Slick did just that with hers–but with a lower-case “g” because she didn’t want to be pretentious….

Yeah, I was thinking about that when I wrote the post, but couldn’t remember if it was Grace Slick or another artist. She also later changed the name to something more normal.

Still, naming your kid “god” is something you’d expect from a Rock diva (DANGER WILL ROBINSON! DANGER! Killer Latin pun in immediate vicinity!)

Now here’s a howdeedoo! You probably could get away with naming your kid “Diva.”

Here's A Howdeedoo!

Regarding the entry on what names are allowed, a reader writes:

Speaking of naming kids “God,” I’m reminded that Grace Slick did just that with hers–but with a lower-case “g” because she didn’t want to be pretentious….

Yeah, I was thinking about that when I wrote the post, but couldn’t remember if it was Grace Slick or another artist. She also later changed the name to something more normal.

Still, naming your kid “god” is something you’d expect from a Rock diva (DANGER WILL ROBINSON! DANGER! Killer Latin pun in immediate vicinity!)

Now here’s a howdeedoo! You probably could get away with naming your kid “Diva.”

Baby Rose By Any Other Name . . .

baby. . . would still have stinky diapers. 😛

‘Kay, yesterday at Mass they had three babies baptized, and it reminded me that a while back someone wrote and asked about whether it is required to give saint names to babies. (Sorry for the delay in answering.)

As the reader recognized, there would be problems with having a strict, saint-name-only policy. In particular, it would make it impossible to get new names into the system, and that would be a special problem in newly evangelized lands, where the saint names would all be foreign.

So what’s the scoop?

Well, here’s what the 1917 Code of Canon Law had to say about the matter:

Canon 761

Pastors should take care that a Christian name is given to those whom they baptize; but if they are not able to bring this about, they will add to the name given by the parents the name of some Saint and record both names in the book of baptisms.

Pretty sneaky, eh? If the parents refuse to slap a saint name on the kid, the priest was to do it in spite of them, and perhaps behind their backs to keep them from being alienated from the Church.

Now note that, strictly speaking, the requirement wasn’t that the kid be given a saint name. It was that he be given “a Christian name.” This was understood to include not only the names of saints but also other pious names, such as the virtues (Faith, Hope, Charity, Modesty, Chastity, Prudence). The great majority of the time, though, having “a Christian name” meant having a saint name.

If, however, the pastor couldn’t get the parents to agree to “a Christian name,” he was to slap a saint name on the kid in spite of the parents’ wishes. You could see why parents would get honked off at this practice.

And so it’s no surprise that the law don’t say that no mo. Here’s what the 1983 Code of Canon Law says:

Canon 855

Parents, sponsors, and the pastor are to take care that a name foreign to Christian sensibility is not given.

Now the shoe is on the other foot! The pastor doesn’t have the obligation (or authority) to name a child in spite of the parents. He and the parents, with the sponsors, have the joint obligation not to pick a name “foreign to Christian sensibility.” It doesn’t have to be a Christian name, it just can’t be contrary to Christian sensibility.

If the text had said that it couldn’t be foreign to Christian tradition then it would have to be a name that has some kind of resonance in Christian history, but since the text said that it can’t be foreign to Christian sensibility the law opens the door to things that have not previously been found in Christian tradition.

Further, what parents name their children is usually something they feel strongly about, and pastors (at least those informed about the law) will generally be reluctant to challenge parents as long as the proposed name at least arguably doesn’t violate it.

This gives pretty wide latitude. About the only names you couldn’t give your kid would be things that would be clearly offensive (e.g., “God,” “Satan”) or perhaps deliberately bizarre (e.g., “Moon Unit,” “Motor Head”).

Even in these areas one must tread with some care, because different cultures (and people from those cultures) will consider different things offensive. For example, the popular Spanish name “Jesus” is not offensive (so you can name your child “Jesus”, but not “God”). You might not be able to name your kid “Satan,” but you could name him “Judas” (after Judas Maccabeus or the apostle Judas mentioned in John 14:22 and specifically distinguished from Judas Iscariot; this Judas not-Iscariot may be be Simon the Zealot under another name).

There’s even biblical precedent for including the name of a pagan god in Christian tradition, for one of St. Paul’s evangelist associates was named “Apollos.” In families of Scandinavian origin, even the name “Thor” might be argued to have been received into Christian tradition; there have been a lot of Christians named that in Scandinavia, such as the explorer Thor Heyerdahl (though if the parents were neo-pagans the name clearly would not be permissible, but then the usually wouldn’t being presenting the child for Christian baptism).

A lot of contemporary names that are made-up just to sound pretty also probably could pass muster under this canon, especially if they are pretty–beauty being in the eye of the parental beholder. Only in the most extreme cases would many pastors be inclined to challenge parents on the grounds that the name they made up to give their child is awful-sounding, though Slartibartfast might get challenged, at least on grounds of imprudence if not offensiveness.

A real test would be whether ESPN McCall could get baptized with that name. It’d be harder to argue that the name EWTN McCall would be contrary to Christian sensibilities, especially if the parents had a moving testimonial about how the network saved them from a life of sin and converted them to Christ. 😉

Friday Penance III: The Search For Spock

A reader wrote a couple of lengthy but thoughtful posts on the Friday penance topic, and I thought I’d respond to them. Rather than clog the main blog space with my equally lengthy reply, I’ve put it in a continuation of this post so readers won’t have to scroll through it if they don’t want to read it.

If you don’t know about the Friday penance discussion we’ve been having, here’s a link to part I and here’s a link to part II.

My comments in the extension are in bold.

Continue reading “Friday Penance III: The Search For Spock”

Since Tomorrow Is Friday . . .

. . . I thought I would get around to blogging something that I’ve been meaning to do for a while: discuss what is and is not required by Catholics in observance of Friday.

First, let’s start with the universal law of the Latin church, as found in the Code of Canon Law:

Can. 1251 Abstinence from eating meat or some other food according to the prescripts of the conference of bishops is to be observed on all Fridays, unless a solemnity should fall on a Friday. Abstinence and fasting are to be observed on Ash Wednesday and Good Friday.

Can. 1253 The conference of bishops can determine more precisely the observance of fast and abstinence as well as substitute other forms of penance, especially works of charity and exercises of piety, in whole or in part, for abstinence and fast.

The universal law in the Latin church, therefore, is that Catholics are to abstain from meat on all Fridays except solemnities and on Ash Wednesday. However, canon 1251 allows national conferences of bishops to substitute some other food for meat as the object of abstinence, and canon 1253 allows the national conference to go even further in regulating the practice of abstinence. This means that we, in the U.S., need to look at what the particular law is for the United States and how it may differ from universal law.

The U.S. norms are found in a document titled On Penance and Abstinence, dated Nov. 18, 1966, which despite the revision of the Code of Canon Law remains in force. Before we look at the norms provided by that document, a word about it is in order: Like virtually everything a national conference produces, it’s a compromise document and reflects tensions between different parties in the bishops’ conference in 1966. Some bishops undoubtedly didn’t want to make the changes the document provides, while others may have wanted to go even farther. One thing the bishops were united in, however, was a desire not to be perceived as gutting the Church’s penitential practice. When one reads the whole document, it is clear that the bishops are bending over backwards to avoid conveying this impression.

The effect of the considerations is that one must read the document carefully. One must do that with any law, but particularly with controversial compromise texts like this one, a person trying to determine what the law is must pay very careful attention to the language being used by the document and what it says regarding the faithful’s obligations under law. In this document, it is particularly necessary to distinguish between the language of law and the language of exhortation. The former pertains to the legal change the bishops were making, and the latter pertains to the pastoral “spin” the bishops want put on the situation. As we’ll see, they remove legal obligations while going on to exhort people to do things freely that were formally obligatory. In this way they seek to avoid the impression that they are gutting the Church’s penitential practice.

Now, here are the norms the document provides:

1. Friday itself remains a special day of penitential observance throughout the year, a time when those who seek perfection will be mindful of their personal sins and the sins of mankind which they are called upon to help expiate in union with Christ Crucified;

2. Friday should be in each week something of what Lent is in the entire year. For this reason we urge all to prepare for that weekly Easter that comes with each Sunday by freely making of every Friday a day of self-denial and mortification in prayerful remembrance of the passion of Jesus Christ;

3. Among the works of voluntary self-denial and personal penance which we especially commend to our people for the future observance of Friday, even though we hereby terminate the traditional law of abstinence as binding under pain of sin, as the sole prescribed means of observing Friday, we give first place to abstinence from flesh meat. We do so in the hope that the Catholic community will ordinarily continue to abstain from meat by free choice as formerly we did in obedience to Church law. Our expectation is based on the following considerations;

a. We shall thus freely and out of love for Christ Crucified show our solidarity with the generations of believers to whom this practice frequently became, especially in times of persecution and of great poverty, no mean evidence of fidelity in Christ and his Church.

b. We shall thus also remind ourselves that as Christians, although immersed in the world and sharing its life, we must preserve a saving and necessary difference from the spirit of the world. Our deliberate, personal abstinence from meat, more especially because no longer required by law, will be an outward sign of inward spiritual values that we cherish.

The big legal change comes in norm #3, where the bishops state that “we hereby terminate the traditional law of abstinence as binding under pain of sin, as the sole prescribed means of observing Friday.” So the obligation to abstain from meat is terminated. The question becomes: What obligation, if any, have the bishops put in its place?

The clause “as the sole prescribed means of observing Friday” is consistent with the idea that they did establish another obligation or a mandate to do penance in some form on Friday, but it also is consistent with the idea that they did not establish a new obligation. If the latter is the case then the remark is simply noting that previously abstinence had been the only prescribed way of observing Friday. Other acts of penance could be performed on Friday, but they had to be in addition to abstinece.

To find out what other obligation there may be, one must look at the surrounding text of the norms. When one does this, one discovers several things.

The first, per norm #3, is that the bishops “especially commend to our people for the future observance of Friday . . . we give first place to abstinence from flesh meat.” This is an exhortation and as such does not establish a legal obligation. So abstinence continued to be a recommended practice for the observance of Friday, but not a legally binding one.

The next thing, per norm #1, is that Friday continues to be a day of penance. The norm clarifies the sense in which this is to be understood by explaining that it is “a time when those who seek perfection will be mindful of their personal sins and the sins of mankind which they are called upon to help expiate in union with Christ Crucified.” This qualification strongly suggests that, though Friday is a day of penance, it is not one on which all of the faithful are legally bound or bound under pain of sin to do penance. Instead, “those who seek perfection” will do penance on the day. If the bishops intended all to be bound to do penance on Friday, they would not have used such restrictive language.

This interpretation is confirmed by norm #2, which states that “Friday should be in each week something of what Lent is in the entire year. For this reason we urge all to prepare for that weekly Easter that comes with each Sunday by freely making of every Friday a day of self-denial and mortification in prayerful remembrance of the passion of Jesus Christ.” Again, the language of exhortation is used (“we urge”) rather than the language of mandate. Thus no obligation is created. If the bishops intended to create an obligation then they would have used other language, such as “all are required to prepare for that weekly Easter.”

The norms–the part of the document that would create a legal obligation if there was one–thus fails to do so. As a result, there is no obligation in the United States to practice penance on Friday, but Friday remains a day of penance which the bishops have urged all to do penance and, in particular, recommended the continued practice of abstience.

Reading the remainder of the document confirms the interpretation outlined above. As a compromise document and a controversial one, the stress that is placed on the recommendation to continue to do penance and to abstain is great, and with an inattentive reading the strength of the recommendation might lead one to think that there is an obligation to do penance on Friday. But a careful reading of the text shows that the language being used in the text never strays from the language of exhortation to the language of legal mandate.

There also is a dog that didn’t bark in this text.

The bishops were so concerned to avoid the impression that they were gutting the practice of penance that if they were creating an alternative obligation then they could not have failed to underscore this point. It would have been the most crushing rejoinder to their potential critics if they had said something like, “Though we have terminated the obligation to abstain, the faithful are nevertheless bound to perform a penance of their choice on Fridays and thus the Catholic practice of Friday penance remains in place even though the form the penance takes is now left to the determination of the individual.” The fact that the bishops nowhere say this or anything like it strongly indicates that it was not the bishops’ intent to create an alternative obligation. Calling attention to the alternative obligation by frankly stating it would have utterly invalidated the criticism the bishops were most concerned to avoid.

But the fact that the bishops nowhere state an alternative obligation indicates that one does not exist. Legal obligations do not exist that are not legislated.

Thus we conclude that the American bishops have exercised their competence, later acknowledged by canon 1253 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, to determine more particularly the manner of abstinence by restricting it to a few days a year (Ash Wednesday, the Fridays of Lent, and Good Friday–the last being part of Triduum rather than Lent) and by recommending the continued practice of abstinence on other Fridays. Rome confirmed this document, and thus it is the law for Latin Catholics in the United States.

This also is the understanding indicated in the Canon Law Society of America’s New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law. The commentary on canon 1253 summarizes the obligations and recommendations without indicating that a legal obligation to do penance continues to exist on typical Fridays of the year.

I Thought This Only Happend On Soap Operas

Man meets woman.

Man sleeps with woman.

Woman gets pregnant.

Woman demands they marry.

They do.

Baby looks nothing like man.

Woman claims babies switched in hospital.

Man threatens to sue hospital.

Woman admits baby was fathered by second man.

Marriage gets annulled.

Court orders woman to pay man $42,000 for jerking him around in this fashion.

Okay, the last one is a giveaway that this didn’t happen in America. It happened in South Korea. If it had happened here, I somehow doubt the man would have been able to be successful in court.

Breaking and Entering in Self-Defense?

A politician in Greenland is pleading self-defense on a breaking and entering charge.

Her argument is that it was too cold outside (this was Greenland, after all) and so she needed to get liquor to warm up. A local hotel which contained liquor was closed, so she forced her way in to get it.

Must . . . resist . . . making . . . joke . . . about . . . boozy politicians . . . and their . . . crazy antics.

Is That It For Marbury v. Madison?

I finished my audio course on Roman history (review to come) and am now doing a course on major Supreme Court decisions. The first case the course considers is Marbury v. Madison, the 1803 decision in which the Court first exercised its power of judicial review (i.e., its ability to declare a law unconstitutional). This power is not enumerated in the Court’s powers in the Constitution, nor is it granted to the Court by statute, and so every commentary on the case focuses on its historic significance as carving out new power for the Court.

I’m not interested in that.

Actually, I am, but not at the moment. There is an argument to be made that the power of judicial review is implied in the Constitution, but what interests me presently is whether Marbury v. Madison was rightly decided. I’m thinking that it was not, but I’m not a legal scholar, and so perhaps someone reading this blog who is a legal scholar can tell me whether my reasoning is sound.

Here’s the basic issue: This guy named Marbury had been appointed justice of the peace by the president. I know, you’re saying “Big whoop. A justice of the peace. So what?” but back then being a justice of the peace was a Big Deal. The problem is, his commission document was never delivered to him, so he petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an order to the Secretary of State (James Madison) to fork over the commission. Problem was, Madison was part of a new administration that didn’t want to do that, and so he wouldn’t.

Marbury’s lawyer went to the Supreme Court and said, “Look, your honors, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave y’all the power to issue orders of that kind if someone approaches you directly (rather than working his way up through the lower courts), so please issue one in this case.”

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, said–in effect–“You’re right that the law in question says we have the power to issue such orders if someone approaches us directly, but the problem is that this law is unconstitutional. Congress can’t give us that power because it is prohibited by Article III of the Constitution, which says:

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

“This means,” Madison in effect continued, “that we the Court have original jurisdiction (i.e., people get to approach us directly) only in a limited number of cases and in all other cases we have only appellate jurisdiction (i.e., people will have to work their way up through the courts). When Congress said we could issue the kind of order you’re after, they were adding an item to our original jurisdiction which the Constitution says should belong to our appellate jursidiction. Therefore, what they said was wrong. The law is unconstitutional. Too bad. So sad. You’re out of luck.”

This seems like a blazingly bad argument to me because there is a big honking EXCEPTION written into the Constitution itself. What the relevant provision says is: “In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”

It seems to me that in writing the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Congress was making one of the exceptions that the Constitution said it had the power to make by adding a new item to the list of things that belonged to the Court’s original jurisdiction.

I’ve done a little searching around on the web and found some practical arguments why this is a bad idea (e.g., the Court would be overwhelmed with people petitioning it to issue such orders to government officials), but this is not an argument addressing what the law says.

Could any legal scholars out there point me to a discussion of the exceptions clause in Article III and why it would or would not affect the Court’s ruling in Marbury v. Madison? I can think of ways to argue this issue back and forth, but I’d like to read some professionals kicking the issue around.

Is That It For Marbury v. Madison?

I finished my audio course on Roman history (review to come) and am now doing a course on major Supreme Court decisions. The first case the course considers is Marbury v. Madison, the 1803 decision in which the Court first exercised its power of judicial review (i.e., its ability to declare a law unconstitutional). This power is not enumerated in the Court’s powers in the Constitution, nor is it granted to the Court by statute, and so every commentary on the case focuses on its historic significance as carving out new power for the Court.

I’m not interested in that.

Actually, I am, but not at the moment. There is an argument to be made that the power of judicial review is implied in the Constitution, but what interests me presently is whether Marbury v. Madison was rightly decided. I’m thinking that it was not, but I’m not a legal scholar, and so perhaps someone reading this blog who is a legal scholar can tell me whether my reasoning is sound.

Here’s the basic issue: This guy named Marbury had been appointed justice of the peace by the president. I know, you’re saying “Big whoop. A justice of the peace. So what?” but back then being a justice of the peace was a Big Deal. The problem is, his commission document was never delivered to him, so he petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an order to the Secretary of State (James Madison) to fork over the commission. Problem was, Madison was part of a new administration that didn’t want to do that, and so he wouldn’t.

Marbury’s lawyer went to the Supreme Court and said, “Look, your honors, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave y’all the power to issue orders of that kind if someone approaches you directly (rather than working his way up through the lower courts), so please issue one in this case.”

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, said–in effect–“You’re right that the law in question says we have the power to issue such orders if someone approaches us directly, but the problem is that this law is unconstitutional. Congress can’t give us that power because it is prohibited by Article III of the Constitution, which says:

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

“This means,” Madison in effect continued, “that we the Court have original jurisdiction (i.e., people get to approach us directly) only in a limited number of cases and in all other cases we have only appellate jurisdiction (i.e., people will have to work their way up through the courts). When Congress said we could issue the kind of order you’re after, they were adding an item to our original jurisdiction which the Constitution says should belong to our appellate jursidiction. Therefore, what they said was wrong. The law is unconstitutional. Too bad. So sad. You’re out of luck.”

This seems like a blazingly bad argument to me because there is a big honking EXCEPTION written into the Constitution itself. What the relevant provision says is: “In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”

It seems to me that in writing the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Congress was making one of the exceptions that the Constitution said it had the power to make by adding a new item to the list of things that belonged to the Court’s original jurisdiction.

I’ve done a little searching around on the web and found some practical arguments why this is a bad idea (e.g., the Court would be overwhelmed with people petitioning it to issue such orders to government officials), but this is not an argument addressing what the law says.

Could any legal scholars out there point me to a discussion of the exceptions clause in Article III and why it would or would not affect the Court’s ruling in Marbury v. Madison? I can think of ways to argue this issue back and forth, but I’d like to read some professionals kicking the issue around.

"My Object All Sublime . . . "

. . . I shall achieve in time:

To let the punishment fit the crime

The punishment fit the crime.

The Mikado

I had mixed feelings reading this story, which reveals that one in 75 American men is in prison. On the one hand, I’m very much in favor of strong sentencing laws, and the crime rate is down. If figures like that are really needed to control the crime problem, I don’t have a problem with it.

On the other hand, I’m not convinced that chucking people in prison is always the best way for malefactors to be punished. Corporal punishment is an alternative to prison that has served many societies well and is less harmful to a person’s ability to lead a productive, law-abiding life after punishment than prison is. Some countries that use it have fewer people in prison and also have lower crime rates (remember the whole Singapore caning controversy from a few years ago?). Prison, by contrast, tends to serve as simply a school in how commit further crimes and that hardens criminal in a destructive lifestyle.

I also have a basic desire to see justice be done, and this means that the punishment must fit the crime. For some crimes, punishments are presently waaaay out of whack with the actual harm caused by the crime.

A few years ago I was making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and on the flight to Tel Aviv the stewardesses (who were remarkably surly with the passengers–to the point of unprofessionalism) began threatening the passengers with $50,000 fines for lighting a cigarette outside of the smoking area. I’m sorry, but no matter how much one may oppose smoking, the idea that lighting a cigarette in the non-smoking section does $50,000 worth of damage to the community is simply crazy.

A similar area where the punishment is way out of whack with reality is in copyright law. Punishing offenders who are pirating copyrighted works for sale is one thing, but hitting people with $540,000 law suits because their daughters downloaded a few songs from the Internet for private use is similarly bonkers. The songs themselves would cost a few dollars, and even magnifying the fine for the bad example set by the offending daughters setting a bad example for others, one still comes nowhere near the kind of life-ruining damage done by the potential fine. The punishment is simply incommensurate with the offense and thus unjust.

As long as whacko special interest groups are able to get legislation like this passed to protect their interests with the threat of massive retaliation, though, I don’t see this changing.