Which Church (Sui Iuris) Do You Enter at Baptism?

In the combox down yonder, a reader writes:

I'd be curious how to find out what rite one is. I have a friend who was born to a Latin mother and a Ukrainian Catholic father and was baptized in a Byzantine Catholic church. As we understand it, it depends on what year he was baptized in, but we're not sure how the church of baptism factors into it. In any case, it's an interesting general question as to how the various rites are kept track of and managed as far as individuals are concerned.

Here is what the present law says:

Code of Canon Law (1983)

Can. 111 §1. Through the reception of baptism, the child of parents who belong to the Latin Church is enrolled in it, or, if one or the other does not belong to it, both parents have chosen by mutual agreement to have the offspring baptized in the Latin Church. If there is no mutual agreement, however, the child is enrolled in the ritual Church to which the father belongs.
§2. Anyone to be baptized who has completed the fourteenth year of age can freely choose to be baptized in the Latin Church or in another ritual Church sui iuris; in that case, the person belongs to the Church which he or she has chosen.

Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (1990)

Canon 29
§1. By virtue of baptism, a child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year of age is enrolled in the Church sui iuris of the Catholic father; or the Church sui iuris of the mother if only the mother is Catholic or if both parents by agreement freely request it, with due regard for particular law established by the Apostolic See.
§2. If the child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year is:
(1) born of an unwed mother, he is enrolled in the Church sui iuris to which the mother belongs;
(2) born of unknown parents, he is to be enrolled in the Church sui iuris of those in whose care he has been legitimately committed are enrolled; if it is a case of an adoptive father and mother, §1 should be applied;
(3) born of non-baptized parents, the child is to be a member of the Church sui iuris of the one who is responsible for his education in the Catholic faith.

And here is what the prior law said:

Code of Canon Law (1917)
Canon 756
§1. Children must be baptized according to the rite of the parents.
§2. If one parent belongs to the Latin rite, and the other to an oriental [rite], the children are baptized according to the rite of the father, unless provided otherwise by special law.
§3. If only one [parent] is Catholic, the children are to be baptized in that rite.

As you can see, there are some options. Partly, it does depend on when the child was baptized (and I'm presuming the child was under 14). If it was before 1983, the 1917 Code's canon would have applied. If it was after 1983 then that year's Code's canon would have applied. And if it was after 1990s, the Eastern Code's canon would also have applied.
It isn't just the year that is in issue, though. It is also the choice of the parents if it was after 1983.
My guess is that since the child had a Byzantine rite father and a Latin mother and the child was baptized in a Byzantine church that the parents probably had not agreed to have it baptized as a Latin (otherwise one would think it would have been baptized in a Latin parish). So probably the child belongs to whichever Byzantine rite church the father belongs to.
Which raises another point . . .
There is a difference between a "rite" and an Eastern Catholic church.

Canon 28
§1. A rite is the liturgical, theological, spiritual and disciplinary patrimony, culture and circumstances of history of a distinct people, by which its own manner of living the faith is manifested in each Church sui iuris. 

§2. The rites treated in this code, unless otherwise stated, are those which arise from the Alexandrian, Antiochene, Armenian, Chaldean and Constantinopolitan traditions. 

Canon 27
A group of Christian faithful united by a hierarchy according to the norm of law which the supreme authority of the Church expressly or tacitly recognizes as sui iuris is called in this Code a Church sui iuris.

So properly speaking the child belongs to a church sui iuris (a church with its own law) and the church follows a particular liturgical/theological/spiritual/etc. rite. There are more than a dozen Catholic churches sui iuris that follow the Byzantine rite, but the child is only a member of one of them.

New Rules on Sex Abuse–What Will the Vatican Announce?

A few months ago, during the height of the latest abuse scandal, the Holy See created a new page on its website offering resources documenting the Church’s response to the problem over the last number of years.

HERE’S THE PAGE.

One of the things they put on it was a brief, layman’s guide to the procedures the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith uses in evaluating cases of priestly sexual abusers.

HERE’S THAT DOCUMENT.

One of the things that document did was say that there is a revision underway of the current regulations, which are set forth in a motu proprio called Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela. Specifically, the document said:

For some time the CDF has undertaken a revision of some of the articles of Motu Proprio Sacramentorum Sanctitatis tutela, in order to update the said Motu Proprio of 2001 in the light of special faculties granted to the CDF by Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI.

Now a plethora of press reports indicate that the publication of the revision is nigh. In fact, according to several press accounts, it was approved by Pope Benedict in a Saturday audience with Cardinal William Levada (head of the CDF) last week. (NOTE: That it was a Saturday audience is kind of odd. Normally the pope meets with the head of the CDF on Fridays, though perhaps not that much should be read into the shift of days.)

There is no way of knowing at this point how accurate the press accounts are of what the new norms will say, but piecing bits together from different reports suggest that there may be interesting things afoot.

First, what kind of form will the new norms take? It appears that they may not be a new motu proprio—which is a document issues by the pope. Instead, they may be an instruction, which is the kind of document the head of the CDF could issue with the approval of the pope.

It also appears that, concerning priestly sexual abuse, they will largely serve to reinforce the status quo. They will not, according to at least one report, mandate a “one strike and you’re out” policy on a global level. This kind of policy is in place in the United States and in certain other countries, but it has not been mandated globally. If the mainstream media goes after the new norms in a big way, expect it to go after this aspect of them as proof the Holy See isn’t doing enough or still doesn’t “get it.”

Another thing the mainstream media may go after is that the new norms will certainly not require bishops all over the world to report suspected abusers to the police. The norms may say something about complying with local law regarding sexual abuse, but they won’t mandate automatic reporting to civil authorities because it would give totalitarian countries—like Communist China or Vietnam or, apparently, Belgium—a new tool for persecuting the Church, or harming the confidentiality of accusers (some will come forward only on the condition they they aren’t going to have to get involved with the criminal justice system, which is one of the reasons such victims have been speaking out against the actions of the Belgian authorities; they had been frank with the Church under conditions of confidentiality, only to have their files seized by the state for possible use in criminal prosecutions, meaning that the victims may be dragged into civil court).

However understandable the Holy See’s motives may be in not mandating universal reporting to the authorities, don’t count on the MSM to understand them.

A change that the media might see as “good but not enough” in the new norms is the extension of the statue of limitations on reporting priestly sexual abuse from 10 years to 20 years, starting with the victim’s 18th birthday. The CDF has the ability to waive the current 10 year statute of limitations, and according to reports it routinely does so, so the extension to 20 years actually would represent a kind of codification of the status quo.

An interesting expansion of the way sex abuse cases will be treated, reportedly, is that possession of child pornography will now be counted as one of the offenses reserved to the CDF.

At least one source as reports that the abuse of mentally impaired adults will be classified as one of the reserved offenses, putting it on par with child sexual abuse.

It is also expected that the document will make certain provisions that are currently handled as “exceptions” to present norms. According to John Allen, the set of exceptions:

• Allows one judge on a church tribunal to be a lay person, and eliminates the requirement of a doctorate in canon law;
• Allows for by-passing trials in especially grave cases, removing abuser priests on the basis of a decree;
• Gives the doctrinal congregation power to “sanate” the acts of lower courts, meaning to clean up any procedural irregularities;
• Establishes that an appeal in abuse cases goes to the doctrinal congregation rather than the Signatura, the Vatican’s highest court.

There are also indications that the new norms may deal with other crimes reserved to the CDF, but these have not been the focus of current reporting.

MORE INFORMATION: HERE, HERE, HERE, AND HERE.

Speculation is that the new norms will be announced in the next two weeks, but of course we’ll have to see whether that is the case, as well as whether the above report correspond to what they will actually say.

Count on the media to try to milk maximum sensationalism out of the story (just look at some of the language used in the New York Times’ preliminary report).

In the meantime, what are your thoughts?

What Do Italian Priests’ Mistresses Want You To Know?

A group of 40 or so mistresses of Italian priests, including Stefania Solomone (pictured), want you—and especially Pope Benedict—to know that they don’t like priestly celibacy.

That’s why they’ve written the Pope a letter (Italian original) on the subject.

The occasion was Pope Benedict’s statement that

“The horizon of the ontological belonging to God also constitutes the proper framework for understanding and reaffirming, in our day too, the value of sacred celibacy which in the Latin Church is a charism required for Sacred Orders and is held in very great consideration in the Eastern Churches . . .

“It is an authentic prophecy of the Kingdom, a sign of consecration with undivided heart to the Lord and to “the affairs of the Lord”, the expression of their gift of self to God and to others. The priest’s vocation is thus most exalted and remains a great mystery, even to us who have received it as a gift. Our limitations and weaknesses must prompt us to live out and preserve with deep faith this precious gift with which Christ has configured us to him, making us sharers in his saving Mission.”

The mistresses particularly objected to the phrase “sacred celibacy,” who seem to have determined to write their letter “from the moment we heard the reaffirmation of the sacredness of what is not sacred in the least.”

This episode just fills me with sadness.

The discipline of celibacy (i.e., remaining unmarried, which implies continence, or abstaining from sexual relations as its corollary in Christian morality) for the service of the Kingdom has been part of Christian patrimony since the time of the apostles. Jesus himself recommended it in the Gospels, though he noted that it was not a gift given to everyone.

How that discipline is applied in particular ages and in particular spheres of the Church is something that has changed over time.

There is no reason in principle why the Church could not change its discipline regarding clerical celibacy in the future. The question is whether it would be prudent to do so, and what form of revision—if any—would be beneficial.

A Catholic can thus legitimately hold the opinion that the Church should modify or even abolish the discipline of clerical celibacy.

There was a period after Vatican II where there was a great expectation that a change in the discipline would be coming in the near future, which created unrealistic hopes in many. It also, no doubt, helped alienate many priests when these unrealistic expectations were not fulfilled, leading many of them into sexual sin (with adult women; wanting permission to marry a woman doesn’t correlate with desires to have sex with children) or out of the priesthood entirely.

The pressure was so great that John Paul II judged it prudent to take the subject off the table, even though it is a matter of Church discipline rather than dogma, and so he and others at the Vatican repeatedly stressed that the subject was not up for discussion.

Pope Benedict has taken a somewhat different tack. In the 2007 Synod of Bishops on the Eucharist, he allowed the subject to be discussed among the participants. As one might expect, reports at the time indicated that some of the Eastern bishops, who deal with the practical difficulties of a married clergy, were the most vocal in stressing that the Latin Church should not abolish its discipline on this point. So the topic was discussed, and that bishops recommended that it not be pursued further (at least at this time). That’s right there in the propositions that the bishops delivered to the pope as recommendations (see Proposition 11).

So on the one hand, my heart goes out to Pope Benedict, who has been singularly unafraid of dialog on points where the Church could change its discipline, including dialog on this point in particular. Yet as this story gains traction in the world press, he stands to be shoved into the media mold of “mean old celibate pope”—when in reality he has been willing to have the subject of revising the Latin Church’s celibacy discipline be seriously discussed!

My heart also goes out to the mistresses, because they have a human desire to marry those to whom they are romantically attached and are genuinely pained at the situation in which they find themselves.

That’s the position in which mistresses commonly find themselves.

But the thing is . . . they’re mistresses.

They are living a life that is objectively sinful.

They are violating very basic and well-known elements of Christian morality. It’s hard to claim innocent ignorance in this case.

The same thing goes—even moreso—for the priests with whom they are involved.

One can feel for the emotional distress over the situation in which they find themselves, and one can understand their petition for a change in Church law that would allow them to regularize their situations, but at the same time there is a tragic dimension to their situation that remains unacknowledged in their letter: They are, in fact, living in sin.

And it’s a big one, overlaid with sacrilege because priests are involved—a factor that weighs even more heavily on the priest in the relationship than one the mistress, because the priest is responsible for his consecrated person in a way that others are not.

It is a tragedy that these people attached romantic feelings to each other—something that they knew from the beginning was wrong.

So reading the letter is a mixed experience.

In certain passages they make insightful points (particularly regarding the psychological dynamics of their situation). In other passages they articulate positions that a Catholic may legitimately hold.

But then they get into stuff that is flat-out rationalization.

They play the victim card repeatedly, and there is an element of truth to the idea that they are victims—but not as much victims of the law of celibacy (as they would maintain) but rather victims of the men who have been playing with their affections to fulfill their own psychological and sexual impulses.

I’m sorry, but there are lots of people in the world who are romantically off limits to every single one of us. These people include all children, all members of our own sex, all married members of the opposite sex except our spouse, and—if we are married—every other person on the planet except our spouse.

To become romantically or sexually involved with any one of these people is a sin, and anybody with even a basic education in Christian morality knows that.

Not being able to marry or to become romantically involved with someone is not something surprising. It is the norm for every single human being with respect to almost every single other human being.

If you want to marry someone, great. Go out and look for someone you legitimately could marry, but you are not a victim because a particular person you’d like to marry has already taken a vow (or made a promise) of celibacy any more than you are a victim if the person you’d like to marry has already taken marriage vows to someone and is thus one among the billions of people not romantically available to you.

This is just life.

And I’m not sure that’s something the authors of the letter get. At times reading it, describing the struggles that they and their paramours experience, one hears echoes of what ordinary people face and fear. Do priests get lonely? Sure. So do lots of non-priests, including lots of married people. Do they get depressed? Of course. So do lots of people of every age and every condition.

We all experience unpleasant things in life, we all have struggles and pain, and we all encounter situations that would be different in a more perfect world. But the ability to claim victimhood is limited when one has become involved with a person who is not lawfully available to you and with whom you are conducting an objectively sinful affair.

It’s one thing to advocate a change in the Latin Church’s discipline of clerical celibacy (or the Eastern Churches’, for that matter, because they have a version of it, too). It’s another thing to portray oneself as the victim because you are engaging in a relationship that is objectively sinful from the beginning and which you knew to be objectively sinful when you entered it.

If you want to advocate a change, fine. But don’t do so portraying yourself and your paramour as victims and ignoring the real and objectively sinful character of your relationship. You are in control of your actions and your choices. Don’t pretend that you’re not.

As St. Paul, who knew a thing or two about celibacy for the sake of the Kingdom, wrote: “No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it” (1 Cor. 10:13).

What are your thoughts?

Bishop Olmsted an Evil Monster?

I thought I would take the opportunity to offer a few thoughts on some of the issues raised in the combox of my previous postregarding the situation in the Diocese of Phoenix.

A sizeable number of commenters strongly deplored Bishop Thomas Olmsted’s actions regarding Sr. Margaret McBride.

So far as I can tell based on the known facts, Bishop Olmsted had done three, possibly four, things regarding Sr. McBride:

1) He has contacted Sr. McBride to get her side of the story regarding the abortion she approved.

2) He has informed her that, based on the facts as he understands them, she has triggered the provision of canon law that provides a latae sententiae (automatic) excommunication connected with abortion.

3) After the excommunication was reported in the press, Bishop Olmsted allowed his communications director to confirm the excommunication.

4) Bishop Olmsted *may* (or may not, we don’t know since nobody official is discussing this) have had a role in the reassignment of Sr. McBride to other duties at St. Joseph’s (the Catholic hospital where she works and where the abortion occurred).

I don’t see how anybody can object to Action #1. If a Catholic bishop is informed that an abortion has taken place at a Catholic hospital in his diocese, he is supposed to investigate it and find out what happened. Contacting people for their side of the story is always a good thing, so I don’t see grounds for outrage on this one.

Action #2 is something I think people may misunderstand. I’ve seen reports elsewhere on the Net where people are saying things like “the Bishop automatically excommunicated her when he found out.” This is not what happened. It’s a misunderstanding. He didn’t “automatically excommunicate” her. According to the Bishop, she “automatically excommunicated” herself. He informed her of this fact.

Canon law provides an automatic excommunication for a small number of offenses (e.g., abortion, throwing away the consecrated species of the Eucharist, assaulting the pope). When a person commits one of these actions (all things being equal) the person automatically incurs the censure of excommunication by the commission of the act itself.

If Sr. McBride incurred this penalty, it was by her own action, not the bishop’s.

Based on his reading of the facts, Bishop Olmsted concluded that she had incurred the penalty and made her aware of this.

That is not an act of cruelty.

It is a spiritual work of mercy because it gives her occasion to pause, reflect, and take the steps necessary to be reconciled with the Church (which is the purpose of excommunication to begin with; it is medicinal in nature, intended to facilitate repentance and reconciliation).

One could argue that perhaps Bishop Olmsted was wrong in his assessment of the facts and that Sr. McBride did not excommunicate herself. I’m not a canon lawyer, but depending on the facts of the case I can imagine a number of different potential lines of defense in Sr. McBride’s favor (i.e., that she did not excommunicate herself).

So can others.

Coming from very different places on the Catholic spectrum, Michael Liccione and Thomas Doyle both offer potential lines of defense.

As I am sure they can, I can also think of additional lines of defense they don’t mention in their articles.

But I am not in possession of the full facts of the case because so many of them are confidential.

Bishop Olmsted is in possession of the facts, and, unlike me, he is a canonist.

Based on what is known, I can understand why people would question whether Sr. McBride excommunicated herself, but we’re dealing with something at several removes, and we need to be cautious in making judgments about situations on which we do not have all the facts.

On the other hand, I could imagine one saying, “I defer to Bishop Olmsted on the question of whether Sr. McBride excommunicated herself. Let’s say that she did violate the law in this way. But I think it’s a bad law.”

That’s a position a Catholic (or anyone else) can legitimately hold.

Some canonists have argued that penalties that take effect automatically are a bad idea anyway. At his blog, canonist Edward Peters writes:

I have long held that latae sententiae penalties are unsustainable in a modern legal system, that their use inevitably distracts attention from the underlying offense and redirects it toward the complexities of the canonical legal system (which most folks are not prepared to assess), and that the 150 year trend toward reducing automatic penalties in the Church is good and should be maintained. Still other issues, such as authority to remit sins and sanctions, are unnecessary complicated by automatic sanctions as well.

And, one may note, the Code of Canons for the Eastern Churches (CCEO), which is the equivalent of the Code of Canon Law (CIC) for Eastern Catholics, has no latae sententiae penalties at all and handles the same issues in other ways (cf. CCEO 1402).

So it is perfectly possible for the Church not to even have this kind of law—or to configure it differently so that it would have a broader or narrower scope regarding abortion—or to add new offenses (e.g., sexual abuse of a minor by a cleric)—or to delete existing ones.

All of these are legitimate opinions one can reasonably hold and discuss and advocate.

But in such cases, one’s disagreement is with the law, not with Bishop Olmsted.

He has to deal with the law the way it is, not the way he—or anyone else—might wish it to be, just as every cop and every judge has to deal with the law as it is in his jurisdiction.

So I don’t see grounds for faulting Bishop Olmsted for seeking to apply the law—as it is, not in some other way—to events in his diocese. That’s his job.

Action #3 (confirming the excommunication after the press began reported on it) seems to be a reasonable thing for a bishop to do, lest confusion result. The press has a hard enough time getting religion stories right, and it’s entirely understandable that the bishop would want to head misunderstandings off.

Action #4—which is only speculative, but which involves reasonable speculation—seems to naturally follow from the previous actions.

Sr. McBride’s position was “vice president of mission integration” at the hospital. I’m not entirely sure what that means, but I suppose it means helping ensure that the hospital undertakes its medical services in fulfillment of its mission as a Catholic entity, in keeping with the Church’s vision of human rights, including and in a special way the foundation of all rights, the right to life.

If it is true that Sr. McBride had such a grave lapse of judgment as to approve of a direct abortion taking place in the facility then it is easy to see how this would be inconsistent with her job duties regarding mission integration. It is also easy to see how excommunicating oneself is inconsistent with a job involving mission integration.

Again, one could disagree with Bishop Olmsted and argue that Sr. McBride did not approve of a direct abortion (the kind that is intrinsically evil) or that for various reasons she did not automatically excommunicate herself, but those matters pertain to his judgment involved in Action #2. If one grants that he is right about Action #2, then Action #4 follows from it as a logical consequence, so there is no special ill will manifest in having her duties changed given the established assessment of her actions.

I thus don’t understand the outrage being expressed toward Bishop Olmsted.

If you want to disagree with him, okay. But do so with some reserve, because we are not privy to the facts of this case. We only know them partially.

If you want to disagree with the law and suggest what you think would be a better formulation, fine. But recognize that your objection is to the law, not the Bishop.

There is ample room here for Catholics and other people of good will to discuss and even disagree, but let’s do it with caution and respect.

I’ve got more to come on this issue, including the medical situation involved and the ethics of direct vs. indirect abortion, but in the meantime . . .

What do you think?

What Are the True Facts Regarding the Abortion-Approving Nun?

MCBRIDE I’ve had several requests to comment on the announcement in the Diocese of Phoenix that Sr. Margaret McBride of the Sisters of Mercy (pictured) has incurred automatic excommunication for approving an abortion at St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center in Phoenix.

So here goes.

As you would expect, Bishop Olmsted of Phoenix is being pilloried in connection with this, with the mainstream media and others trying to fit it to the “Cruel Bishop vs. Victim Nun” stock narrative (as opposed, e.g., to the “Conscientious Bishop Trying To Do His Job after Nun Approves Horror” narrative).

So let’s try to take an objective look at the situation, starting with the facts of the case.

Unfortunately, the facts of the case are not entirely clear. The identity of the mother who had the abortion, for example, has not been disclosed due to medical privacy laws, but here is what we know:

1) Last December a 27-year old woman with pulmonary hypertension was 11 weeks pregnant and sought some form of care at St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center in Phoenix.

2) According to a statement of St. Joseph’s, a consultation was held “with the patient, her family, her physicians, and in consultation with the Ethics Committee, of which Sr. Margaret McBride is a member.”

3) It was decided that “the treatment necessary to save the mother’s life required the termination of an 11-week pregnancy.”

4) The abortion was performed, though the means by which it was done is not clear. Presumably it was suction aspiration, or possibly dilation and curettage since RU 486 does not seem to be recommended for 11 pregnancies. The Arizona Republic states that it was a “surgery,” which would also point to either suction-aspiration or D & C, but it mentions this only in passing, and so it could be something the reporter assumed, not what actually happened. If it was (as I strongly suspect), suction-aspiration or D & C then the child was directly torn in pieces as part of the procedure.

5) At some point this came to the attention of the Diocese of Phoenix, and Sr. McBride confirmed to Bishop Olmsted that she had approved the abortion.

6) At some point, presumably after this, Sr. McBride was reassigned within St. Joe’s. Neither the diocese nor the hospital has said whether Bishop Olmsted had a role in the reassignment.

7) Also at some point, presumably at about the same time, Sr. McBride was informed that she had incurred a latae sententiae (automatic) excommunication per canon 1398 of the Code of Canon Law, which states: “A person who procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.”

8) At some point the reassignment of Sr. McBride came to the attention of the Arizona Republic, whose staff contacted both Bishop Olmsted and St. Joseph’s for statements.

9) On or about May 14, St. Joseph’s confirmed to the Arizona Republic that an abortion had taken place there in December. On or about this same date it provided a statement to the newspaper.

10) On May 14, Bishop Olmsted provided a statement as well.

11) On May 15, the Arizona Republic published the statements online (kudos to the Arizona Republic for doing so instead of hiding them and merely quoting and summarizing them without showing us the context).

12) The same day, it published this story by Michael Clancy on the matter (for some reason the story now carries a date of May 19, though it originally came out four days earlier; perhaps this is an unacknowledged revision of the original story). It was at this point the story became known to the public in general.

And those are the basic facts as we know them (or seem to know them).

Let’s see if we can answer a few questions:

1) Is the bishop really being mean?

From the way this is being reported, you’d think that Bishop Olmsted was issuing thundering public denunciations of Sr. McBride, that he took the initiative to sent out some kind of press release announcing the excommunication, perhaps to warn members of his flock that Sr. McBride is to be publicly shunned or something.

From what I can tell, this is the exact opposite of what happened. It appears that Bishop Olmsted issued his statement only in response to the hospital confirming the story for the press. Had the hospital kept its mouth shut, Bishop Olmsted would not have made it public.

To minimize public humiliation of Sr. McBride, Bishop Olmsted did not say in his statement that she had been excommunicated. In fact, she was not mentioned in his statement at all. The only mention of excommunication the statement makes is a general one, with no specific individuals in focus. It is just the general caution, “If a Catholic formally cooperates in the procurement of an abortion, they are automatically excommunicated by that action.”

Reporter Michael Clancy also seems to acknowledge that the Bishop did not speak explicitly of Sr. McBride, stating in his story only that he “indicated” (as opposed, e.g., to “said”) that McBride was excommunicated.

My guess is that what happened here is that the Bishop wanted to deal with these matters privately, but someone at the hospital tipped the press, which then asked both the Bishop and the hospital about the matter. When the hospital confirmed, the Bishop felt obliged to respond as well, but of a desire to protect the reputations/privacy of those involved, he responded only in general terms, acknowledging that an abortion had taken place, that he was horrified by this, and explaining the Church’s position on such matters.

Scarcely the “Cruel Bishop vs. Victim Nun” narrative. No thundering public denunciations of Sr. McBride; no attempts to publicly shame her—quite the opposite!

But the press ran with it, making explicit the fact that she had been excommunicated. The bishop hadn’t said so, but presumably she and/or someone else who knew about it told the Arizona Republic, and the Arizona Republic took the reference to the Church’s law in the bishop’s statement as confirmation.

The story then went all over the place, and the diocese felt obliged to provide a Q & A to clear things up.

This Q & A was released on May 18th by Rob DeFrancesco, the diocesan director of communications. It is online here (.pdf), and it seems to have been written by the communications office, because it contains a number of imprecisions regarding canon law that Bishop Olmsted, who is himself a canonist, would not be expected to use in his writing.

The document is notable, though, in that it confirms that Sr. McBride—and ostensibly others (none of who are named)—automatically excommunicated themselves due to their involvement in the abortion.

Again, this does not support the narrative of a bishop being cruel by publicly humiliating someone. Instead, it suggests a bishop trying to preserve the reputations and privacy of all involved but feeling compelled by the press to reluctantly confirm certain facts in order to prevent public misunderstanding.

2) Did Sr. McBride automatically excommunicated herself?

This is an important question, because if she did then one can scarcely fault Bishop Olmsted for informing her of this fact. It would be his duty as a pastor to inform her of the canonical consequences of her action and encourage her repentance and reconciliation with the Church. In other words, he would be doing his job, seeking to encourage reconciliation in the wake of a tragic error.

So . . . did she?

As outsiders, it’s hard for us to say for ourselves because the specific facts of the case aren’t known. Bishop Olmsted has sought to preserve Sr. McBride’s privacy, and according to Catholic News Service, “Sister Margaret . . . has declined to comment on the controversy.”

But let’s look for a moment at the law as it seems to apply to this case.

According to canon 1398, quoted above, a person who “procures a completed abortion” incurs automatic excommunication. Among other things, this must be understood in light of subsequent Magisterial teaching (e.g., Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium Vitae) as referring to a “direct abortion, i.e., every act tending directly to destroy human life in the womb ‘whether such destruction is intended as an end or only as a means to an end’” (EV 62).

This excludes procedures that do not directly kill the child but that foresee the child’s death as a non-intended, non-desired side effect (e.g., radiation or chemotherapy treatments for a pregnant mother with cancer). It is also why I dealt above with the fact that the child was almost certainly killed by suction-aspiration or dilation and curettage, both of which tear the child into tiny bits and are thus unambiguously the direct killing of an innocent individual, with no dispute possible, even hypothetically.

So far as we can tell, there is no dispute that a direct abortion occurred in this case, meaning that this part of the question is off the table.

So did Sr. McBride “procure” such an abortion?

Before we answer this question, we must mention another canon that has relevance to this case. Canon 1329 provides that:

§2. Accomplices who are not named in a law or precept incur a latae sententiae [automatic] penalty attached to a delict [offence] if without their assistance the delict would not have been committed, and the penalty is of such a nature that it can affect them . . .

One might hold that only the woman who has an abortion and/or the one who pays for or arranges for it “procures” it, but canon 1329 makes it clear that the penalty of automatic excommunication also applies to accomplices “if without their assistance the delict would not have been committed.”

So one can either argue that by voting to approve the abortion Sr. McBride fell under the provision of “procuring” the abortion or that she functioned as a necessary accomplice under the provision of canon 1329 §2.

In either case, she would have incurred automatic excommunication.

Thus Bishop Olmsted would have been simply doing his pastoral duty of informing her of the fact that she had excommunicated herself and needed to take steps to reconcile with the Church.

3) Is there another option?

Suppose that Sr. McBride did not “procure” an abortion and that she was not a necessary accomplice in procuration one. Is there a theory that would allow her to be seen as automatically excommunicating herself?

Maybe.

Such a theory seems to be suggested by the Q & A that the Communications Office of the Diocese of Phoenix released.

This Q & A states:

Why was Sr. McBride excommunicated?

Sr. McBride held a position of authority at the hospital and was frequently consulted on ethical matters. She gave her consent that the abortion was a morally good and allowable act according to Church teaching. Furthermore, she admitted this directly to Bishop Olmsted. Since she gave her consent and encouraged an abortion she automatically excommunicated herself from the Church. “Formal cooperation in an abortion constitutes a grave offense. The Church attaches the canonical penalty of excommunication to this crime against human life.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church #2272) This canonical penalty is imposed by virtue of Canon 1398: “A person who procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.

The significant part of this is the quotation from CCC 2272, which states that formal cooperation in an abortion is a grave offense to which the Church attaches the penalty of excommunication.

Formal cooperation is a much lesser test than that provided for in Canon 1329. To formally cooperate with an act one need only cooperate with it (as Sr. McBride clearly did by voting to approve the abortion) and approve of it (as she did if she consented to it as “a morally good and allowable act,” per the Q & A). This involves much less than being an accomplice without whom the offense “would not have been committed.”

Still, an unquoted part of the Catechism text notes that this application is “subject to the conditions provided by Canon Law” (presumably including Canon 1329). It then references Canons 1323 and 1324, neither of which seem apropos to this case.

Nevertheless, it seems that the Communications Office of the Diocese of Phoenix may be holding to a theory that, based on CCC 2272, any formal cooperation with a direct abortion will trigger automatic excommunication, and if it is true that Sr. McBride “gave her consent that the [direct] abortion was a morally good and allowable act according to Church” then it seems she formally cooperated in such an abortion and triggered the penalty on this theory.

There would be several defenses against this view (among them: The Catechism is a teaching document that does not establish legal requirements; also, Canon 18 requires that a strict interpretation be given to laws involving the penalty of excommunication).

And the theory just articulated is not the common understanding among canonists, which is one reason why the Q & A seems to contain imprecisions that one would not expect of Bishop Olmsted as a canonist, but it deserves to be mentioned since it’s in the Q & A.

MORE FROM CANONIST EDWARD PETERS.

What are your thoughts?

“Grave Sin” = Mortal Sin

Confessional The Catechism of the Catholic Church states:

1857 For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: "Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent."

What if a sin has been committed that has grave matter but lacks the knowledge and consent needed to make it mortal? How might one refer to such a sin?

Since it has grave matter, one might refer to it–logically–as a grave sin. That would seem pretty straightforward: Sin with grave matter is grave sin. Add the needed knowledge and consent and it becomes mortal. Right?

Well, you'd think that. Only you wouldn't be right.

For some years it's been clear (to me, anyway) that ecclesiastical documents like the Code of Canon Law and the Catechism of the Catholic Church regularly use the phrase "grave sin" to mean "mortal sin."

But until recently I haven't had an explicit statement documenting this fact. Now I do (CHT to the reader who provided it!)

The statement is found in a post-synodal apostolic exhortation by John Paul II from 1984. The synod of bishops had been held the previous year on the theme of reconciliation and penance, and in the resulting exhortation, 

During the synod, some apparently proposed a spectrum of sins consisting of venial, grave, and mortal sins–apparently using the middle category not the way proposed above but as a sin that is worse than venial but less than mortal. This is perhaps related to the mistranslation of "grave" as "serious" in English that was common for a long time.

In any event, that kind of division would be wrong, and so John Paul II wrote:

During the synod assembly some fathers proposed a threefold distinction of sins, classifying them as venial, grave and mortal. This threefold distinction might illustrate the fact that there is a scale of seriousness among grave sins. But it still remains true that the essential and decisive distinction is between sin which destroys charity and sin which does not kill the supernatural life: There is no middle way between life and death.

And so (here comes the money quote) . . .

Considering sin from the point of view of its matter, the ideas of death, of radical rupture with God, the supreme good, of deviation from the path that leads to God or interruption of the journey toward him (which are all ways of defining mortal sin) are linked with the idea of the gravity of sin's objective content. Hence, in the church's doctrine and pastoral action, grave sin is in practice identified with mortal sin.

So. Glad we've got that cleared up.

Maybe You Can Answer This Question . . .

The_PriestThere’s an aspect to the current press coverage of Pope Benedict that I don’t understand.

Yes, I know why they’re doing it. Because they need scandal to sell papers. Because they have antipathy towards the Catholic Church (except when it is in their interests no to, like when Pope Benedict visited America). And, yes, because they don’t understand what they’re reporting on.

But really.

Why are they so laser-focused on the issue of laicization or “defrocking”?

Remember Jesus’ parable about the two sons, one of whom said he would go work in the field but didn’t and the other of whom said he wouldn’t go work in the field but did?

The first son was right on symbol but wrong on substance. The second was wrong on symbol but right on substance.

Of course, the best thing is to be right on symbol and right on substance, but if it’s a choice between one of the two, Jesus clearly indicated what was more important: substance over symbol.

How does that apply to the current scandal?

If you look at the American cases that the press is currently hyperventilating about, they had all been removed from pastoral ministry long before the cases ever got to Cardinal Ratzinger’s department at the Vatican.

These weren’t cases where the priests’ bishops were moving them around in a kind of shell game, keeping them with regular access to children. They had been removed from that situation (though the Wisconsin priest, Lawrence Murphy, apparently still had some contact with the Milwaukee deaf community—which Archbishop Bertone at the CDF insisted be stopped at once).

So—in terms of substance—the Church had already largely dealt with the matter. It had deprived these priests of the pastoral assignments that put them in contact with potential victims.

Dismissing them from the clerical state—laicizing or defrocking them—would would be a less urgent matter, and one that is in significant measure symbolic (since even a laicized priest retains the powers he gained from his ordination, even if he is only allowed to exercise a few of them and only in emergency circumstances, like hearing a deathbed confession).

Yes, there are other canonical consequences—ones that would be painful to the priest (assuming he was interested in remaining a priest), like not being able to lawfully celebrate Mass any more, even in private (which assumes he cares enough about the Church’s rules to obey such a stricture; some don’t, such as LifeTeen founder Dale Fushek, who set up his own independent worship center once he was laicized).

While the Church obviously sees value in laicizing gravely errant priests (or the procedure wouldn’t be on the books), the burning issue for people concerned about children should not be “How quickly was this guy laicized?” but “How quickly was this guy removed from pastoral ministry?”

My suspicion is that the press is glossing over this issue for the reasons stated above (greed, malice, ignorance), but they seem unduly focused on the question of how quickly Cardinal Ratzinger’s office moved with respect to the laicization of priests whose bishops had already (before the case got to the CDF) taken measures to keep them from harming others.

I think that by focusing on the laicization issue the press is positively misleading the public by conveying the impression that the Church hadn’t yanked these guys from their pastoral assignments. My fear is that a lot of people will walk away with the totally false impression that unless a priest has been “defrocked” then the Church is allowing him to maintain regular contact with victims through a pastoral assignment, and that by not laicizing them at once Cardinal Ratzinger was turning a blind eye and allowing them to go on raping children in parishes with impunity. (Indeed, that seems to be exactly what Andrew Sullivan has been claiming.)

But that’s not the case—not even with Lawrence Murphy, who as far as was known when his case came up in the 90s (and as far as is known today) hadn’t molested anyone in two decades.

So why rage over how fast or whether these men were laicized if their bishops had already taken steps to stop the threat they posed? (Steps that in the Murphy case the CDF said had to be strengthened at once.)

I’m not saying that there isn’t room for criticism here, even vigorous criticism, or that these guys shouldn’t have been laicized, or that the CDF shouldn’t have acted more swiftly than it did.

Criticism—even vigorous criticism—is one thing, but blind, seething rage is another.

Blind, seething rage would be a more appropriate response to keeping these monsters in ordinary parish assignments, but they have been removed from that situation, there is more room for the judicial process to play out.

And, indeed, that’s the American church’s current policy: Yank a priest from ministry at the first credible accusation and then deal with longer-term canonical questions afterwards.

So I don’t get it.

I’m not seeing the CDF saying to leave these priests in pastoral assignments, and so while I see room for criticism, I don’t see a basis for the kind of apoplexy that the press is experiencing.

Your thoughts?

Smoking Gun Memo Finally Translated

SmokinggunThis will be a long one, so let me summarize the key points right up front:

* One of the documents contained in the New York Times files on the Fr. Lawrence Murphy case is a memo in Italian summarizing a meeting that was held at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith about Fr. Murphy.

* This memo has not had a professional English translation until now.

* The new translation is a smoking gun in that it reveals how badly the New York Times and others have botched the story.

* Then-Cardinal Ratzinger was not present at the meeting. It was run by the Secretary of the CDF, then-Archbishop Bertone.

* Cardinal Ratzinger’s name never comes up, making it impossible to determine anything regarding his involvement in this case.

* In the meeting Bertone points out the difficulties in proceeding with canonical trial for Fr. Murphy, but he does not forbid one.

* The chief difficulty, according to Bertone, is gathering the needed proof against Murphy given the passage of time (not Murphy’s advanced age or ill-health, neither of which is mentioned at all).

* Bertone is appalled at how long this case has been allowed to linger and by the fact that Murphy apparently still has the ability to celebrate Mass for the deaf community in Milwaukee. He insists that this be rectified.

* He also insists that Fr. Murphy be made to reflect on the gravity of his crimes and to furnish proof of his repentance.

* If he fails to do so, Murphy can have additional penalties inflicted on him, including “dismissal from the clerical state” (i.e., laicization, “defrocking”).

* The CDF is thus not opposed to defrocking Murphy.

* A note on the same meeting by Bishop Sklba states that Bertone also said that a new canonical process can be initiated against Murphy if he violates directives not to have contact with the Milwaukee deaf community.

* In audio interview referencing the same meeting Archbishop Weakland also characterizes the CDF’s response as a “suggestion,” says that he doesn’t think Cardinal Ratzinger was personally involved with these types of cases at this point, says that everyone—including Weakland himself—moved slowly, and says that trying to initiate a canonical case to defrock a priest was something unusual at the time.

One can still criticize the way the CDF handled the case, but the memo does not reveal a portrait of Bertone—much less Ratzinger—as unwilling to take action against Fr. Murphy. A current trial is not prohibited, and even if one is not held, Murphy is not off the hook. He must be prohibited from contact with the community he has harmed, if he fails to provide proof of his repentance he is at risk of being defrocked, and if he breaks the new rules a further canonical process against him could begin.

Now the long form . . .

The other day while composing the first post regarding Cardinal Ratzinger’s (non-)involvement in the Lawrence Murphy paedophilia case I was frustrated by the fact that one of the key documents was available only in Italian and with a really, really lame machine translation done back in 1998.

The document was a memo summarizing a meeting on May 30, 1998 at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith between Archbishop Bertone, the secretary of the CDF and thus the man responsible for its day-to-day operations, and the American bishops involved in the Murphy case.

I figured I’d do the best with it I could, but there were likely additional facts in the document that would emerge in future discussion, once the matter was out on the blogosphere.

Boy, was that right!

This is the smoking gun memo for the case. It reveals just how completely wrong the New York Times and the mainstream media have gotten this story.

I owe a Ten Gallon Cowboy Hat Tip to translator Lori Pieper (BIO) (BLOG) for THIS PROFESSIONALLY DONE TRANSLATION. (HER COMMENTARY.)

Just as the New York Times and other media outlets never contacted key figure Fr. Thomas Brundage before running the story, it appears that they also never got a professional translation of the document, with the result that important facts were left out entirely—or ended up being misrepresented in the press to convey the opposite impression.

So much for the MSM’s “layers of fact checkers.” They couldn’t even have their correspondent in Italy (I assume that person can translate Italian to English?) do a translation of an obviously key document (a meeting held at the Vatican regarding the very case they’re investigating? Sheesh!).

But thanks to the blogosphere and its Army of Davids, we now have a translation. (All emphases, both bold and italics, in the original.)

So what does it say?

Summary of a meeting between the Superiors of the CDF and Their Excellencies the Prelates involved in the case of Lawrence C. Murphy, a priest accused of solicitation in Confession (Prot. No. 111/96).

As the title reveals, the reason that the CDF was involved in this case is that it involved a priest accused of sexual solicitation in the confessional—not because it involved paedophilia. At the time, the CDF did not have a mandate to cover paedophilia (those were normally handled by the local bishop or, if appealed to Rome, by a different Vatican court—the Roman Rota). But the CDF did (and does) have a mandate to deal with cases involving priests who commit sexual solicitation in the confessional.

The meeting took place on Saturday, May 30, 1998 in the office of the CDF. Present for the CDF were: His Excellency, Archbishop Tarcisio Bertone, Secretary, who presided over the meeting, the Rev. Father Gianfranco Girotti, Undersecretary. Don Antonio Manna of the Disciplinary Office, Don Michael Jackels (translator) and Fr. Antonio Ramos. Present were Their Excellencies the prelates who had requested the meeting: His Excellency, Rembert Weakland, Archbishop of Milwaukee (USA), his Auxiliary, His Excellency, Richard Sklba and His Excellency, Raphael Fliss, Bishop of Superior (USA).

Note who is not in attendance: Cardinal Ratzinger. It is possible that Bertone was acting on Ratzinger’s instructions in this meeting, but it is also possible that he was acting independently. We just don’t know. Ratzinger’s name never even comes up in this document.

Also note that the CDF has a Disciplinary Office, which is represented at the meeting by Don Antonio Manna. This is not the only case the CDF has to work on.

As the meeting starts, Milwaukee Archbishop Rembert Weakland begins with a summary of the case:

1. His Excellency Archbishop Weakland briefly set forth the previous facts of the case, bringing out the following points: 1°) there have turned out to be many victims of the abuses by Fr. Murphy, all of them deaf; 2°) in 1974, there was an intervention in Fr. Murphy’s case, but nothing had been recorded in the archdiocesan archives (it appears that there was a civil lawsuit, which ended without any penalty being imposed on the accused and the intervention consisted of sending the said priest to another diocese, i.e. Superior); 3°) the deaf community is now experiencing great indignation because of this case and refuses any pastoral solution; 4°) because of the long period of time that has passed since the events took place, it is no longer possible to begin a civil lawsuit in the state of Wisconsin; 5°) Fr. Murphy has no sense of remorse and does not seem to realize the gravity of what he has done. In addition, 6°) there is the danger of great scandal if the case is publicized by the press. According to the testimonies that have been collected, Fr. Murphy’s misdeeds had their origins in Confession.

Point 2 is startling, shocking even. For there not to be diocesan records concerning the 1974 “intervention” (that is, the action undertaken by the diocese) under Weakland’s predecessor Archbishop William Cousins reveals an instance of appalling incompetence at best.

Point 3 is the primary motivator for Weakland taking canonical action against Murphy. The deaf community will not find other solutions acceptable at this point.

Actually, there is more to it than this. Though the memo speaks of the deaf community as a united whole, in a recent audio interview with the BBC Weakland states that there was a sharp division in the Milwaukee deaf community over this case, with the younger members—who had been abused—indignant and the older members—who saw Murphy as someone helping them—taking his side.

It might be more accurate, then, to say that certain elements of the local deaf community would not accept anything other than a trial at this point.

Point 4 is another reason for canonical action. Because the Wisconsin statute of limitations has expired, the deaf community cannot begin an action against Murphy in civil court. If there is to be a judicial action taken against him, it must be in Church court.

Note that the idea of keeping the case secret is not on the table. The matter is public, and the civil authorities already knew (see point 2, above). It appears that if a civil lawsuit were still possible, nobody in the room would object to it.

Point 5 is the assessment that Fr. Thomas Brundage (see link above) and others involved in the case came to, though Murphy claimed the contrary in his January 1998 letter, in which he said that he had repented of his past transgressions. Nevertheless, as we will see, it is the assumption that he is not properly repentant that the meeting will proceed on.

Point 6 reflects the natural desire to avoid scandal. But be careful here. In ecclesiastical-speak, “scandal” does not just mean controversy. It means “to cause (others) to stumble” in their faith or morals (Greek, skandalizein, “to cause to stumble,” “to trip”), such as alienating people from Christ and his Church through the actions of sinful ministers—something any bishop would and should want to avoid.

Note that Weakland wants to pursue canonical action against Murphy to provide justice for abused members of the deaf community and heal the rift Fr. Murphy has created. And at the same time he wants to avoid the scandal and alienation that sensationalistic press coverage would generate.

It is one thing to try to avoid taking action in order to minimize press coverage. It is another to want to take action while minimizing scandal. It’s hard to fault Weakland for wanting to take the latter path.

One note on Weakland’s last point: The memo states that Fr. Murphy’s crimes “had their origin in Confession.” In the audio interview, Weakland clarifies that he’s not saying that they physically took place in the confessional but that they were in some way connected to the confessional. (Perhaps, e.g., he used his knowledge from the confessional to identify potential abuse victims.) This may relate directly to one of the difficulties that Archbishop Bertone points out.

Now that Weakland has had his say, Bertone of the CDF has his:

2. His Excellency the Secretary of the CDF—stressing both the long period of time that has now passed (more than 35 years!) from when the events took place, which constitutes the true problem even on the canonical side, and the fact that there has been no report of other crimes perpetrated or scandals created by Murphy during these years in Superior—maintains that there is insufficient information to instruct a canonical process. Nevertheless, he stresses, it is unacceptable for him [Murphy] to be able to go and celebrate the Eucharist in the deaf community in Milwaukee; it will be necessary, therefore, to impede him, having recourse also to some penal remedies. For precautionary reasons, he can be ordered to celebrate the Eucharist only in the diocese of Superior, especially since this is agreed to both by his Ordinary, i.e. the Archbishop of Milwaukee, and the Ordinary of the place where he resides. But such a provision must be communicated to him in writing. [1]

Note the element of exasperation at how long this has been allowed to linger (that exclamation point after “35 years” is there in the Italian). Because of this, Bertone feels that there is not enough information to properly inform a canonical process against Murphy. As a secondary point, he notes that there have been no new allegations against Murphy, but even though the statute of limitations has already been waived in terms of Church law, the gobsmacking lack of documentation and amount of time that this case has been left to linger creates significant hurdles for prosecuting this case.

That does not mean inaction at this point. On the contrary, Bertone now turns to measures that should be taken against Murphy even in the absence of an ecclesiastical trial.

He is indignant that Murphy has the ability to celebrate Mass for the deaf community in Milwaukee.

There is some confusion about precisely what Murphy did and was allowed to do in this matter. One source, from Feb 1997, suggests that Weakland and Sklba of Milwaukee have directed Murphy not to have contact with deaf people but that there is “some indication from the diocese of Superior” that he has done so by saying Mass and helping with retreats for the deaf.

Murphy’s own letter, from January 1998, indicates that his ministry was never restricted by Weakland’s predecessor, Cousins, and that thus he has on occasion said Mass at parishes in the diocese of Superior and helped at retreats for the deaf. He also states that he has complied with every directive of Cousins and now Weakland.

From the documentation I’ve been able to review, it is not clear just what the facts are. It may be there, but I haven’t seen proof that Murphy was saying Mass for the deaf in the Milwaukee archdiocese (or for the deaf in the diocese of Superior). It strikes me as unlikely that Murphy would say he had complied with all of Weakland’s directives if he knew that Weakland could produce a document showing him to be in violation. So perhaps Weakland only communicated the directive orally. Or perhaps there was miscommunication. Or perhaps the source quoted in the Feb. 1997 document was under the mistaken impression that such directives had been communicated when they hadn’t been.

In any event, Bertone is acting on the premise that Murphy still legally has the ability to celebrate the Mass for the deaf community in Milwaukee, and he is indignant and determined to end that.

The language he uses—for anyone familiar with the ultra-polite, ultra-diplomatic way that Catholic bishops speak to and about each other—is dramatic.

First, he says that is is “unacceptable” that Murphy has the ability to go and say Mass for the Milwaukee deaf community. In the language of bishops, saying this is “unacceptable” translates into normal speech as, “Why haven’t you taken care of this already, you fools? How can you possibly allow this criminal to continue to have contact with the very community he has harmed? You don’t need a trial to stop him from doing that. Use your authority as bishops!”

Thus he says it will be “necessary” (charged term) to “impede” (charged term) Murphy, including having recourse to the infliction of “penal remedies” (charged term).

BTW, Bertone may have been even more blunt about all this in person. What we are dealing with is the exquisitely politely-drafted memo version.

“For precautionary reasons” (i.e., to protect the Milwaukee deaf community from further scandalization—or even abuse—by Murphy), the two bishops can take immediate action. Together Weakland (the ordinary or episcopal “boss” to whom Murphy reports) and Fliss (the ordinary or episcopal “boss” of the place where Murphy lives) can order him not to celebrate Mass except in the Diocese of Superior, thus preventing him from doing so for the deaf community in Milwaukee.

This order “must” (charged term) be communicated to him in writing so that there can be no mistake about it. No “he said; he said.” (Perhaps this is an indication that prior directives to Murphy—if any—had been oral in nature.)

You don’t need a trial for this, guys. Do it!

Don’t let yourselves be hung up by a trial, because there are some hurdles there . . .

3. In regard to the possibility of a canonical process for the crime of solicitation in Confession, His Excellency the Secretary draws attention to some problems that it presents: 1°) first of all the difficulty of proving such a crime, the interpretation of which will have to be made in stricto sensu [in the strict sense]; 2°) the difficulty that deaf people have in furnishing proof and testimonies without aggravating matters, keeping in mind both the limits inherent in their disability and the distance of the events in time. Nevertheless, he stresses, it will be necessary to make Murphy reflect seriously on the grave nature of the evil he has done and on the fact that he will have to give proofs of reformation. 3°) He mentions finally the broad right of [self]-defense that exists in the U.S. and the difficulties that would be put forward by the lawyers in this direction.

Point 1 is Bertone’s real concern here: “the difficulty of proving such a crime.” Notice that, despite the fact that Murphy had sent a letter pleading ill-health as a reason not to proceed. Bertone’s concern is with the difficulty of using a trial under these circumstances, not with Murphy’s health. The latter may well have been one motivating factor in the CDF’s recommendations, but it doesn’t appear in the minutes of this meeting.

And so Bertone points out several difficulties with the proposition of going to trial.

Here we arrive at a place where the previous, machine translation, is positively misleading. Contrary to Andrew Sullivan and reader Carolyn Disco, who are dependent on the machine translation, Cardinal Bertone does not speak of increasing scandal or the need for secrecy. What Cardinal Bertone refers to is the need to prove that the crime has been committed “in the strict sense” (not proving it “in strict secrecy”) and that this will be difficult without “aggravating matters” (not “increasing the scandal”).

The first difficulty Archbishop Bertone mentions (dealt with in the latter part of point 1) is that the law applied to Murphy will have to be interpreted in the strict sense.

This refers to a point in canon law that may not be obvious. According to canon 18 of the Code of Canon Law,

Can. 18 Laws which establish a penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are subject to strict interpretation.

The purpose of this canon (among other things) is to prevent innocent people from having penalties inflicted on them based on loosey-goosey readings of the law. If you’re going to be hit with a penalty, it should be unambiguous that you violated the law. (Note that this applies not just to priests, but to anybody who could be hit with a penalty. It’s related to the “innocent until proven guilty” ethic.)

Thus penal laws applied to Murphy will have to be interpreted in the strict sense. That means that you will have to prove that his actions clearly violated the letter of the law, not debatably violated it, not violating its spirit or intent, but clear violation of the letter of the law itself.

This opens up potential challenges that Murphy’s advocate could make in the case.

For example, remember how in the audio interview Weakland cautioned that the crimes may not have been in the confessional itself but only had some connection with it or “had their origin” in it, the way the memo states? Perhaps Weakland has a weak case against the guy in terms of proving a connection with the confessional. Murphy’s canonical advocate could certainly argue fallibility of memory after this many years.

We know how defense attorneys are (and you have to let the guy have a defense attorney or there is not even a pretense of justice): “Is Victim A really sure that Murphy said this to him in confession and not outside of it? How can he be sure after so many years? How does he know that Murphy’s abuse of him wasn’t based on attraction he felt independently and not based on what was said to him in confession? It’s one thing when these kinds of things are fresh in memory, but after 35 years?”

Remember: If Weakland wants to run this case under the auspices of the CDF then it needs to be tried on what the CDF has competency over at this time, which is abuse of the sacrament of confession. If Weakland wants to run it as a paedophilia case then the normal dicastery to contact would be the Roman Rota, not the CDF.

So Weakland may have made a mistake not only by waiting so long to deal with the case but also by picking a dicastery that doesn’t have the right jurisdiction given the evidence he can provide.

Also related, though not specifically mentioned here, is that like any priest accused of misconduct in the confessional, Murphy is hampered in making his own defense by the fact that he can never (under pain of automatic excommunication) violate the seal of confession. According to the Code of Canon Law,

Can.  983 §1. The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words or in any manner and for any reason.

“For any reason” includes your own defense in a Church trial. Even to prove your own innocence, you can’t break the seal.

That makes hearing these kinds of cases harder, since one of the parties is significantly impeded from being able to tell his side of the story.

In point 2, Bertone brings out another difficulty in proceeding with the case, namely, “the difficulty that deaf people have in furnishing proof and testimonies without aggravating matters.”

I have to say that I don’t know what Bertone is referring to here. The memo tries to clarify by referencing “the limits inherent in their disability and the distance of the events in time.”

Perhaps Bertone is thinking that, given the utter lack of documentation from the 1970s, that it would aggravate matters for the deaf community by forcing members of it to undergo deposition via an interpreter in ways that could rip open old wounds about painful experiences a long time ago.

This could be particularly true if, as Weakland says in the audio interview, the local deaf community was divided, with one generation taking Murphy’s side and another opposing him.

Or perhaps he thinks that deaf people somehow have difficulty communicating matters with precision due to the nature of sign language (in which case he doesn’t—or at least didn’t—have much awareness of how American Sign Language works; it can be just as precise as spoken languages). Or perhaps he is thinking that some deaf people have difficulty communicating because their parents do not arrange for their children to have a good education in sign language and proper exposure to the deaf community (though that would not seem to be the case in a school for the deaf).

He does seem to be thinking of the fact that, for both the hearing and the deaf, our memories aren’t always as reliable as we would want concerning long-ago events, including—and perhaps especially—traumatic events.

Whatever the case here—and it may simply be bad memo drafting since we don’t have Bertone’s own words—he thinks that it will be difficult to get the needed proof for a trial.

Despite this, and in the same point, Bertone stresses that it will be “necessary” (charged word) “to make Murphy reflect seriously on the grave nature of the evil he has done and on the fact that he will have to give proofs of reformation.”

So Murphy is not to be let off the hook if a trial doesn’t proceed. He’s going to have to reflect on the gravity of his sins and provide proof that he has repented.

In point 3 Bertone cites a third difficulty for a trial, which is “the broad right of [self]-defense that exists in the U.S. and the difficulties that would be put forward by the lawyers” acting on Murphy’s behalf.

The memo doesn’t say, but it is possible Bertone is thinking not just of Murphy’s canonical advocate in the Church trial but of civil lawyers getting involved and trying to interfere with ecclesiastical proceedings. Indeed, that may be what he is thinking since under the Church’s internal law, priests in America don’t have any broader right of self-defense than priests in other countries (though American priests might seek to exercise their canonical rights more aggressively).

So, while he doesn’t exclude the possibility of a trial of Murphy, Bertone notes various difficulties that one would face, while simultaneously insisting that actions must be taken against Murphy.

Weakland then agrees to such actions . . .

4. His Excellency Archbishop Weakland commits himself to try to obtain from Father Murphy—whom he compares to a “difficult” child—a declaration of repentance; all three psychologists who have examined him consider him a “typical” pedophile, who therefore “considers himself a victim.” In this regard, the Under-Secretary [of the CDF] Father Gianfranco Girotti, stresses that the said priest will have to give clear signs of repentance, “otherwise we will have to have recourse to a trial.” His Excellency the Secretary [i.e. Bertone] proposes imposing on him a period of spiritual retreat together with a salutary admonition in order to be able to understand whether he really is repentant or not, otherwise, he would expose himself to the risk of having more rigorous measures imposed on him, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state. He then advises entrusting him to a priest as his spiritual director, with meetings every one or two months.

Here we have arrived at another point where the original machine translation is badly misleading. It is incredibly garbled. Among other things, it makes it appear that three psychologists would need (in the future) to evaluate him and determine if he is a typical paedophile. In fact, as the above translation makes clear, three psychologists have examined him and found him to be a typical paedophile.

Worse, the machine translation leaves out altogether Bertone’s proposal of “imposing on him a period of spiritual retreat together with a salutary admonition in order to be able to understand whether he really is repentant or not, otherwise, he would expose himself to the risk of having more rigorous measures imposed on him, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state” (emphasis in original). Dismissal from the clerical state is laicization or “defrocking,” so defrocking Murphy is explicitly on the table in this meeting. Yet the machine translation leaves it out entirely.

So, far from opposing a trial, on grounds of age or health or anything else, the undersecretary of the CDF indicates that “we will have to have recourse to a trial” if Murphy doesn’t furnish “clear signs of repentance.”

Bertone goes farther, saying that Murphy needs to be sent on retreat with the warning that if he doesn’t come back seriously repentant that he will risk exposing himself to “more rigorous measures [being] imposed on him,”  including “dismissal from the clerical state.” He also wants a spiritual director to keep tabs on Murphy.

5. His Excellency the Secretary finally sums up the two central points of the line to be followed in regard to the priest, in a word: 1°) the territorial restriction of the celebration of the Eucharist and 2°) the admonition to induce him to show remorse.

So, whether there is a trial or not, two points are definitely to be followed: Keep Murphy from celebrating Mass for the Milwaukee deaf community and take steps to provoke repentance, with the warnings above about what will happen if he’s not properly repentant, age and anything else notwithstanding.

Weakland then get the last effective word:

Before the conclusion of the meeting, Archbishop Weakland thought it important to restate that it will be difficult to make the deaf community understand the slight extent of these provisions.

And that’s the end of the meeting.

We also have another, briefer account of the meeting in the form of notes that were taken on it by Bishop Richard J. Sklba [RJS in the notes], who was one of the attendees. He writes:

385.

Lawrence Murphy

On May 30, 1998 I joined Archbishop Weakland and Bishop Fliss in meeting with Archbishop Bertone and staff regarding the case. It became clear that the Congregation was not encouraging us to proceed with any formal dismissal on the basis of 24 years of apparent good conduct and the precept impeding exercise of orders currently in effect. We were also cautioned about the difficulty of the question of the Confessional, both in terms of the strict canonical definition of the crime as well as the time lapse between obtaining the information and acting thereon. Archbishop Bertone noted that disobedience of any precept forbidding contact with community members could form the basis for another canonical process.

RJS

So Sklba’s understanding was also that the CDF was “not encouraging us to proceed” but also not forbidding.

An interesting note that wasn’t captured in the official memo summarizing the meeting is Sklba’s last sentence: “Archbishop Bertone noted that disobedience of any precept forbidding contact with community members could form the basis for another canonical process.”

So even if there would be difficulties prosecuting a case this old, if Murphy violates the soon-to-be-imposed requirements not to have contact with the deaf community, he can be nailed for that.

In the audio interview, Weakland also offers a very brief account of the CDF meeting, which he also characterizes as resulting in a “request” to handle the case with restrictions rather than a trial (at the 3:55 mark). Weakland also states (4:40) that he doesn’t think Cardinal Ratzinger was personally involved in this kind of case at this point (i.e., before the CDF was given the mandate to handle them) and that everyone—Weakland himself included—was acting slowly. Weakland states that he probably should have acted ten years earlier (5:10). He also states, very interestingly, that at the time U.S. bishops weren’t really thinking about canonical cases to get priests defrocked (5:15), that what he was trying to do was something unusual for the time—perhaps explaining the difficulty he encountered trying to do it.

Happy Meat-Eating Friday!

StJosephandJesus Yes! It's true!

You can eat meat today!

Why?

Because it is the Feast of St. Joseph, and that day is a solemnity.

One property of solemnities is that if they fall on Fridays then they override the requirement to abstain from meat.

MORE FROM ED PETERS.

That means you can have meat today!

Woo-hoo!!! Meat! Wonderful God-created meat!

It's what's for dinner.

And let us not forget the reason that we are able to have meat this day: St. Joseph.

Maybe you'd care to . . . 

FIND OUT MORE?

“Substantial Observance”

Holysee  One of the interesting phrases in Paenitemini occurs in this norm:

II. 1. The time of Lent preserves its penitential character. The days of penitence to be observed under obligation throughout the Church are all Fridays and Ash Wednesday, that is to say the first days of "Grande Quaresima" (Great Lent), according to the diversity of the rites. Their substantial observance binds gravely.

So the substantial observance of the days of penitence binds gravely. What does that mean?

Clearly the inclusion of the word "substantial" is meant to qualify what is being said. (The word "substantial" is a qualifier. Duh!) Pope Paul VI could have simply said "Their observance binds gravely." But he didn't. He included the word "substantial."

This suggests that it would be possible to fail to observe the days of penitence in some lesser degree and it would not result in a grave sin.

This would not be worth pointing out if we were talking about people who forgot it was Friday and ordered a hamburger for lunch and ate it without realizing. In that case we have innocent ignorance preventing the commission of a mortal sin. 

It also would not be worth pointing out in the case of someone who forgot it was Friday, ordered a hamburger, and realized it was Friday only after having taken a bite out of it and then quickly swallowing the bite, not knowing what else to do. In that case we would have lack of full consent preventing the commission of a mortal sin.

Finally, it would not be worth talking about this in the case of necessity–e.g., someone with a medical condition–because the necessity would excuse from the obligation to observe the elements of penitential law they impinge on.

In the first two cases we would have mortal sin averted because one of the conditions needed for mortal sin (knowledge or deliberate consent) would be lacking. In the third case the obligation itself would cease.

So Paul VI could have simply said, "Their observance binds gravely," and the ordinary application of the principles of moral and pastoral theology would have allowed for inadvertent, non-deliberate, or necessary failures to observe the law to be non-grave.

But he included the word "substantial," suggesting that there could be some degree of knowing, deliberate, non-necessary failure to observe the penitential days and yet it would not result in mortal sin.

Only "substantial" failure to observe them would be grave matter and thus potentially mortally sinful.

Then there would be the question of whether substantial failure of a single day of penance or of the whole complex of penitential days would be gravely sinful.

So it's understandable that people would wonder exactly what Paul VI meant here. I haven't tried to determine the answer in detail, but I have noted that the inclusion of the word "substantial" is meant to have a softening effect, in keeping with Paul VI's overall relaxation of penitential discipline. I don't see how it could be otherwise since he could have just said, "Their observance binds gravely," and left it at that.

Oh, and here's . . . 

THE BIG RED DISCLAIMER: I'm just trying to explain the law here. That doesn't mean I personally favor the content of the law. I'm just trying to be clear and honest about what the law is. If you think my understanding of the law is wrong, fine. Feel free to show evidence to the contrary. If you don't like the law itself, feel free to say so, but bear in mind that I'm not the one who made the law.

Recently I was reading in Canon Law Digest, and in the volume (vol. 6) that covers the year Paenitemini was released (1966), I found a couple of items of interest.

The first is that, at the front of CLD's presentation of the norms of Paenitemini, there is a footnote which says,

A notable commentary by Bertrams on what constitutes substantial observance was published in L'Osservatore Romano of 20 Feb, 1966. See Note following the reference at the end of this document.

"Bertrams"–who is not otherwise identified except as a priest–I believe to be Wilhelm Bertrams, S.J., a noted canonist who taught for many years at the Greg and who was active in this period.

L'Osservatore Romano, at the time, was much more of a house organ than it is today. If something was printed in it, you could treat it as a significant indicator of the Holy See's thought. 

Now they'll take anything. Reviews of The Simpsons, top ten lists of rock albums, kissy-kissy pieces for President Obama, anything! They're so into being "hip" and "relevant" now that they've jettisoned their gravitas and converted from being a reliable indicator of Vatican thought to just an orthodox Catholic publication that the Vatican happens to own.

But back in 1966, publishing a commentary on a papal document in L'OR meant something–and it especially meant something if it appeared February 20th, just three days after Paenitemini was signed on February 17th. Given the lag between signing and publication, it very well may have appeared in the same issue of L'OR as a companion commentary on the main document (something the Holy See often does).

So let's look at what Fr. Bertrams said in his note:

We think that the word "substantial" was chosen designedly, especially in order the better to show the personal responsibility of each one before God, so that every one may practice penance in spirit and in truth, without insisting too much on the traditional distinctions of casuistry between grave and light matter in the violation of the law. Consequently, a single violation could not be considered a grave sin, but the repeated and habitual violation would certainly be grave.

Hence the more serious and sincere is the will to practice penance on the days and in the manner prescribed by the church, the less inclined one should be to consider a partial violation as grave. The more serious the reason which prevents the observance of the law, the less grave will be the transgression. If the reason is really proportionately grave, it is certain that all obligation ceases. This may occur in case of illness, where one cannot take other food because of infirmity, where meals must be taken in common, in travelling when there is no choice, and so on. but when these excuses occur, there remains the obligation of divine law to practice penance in some other way according to the particular condition of the person.

It is clear that Fr. Bertrams, and thus L'OR before it decided to try to be hip, sees Paenitemini as trying to get away from the traditional manual theology way of (e.g., "This particular violation would be light matter and so a venial sin; this other violation would be grave matter and thus could be a mortal sin"). Rather than having people try to cut the pie that way, the message is: Just be serious and sincere in your intent to observe the laws regarding penance and don't worry so much about an individual infraction. As long as you mean to do what the Church does, an individual infraction won't be mortal.

In the second paragraph, though, Bertrams starts talking about cases where there would be partially or fully excusing reasons, which would have applied even before Paenitemini, so this introduces an element of confusion.

Perhaps not surprisingly, a year later the Sacred Congregation for the Council (predecessor of the modern Congregation for Clergy) published a dubium on this issue, which is found in the same volume of Canon Law Digest:

Questions: I. Whether the substantial observance of days of penance, which is declared to be of grave obligation in the dispositive part of the Constitution Paenitemini, II, § 2, of 17 February, 1966, refers to the individual days of penance which are to be observed as a matter of obligation in the whole Church;

II. Or does it refer rather to the whole complexus of penitential days to be observed with the penances attached to them.

Replies: The S. C. of the council replied, with the approval of the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI:

I. In the negative.

II. In the affirmative; that is, one sins gravely against the law, who, without an excusing cause, omits a notable part, quantitative or qualitative, of the penitential observance which is prescribed as a whole.

Given at Rome 24 February 1967.

I find this less helpful than it could be, but it again seems to be backing off the idea of focusing attention away from the individual penitential day to the observance of penitential discipline as a whole. So if, "without an excusing cause, one omits a notable part . . . of the penitential observance which is prescribed as a whole"–not apparently on a individual day per Fr. Bertram and the answer to question I–then one sins gravely.

There is still a lot that is obscure here, but it does seem that by the inclusion of the word "substantial" before "observance," Paul VI was trying to do something encouraging people not to focus so much on the scrupulous fulfillment of particulars and more on the overall spirit of doing penance.