Year: 2010

No, You Can’t Deliberately Kill Innocent People (Sorry!)

A lot of folks have commented on my previous post, Commemorating a Major U.S. War Crime. In the course of the discussion, a number of issues have been raised that I would like to address.

Foremost among them is a foundational principle of Christian morality that quite a number of commenters do not appear to fully appreciate. It is this: One can never do something that is intrinsically evil, period. No circumstances whatsoever can make it morally licit.

That, in fact, is the difference between things that are intrinsically evil and those that are only extrinsically evil. Intrinsically evil things are evil by their own nature, regardless of circumstance, and so they can never be done (per the fundamental axiom of all morals: Do good and avoid evil). Extrinsically evil things become evil because of their circumstances and/or intent, not because of the nature of the act itself. As a result, such acts can be done in some circumstances (those in which they are not immoral), while they cannot be done in others (when circumstances make them immoral to do).

The fact that some actions are intrinsically evil is reflected in St. Paul’s rejection of the proposal, “Why not do evil that good may come?” He says of those who propose this, “Their condemnation is just” (Rom. 3:8).

The principle is treated more elaborately in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which states:

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts – such as fornication – that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

In his subsequent encyclical on moral theology, Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II stressed:

Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances [VS 80].

He returned to the theme again in his encyclical on life, Evangelium Vitae:

No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church [EV 62].

So this point is quite firm in Catholic moral teaching: Some acts, by their very nature, are intrinsically evil and thus cannot be done by anyone at any time, no matter what the intention or circumstances.

One of these acts is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being. In Evangelium Vitae John Paul II proclaimed:

[B]y the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, and in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral. This doctrine, based upon that unwritten law which man, in the light of reason, finds in his own heart (cf. Rom 2:14-15), is reaffirmed by Sacred Scripture, transmitted by the Tradition of the Church and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.

The deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of his life is always morally evil and can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end. It is in fact a grave act of disobedience to the moral law, and indeed to God himself, the author and guarantor of that law; it contradicts the fundamental virtues of justice and charity. “Nothing and no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person, or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a person who is dying. Furthermore, no one is permitted to ask for this act of killing, either for himself or herself or for another person entrusted to his or her care, nor can he or she consent to it, either explicitly or implicitly. Nor can any authority legitimately recommend or permit such an action”.

As far as the right to life is concerned, every innocent human being is absolutely equal to all others. This equality is the basis of all authentic social relationships which, to be truly such, can only be founded on truth and justice, recognizing and protecting every man and woman as a person and not as an object to be used. Before the moral norm which prohibits the direct taking of the life of an innocent human being “there are no privileges or exceptions for anyone. It makes no difference whether one is the master of the world or the ‘poorest of the poor’ on the face of the earth. Before the demands of morality we are all absolutely equal” [EV 57].

In this passage, John Paul II walks right up to the edge of invoking papal infallibility. He is using the most solemn form of papal teaching shy of invoking infallibility (had he said “I declare and define” instead of “I confirm,” he would have invoked infallibility), though in this case that is not necessary because the same teaching has already been infallibly proposed by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church.

Because the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is intrinsically evil, it is never morally legitimate to target innocent civilians, even in wartime. It does not matter what authority (civilian or military) has recommended or ordered the action—even if he be the American president or the master of the world. It does not matter whether innocent people on your side will die as a result. They are absolutely equal to the innocent on the other side and cannot be preferred.

Furthermore, to threaten to do something intrinsically evil is itself intrinsically evil, and to threaten—by words or deeds—to target civilians is intrinsically evil and cannot be done under any circumstances. You cannot hold innocents as hostages to another goal, however noble or lofty it may be.

These are exactly the same principles that underlie the intrinsic immorality of abortion, euthanasia, and other forms of murder. One cannot justify them, no matter the circumstances or the intention.

This does not deal with all the subjects that have been brought up in the combox. It does not, for example, go into cases where—by the law of double-effect—civilian casualties can be tolerated for a proportionate reason. But it does show the fundamental conflict between Catholic morality and the position of those trying to justify the targeting of civilians due the exigencies of wartime or as the “lesser evil” compared to what would otherwise happen.

Killing, attempting to kill, or threatening to kill the innocent can never be justified, even if it means you yourself—also an innocent—will die.

Commemorating a Major U.S. War Crime

Friday was the anniversary of the U.S. Bombing of Hiroshima during World War II. Monday is the anniversary of its bombing of Nagasaki.

The explosion of the Fat Man atomic device over Nagasaki is pictured. It rose eleven miles into the sky over Ground Zero.

The important thing, though, is that it—together with the Little Boy device that was deployed over Hiroshima—killed approximately 200,000 human beings. And it ended the war with Japan.

It is understandable that many Americans at the time were relieved that the long burden of the bloodiest war in human history could finally be laid down. Many then, as now, saw the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a necessary step to preventing even more casualties.

However, some of the blogging being done to commemorate the attack is most unfortunate.

Consider Michael Graham, who wishes his readers a “Happy Peace Through Victory Day.”

Today marks the anniversary of the single greatest act in the cause of peace ever taken by the United States:

Dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.  That one decision, that one device, saved more lives, did more to end war, and created more justice in the world in a single stroke than any other.  It was done by America, for Americans. It saved the lives of hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of American soldiers and sailors.

So, obviously, President Obama’s not too happy about it. . . .

Euroweenie peaceniks and an annoying number of American liberals see the bombing of Hiroshima as a shameful act.  What is it America should be ashamed for—defeating an enemy that declared war on us? Bringing about the end of a fascist empire that killed millions of people, mostly Asians? Preventing the slaughter of the good guys—Americans—by killing the bad guys—the Japanese?

I am not a Euroweenie or a peacenik or a political liberal or even someone opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in principle. I can imagine scenarios in which their use would be justified. I can even deal with the cheeky “Happy Peace Through Victory Day” headline.

But Mr. Graham’s analysis of the situation on a moral level is faulty.

It is true that, by instilling terror in the Japanese government, the use of atomic weapons prevented further and, in all probability, greater casualties on both sides.

Preventing further and greater casualties is a good thing, but as the Catechism reminds us:

The Church and human reason both assert the permanent validity of the moral law during armed conflict. The mere fact that war has regrettably broken out does not mean that everything becomes licit between the warring parties [CCC 2312].

It isn’t just a question of the goal of an action. The goal may be a good one, but the means used to achieve it may be evil. The Catechism states:

Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation. A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons – especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons – to commit such crimes [CCC 2314].

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were definitely acts of war directed to the destruction of whole cities or—at least—vast areas with their inhabitants. The only quibbling could be about whether this was “indiscriminate” destruction. Someone might argue (stretching the word “indiscriminate” rather severely and taking it in a sense probably not meant by the Catechism) that they were not indiscriminate attacks in that they were aimed at vital Japanese war resources (munitions factories, troops, etc.) and the only practical way to take out these resources was to use atomic weapons.

Mounting such a case would face a number of problems. One would have to show that Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained such resources (not that difficult to show) and that these resources themselves were proportionate in value to the massive collateral damage that would be inflicted (a much more difficult task) and that there was no other practical way—like a more targeted bombing—to take them out (again a difficult task).

But for purposes of argument, let’s grant all this. Let’s suppose that there were such resources, and that they were proportionate in value to the massive loss of civilian lives and that there was no other way to get rid of them.

Does that absolve the U.S. of guilt in these two bombings?

No.

You can see why in the logic that Mr. Graham used. It stresses the fact that the use of these weapons saved net lives. This was undoubtedly uppermost in the U.S. military planners’ thinking as they faced the possibility of an extremely bloody invasion of Japan in which huge numbers on both sides would die.

But notice what is not being said—either by Mr. Graham or anybody else: “Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained such important war widgets that without those widgets Japan would be unable to prosecute the war. Thus by taking out those military resources we could deprive Japan of its ability to make war.”

Neither is anybody saying something like this: “We needed to scare Japan into surrender by showing them that we could destroy all of their military resources. We needed to make them terrified of losing all their military resources so that, out of a desperate desire to preserve their military resources, they would surrender.”

These are the dogs that didn’t bark, and they are why this line of argument is a dog that won’t hunt.

The reason nobody says these things is that they were not the thinking behind the U.S.‘s actions. The idea was not to end the war through the direct destruction of military resources in these two cities, nor was it to end the war by scaring Japan into thinking we might destroy all of its military resources. It was scaring Japan into surrendering by threatening (explicitly) to do this over and over again and inflict massive damage on the Japanese population. In other words, to make them scared that we would engage in “the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants.”

That means that, even if Hiroshima and Nagasaki had contained military resources that of themselves would have justified the use of atomic weapons (which is very hard to argue), our intention still was not pure. We were still using Japanese civilians as hostages to the war effort, still threatening to kill civilians if Japan did not surrender. That was the message we wanted the Japanese leadership to get—not, “We will take out your military resources if you keep this up,” but, “We will take out big chunks of your population if you keep this up.”

That meant that the U.S. leadership was formally participating in evil. It does not matter if the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could (through some stretch of the imagination) be justified in themselves. The fact is that they were used to send a message telling the Japanese government that we would kill massive numbers of the military and civilian population, without discrimination. That message is evil, and to knowingly and deliberately send that message is to formally participate in evil.

That made these attacks war crimes.

Now, make no mistake. I’m an American. I’m a fan of the U.S. But love of the United States should not preclude one from being able to look honestly at the mistakes it has committed in the past. Indeed, it is only by looking at and frankly acknowledging the mistakes of the past that we can learn from them. Love of one’s country should impel one to help it not commit such evils.

Racial discrimination? Bad thing. Allowing abortions? Bad thing. Dropping nukes to deliberately kill civilians? Bad thing. Let’s try not to have things like these mar America’s future.

READ ABOUT THE HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI BOMBINGS.

What are your thoughts?

Effects of Excommunication

PopeExcommunicationDet In the combox down yonder, a reader writes:

Jimmy, I’ve got a question for you. What does it really mean, on a day-to-day basis, if someone is excommunicated?

Here’s where I’m coming from: If someone commits a mortal sin, he can’t (or shouldn’t) go to communion until he repents and makes a good confession. If someone is under interdict, he can’t (or shouldn’t) receive communion until the interdict is lifted. If someone is excommunicated, he can’t (or shouldn’t) go to communion until the excommunication is lifted.

Okay, but if you have one of those automatic excommunications that aren’t reserved to the bishop or something, then you can have the excommunication lifted by repenting and making a good confession.

So, what’s the difference? Surely, we keep hearing that excommunication is not the same thing as being excluded from receiving communion. Okay, but if it’s not the same thing, what’s different about it?

It’s understandable why there is confusion on this point. For an ordinary lay person (the kind you’d find in the wild, not one who is a nun or a monk or a diocesan officer of some kind) the day-to-day effects of excommunication (and interdict) boils down to basically lack of ability to participate in the sacraments (including performing ministries at Mass).

There are, however, other effects, which strike clerics and lay people of certain kinds. The Code of Canon Law provides:

Can. 1331 §1. An excommunicated person is forbidden:

1/ to have any ministerial participation in celebrating the sacrifice of the Eucharist or any other ceremonies of worship whatsoever;

2/ to celebrate the sacraments or sacramentals and to receive the sacraments;

3/ to exercise any ecclesiastical offices, ministries, or functions whatsoever or to place acts of governance.

§2. If the excommunication has been imposed or declared, the offender:

1/ who wishes to act against the prescript of §1, n. 1 must be prevented from doing so, or the liturgical action must be stopped unless a grave cause precludes this;

2/ invalidly places acts of governance which are illicit according to the norm of §1, n. 3;

3/ is forbidden to benefit from privileges previously granted;

4/ cannot acquire validly a dignity, office, or other function in the Church;

5/ does not appropriate the benefits of a dignity, office, any function, or pension, which the offender has in the Church.

Can. 1332 The prohibitions mentioned in ⇒ can. 1331, §1, nn. 1 and 2 bind an interdicted person. If the interdict has been imposed or declared, however, the prescript of ⇒ can. 1331, §2, n. 1 must be observed.

You can see how some of these additional effects would strike clerics and certain types of lay folk–e.g., a nun who is a mother superior would not be able to exercise her office, etc.

Which Church (Sui Iuris) Do You Enter at Baptism?

In the combox down yonder, a reader writes:

I'd be curious how to find out what rite one is. I have a friend who was born to a Latin mother and a Ukrainian Catholic father and was baptized in a Byzantine Catholic church. As we understand it, it depends on what year he was baptized in, but we're not sure how the church of baptism factors into it. In any case, it's an interesting general question as to how the various rites are kept track of and managed as far as individuals are concerned.

Here is what the present law says:

Code of Canon Law (1983)

Can. 111 §1. Through the reception of baptism, the child of parents who belong to the Latin Church is enrolled in it, or, if one or the other does not belong to it, both parents have chosen by mutual agreement to have the offspring baptized in the Latin Church. If there is no mutual agreement, however, the child is enrolled in the ritual Church to which the father belongs.
§2. Anyone to be baptized who has completed the fourteenth year of age can freely choose to be baptized in the Latin Church or in another ritual Church sui iuris; in that case, the person belongs to the Church which he or she has chosen.

Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (1990)

Canon 29
§1. By virtue of baptism, a child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year of age is enrolled in the Church sui iuris of the Catholic father; or the Church sui iuris of the mother if only the mother is Catholic or if both parents by agreement freely request it, with due regard for particular law established by the Apostolic See.
§2. If the child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year is:
(1) born of an unwed mother, he is enrolled in the Church sui iuris to which the mother belongs;
(2) born of unknown parents, he is to be enrolled in the Church sui iuris of those in whose care he has been legitimately committed are enrolled; if it is a case of an adoptive father and mother, §1 should be applied;
(3) born of non-baptized parents, the child is to be a member of the Church sui iuris of the one who is responsible for his education in the Catholic faith.

And here is what the prior law said:

Code of Canon Law (1917)
Canon 756
§1. Children must be baptized according to the rite of the parents.
§2. If one parent belongs to the Latin rite, and the other to an oriental [rite], the children are baptized according to the rite of the father, unless provided otherwise by special law.
§3. If only one [parent] is Catholic, the children are to be baptized in that rite.

As you can see, there are some options. Partly, it does depend on when the child was baptized (and I'm presuming the child was under 14). If it was before 1983, the 1917 Code's canon would have applied. If it was after 1983 then that year's Code's canon would have applied. And if it was after 1990s, the Eastern Code's canon would also have applied.
It isn't just the year that is in issue, though. It is also the choice of the parents if it was after 1983.
My guess is that since the child had a Byzantine rite father and a Latin mother and the child was baptized in a Byzantine church that the parents probably had not agreed to have it baptized as a Latin (otherwise one would think it would have been baptized in a Latin parish). So probably the child belongs to whichever Byzantine rite church the father belongs to.
Which raises another point . . .
There is a difference between a "rite" and an Eastern Catholic church.

Canon 28
§1. A rite is the liturgical, theological, spiritual and disciplinary patrimony, culture and circumstances of history of a distinct people, by which its own manner of living the faith is manifested in each Church sui iuris. 

§2. The rites treated in this code, unless otherwise stated, are those which arise from the Alexandrian, Antiochene, Armenian, Chaldean and Constantinopolitan traditions. 

Canon 27
A group of Christian faithful united by a hierarchy according to the norm of law which the supreme authority of the Church expressly or tacitly recognizes as sui iuris is called in this Code a Church sui iuris.

So properly speaking the child belongs to a church sui iuris (a church with its own law) and the church follows a particular liturgical/theological/spiritual/etc. rite. There are more than a dozen Catholic churches sui iuris that follow the Byzantine rite, but the child is only a member of one of them.

I’m Baaaaaa-aaaack!

I want to apologize to everybody for going silent on the blog for so long. If you've been keeping up with me on Facebook (you can do that, if you want) you know that of late I have been working virtually non-stop on the revision of my book Mass Confusion.

The new title will be Mass Revision. It focuses on the new translation of the Mass that is about to come out, updates for the last 12 years of liturgical law, and has a bunch of new features the old version lacked.

But it was very labor intensive to produce, and I had only two months to do it in, so I was working from as early as 6 a.m. to as late as 9:30 p.m–including on Saturdays and Sundays (the latter of which I'm really hesitant to do), having to cancel dance events and getting other callers to sub for me, etc.

As a result, I got behind on blogging (both here and at the National Catholic Register) and e-mail. I meant to get a note up here about what was going on, but didn't.

So I want to apologize. Will endeavor to keep it from happening again.

Fortunately, I shouldn't hit another "crunch time" of that severity for a number of months–at least! (Future projects are likely to be on a less time-compressed schedule.)

So I now have two books in the production pipeline (meaning: out of my hands and at the publishers'): The Fathers Know Best: Your Essential Guide to Early Church Teachings and Mass Revision: Your Essential Guide to the Changes in the Liturgy. Both should be out in a matter of months. Will keep you posted.

In the mean time, the blog is now open for business. What do y'all want to talk about?

I’m Not Sure That I Approve of This Post

History_channel_logo But it's brilliant.

And hilarious.

And disturbing.

And ironic.

And it definitely awakened my inner TV plot-analyzer instincts.

And the author is right. The History Channel really should try to "add artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."

GET THE STORY.

(CHT: Instapundit.)

I also agree with what the author says about Babylon 5 and Doctor Who (mostly).

Did Obama Lie on Abortion and Healthcare?

Remember how President Obama promised that his health care legislation wouldn’t cover abortion?

Remember all that stuff with the Stupak amendment, which was later abandoned?

Remember how the deal in abandoning the Stupak amendment involved a presidential order that would keep federal dollars from going to abortion?

Remember how pro-life legal experts said the presidential order wasn’t worth the paper it was written on?

Remember all that?

Well, now comes this news:

The Obama administration has officially approved the first instance of taxpayer funded abortions under the new national government-run health care program. This is the kind of abortion funding the pro-life movement warned about when Congress considered the bill.

The Obama Administration will give Pennsylvania $160 million to set up a new “high-risk” insurance program under a provision of the federal health care legislation enacted in March.

It has quietly approved a plan submitted by an appointee of pro-abortion Governor Edward Rendell under which the new program will cover any abortion that is legal in Pennsylvania.

There is still some legal sleight of hand involved:

The section on abortion (see page 14) asserts that “elective abortions are not covered,” though it does not define elective—which [National Right to Life legislative director Douglas] Johnson calls a “red herring.”

The proposal specifies coverage “includes only abortions and contraceptives that satisfy the requirements of” several specific statutes, the most pertinent of which is 18 Pa. C.S. § 3204, which says abortion is legal in Pennsylvania. The statute essentially says all abortions except those to determine the sex of the baby are legal.

“Under the Rendell-Sebelius plan, federal funds will subsidize coverage of abortion performed for any reason, except sex selection,” said NRLC’s Johnson. “The Pennsylvania proposal conspicuously lacks language that would prevent funding of abortions performed as a method of birth control or for any other reason, except sex selection—and the Obama Administration has now approved this.”

So what do you think? Did President Obama lie?

New Rules on Sex Abuse–What Will the Vatican Announce?

A few months ago, during the height of the latest abuse scandal, the Holy See created a new page on its website offering resources documenting the Church’s response to the problem over the last number of years.

HERE’S THE PAGE.

One of the things they put on it was a brief, layman’s guide to the procedures the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith uses in evaluating cases of priestly sexual abusers.

HERE’S THAT DOCUMENT.

One of the things that document did was say that there is a revision underway of the current regulations, which are set forth in a motu proprio called Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela. Specifically, the document said:

For some time the CDF has undertaken a revision of some of the articles of Motu Proprio Sacramentorum Sanctitatis tutela, in order to update the said Motu Proprio of 2001 in the light of special faculties granted to the CDF by Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI.

Now a plethora of press reports indicate that the publication of the revision is nigh. In fact, according to several press accounts, it was approved by Pope Benedict in a Saturday audience with Cardinal William Levada (head of the CDF) last week. (NOTE: That it was a Saturday audience is kind of odd. Normally the pope meets with the head of the CDF on Fridays, though perhaps not that much should be read into the shift of days.)

There is no way of knowing at this point how accurate the press accounts are of what the new norms will say, but piecing bits together from different reports suggest that there may be interesting things afoot.

First, what kind of form will the new norms take? It appears that they may not be a new motu proprio—which is a document issues by the pope. Instead, they may be an instruction, which is the kind of document the head of the CDF could issue with the approval of the pope.

It also appears that, concerning priestly sexual abuse, they will largely serve to reinforce the status quo. They will not, according to at least one report, mandate a “one strike and you’re out” policy on a global level. This kind of policy is in place in the United States and in certain other countries, but it has not been mandated globally. If the mainstream media goes after the new norms in a big way, expect it to go after this aspect of them as proof the Holy See isn’t doing enough or still doesn’t “get it.”

Another thing the mainstream media may go after is that the new norms will certainly not require bishops all over the world to report suspected abusers to the police. The norms may say something about complying with local law regarding sexual abuse, but they won’t mandate automatic reporting to civil authorities because it would give totalitarian countries—like Communist China or Vietnam or, apparently, Belgium—a new tool for persecuting the Church, or harming the confidentiality of accusers (some will come forward only on the condition they they aren’t going to have to get involved with the criminal justice system, which is one of the reasons such victims have been speaking out against the actions of the Belgian authorities; they had been frank with the Church under conditions of confidentiality, only to have their files seized by the state for possible use in criminal prosecutions, meaning that the victims may be dragged into civil court).

However understandable the Holy See’s motives may be in not mandating universal reporting to the authorities, don’t count on the MSM to understand them.

A change that the media might see as “good but not enough” in the new norms is the extension of the statue of limitations on reporting priestly sexual abuse from 10 years to 20 years, starting with the victim’s 18th birthday. The CDF has the ability to waive the current 10 year statute of limitations, and according to reports it routinely does so, so the extension to 20 years actually would represent a kind of codification of the status quo.

An interesting expansion of the way sex abuse cases will be treated, reportedly, is that possession of child pornography will now be counted as one of the offenses reserved to the CDF.

At least one source as reports that the abuse of mentally impaired adults will be classified as one of the reserved offenses, putting it on par with child sexual abuse.

It is also expected that the document will make certain provisions that are currently handled as “exceptions” to present norms. According to John Allen, the set of exceptions:

• Allows one judge on a church tribunal to be a lay person, and eliminates the requirement of a doctorate in canon law;
• Allows for by-passing trials in especially grave cases, removing abuser priests on the basis of a decree;
• Gives the doctrinal congregation power to “sanate” the acts of lower courts, meaning to clean up any procedural irregularities;
• Establishes that an appeal in abuse cases goes to the doctrinal congregation rather than the Signatura, the Vatican’s highest court.

There are also indications that the new norms may deal with other crimes reserved to the CDF, but these have not been the focus of current reporting.

MORE INFORMATION: HERE, HERE, HERE, AND HERE.

Speculation is that the new norms will be announced in the next two weeks, but of course we’ll have to see whether that is the case, as well as whether the above report correspond to what they will actually say.

Count on the media to try to milk maximum sensationalism out of the story (just look at some of the language used in the New York Times’ preliminary report).

In the meantime, what are your thoughts?