Unfortunately, I can’t give him full marks, because while he’s trying to think through the stem cell problem in a careful way that is open to the perspective of faith, he makes some wrong turns as he weaves his way through the issue.
First,
GET THE STORY.
It concerns whether stem cells generated from unfertilized ova would have souls.
The short answer is: It depends on whether the technique involved produces a human being. A human being is a living human organism.
It’s clear that the embryos are living (and growing), so that criterion is met.
Are the embryos in this case human? Well, they have at least half of a human genetic code. It wasn’t clear to me from the scientific paper the author linked whether the embryos the researchers produced were the result of fusing two ova or if they were produced from single ova. If the former then they have a full human genetic code and are undeniably human, so let’s assume the latter case–that they somehow stimulated a single ovum into becoming an embryo–which is the harder case since the embryo would have only half a human genetic code. How much of a human genetic code you need to qualify as a human isn’t yet clear, so it isn’t clear if the human criteria is fulfilled, meaning the Deerhunter Principle is involved (see below).
Are they organisms? If they develop into blastocysts–as the ones in this case do–then yes, they’re organisms. They’re not just a mass of cells but groups of cells that shows the developmental organization that the cells of an organism do.
So we’ve got a living organism that may or may not qualify as a human, given its limited genetic code.
Thus the Deerhunter Principle applies.
What’s that?
If you’re out hunting deer and you see something in the woods that might be a deer but might be a human you are not allowed to shoot it.
You can only shoot it if you are certain it is not a human being.
Same principle applies whenever you have something that you’re not sure if it’s a human.
So the stem cell procedure must be presumed to be objectively immoral and thus impermissible until such time (if ever) that we know more about how much human DNA something needs to qualify as human.
That addresses the central question of the piece. Now let’s look at how the author (Brandon Keim) wrestles through it:
[Fr. Tad] Pacholczyk, of course, doesn’t speak for all Catholics, but the essence
of his argument is doctrinaire: life begins at the moment of
conception. That the conception didn’t involve fusion with another cell
is irrelevant, as the potential for full life is there: so-called parthenogetic or virgin births
have been observed in nature, most recently in sharks (and wouldn’t it
be a kicker if it happened, say, at one other highly fortuitous moment
in Middle Eastern history?)
The label "doctrinaire" is pejorative, but perhaps the author merely used the wrong word and meant something like "based on doctrine" or "doctrinal."
BTW, Fr. Pacholczyk nailed the issue in the story.
The bit about Jesus having a naturally parthenogenic birth is offensive to pious sensibilities and also is a non-starter, because a naturally parthenogenic birth will not produce a Y chromosome, which we must presume Jesus (as a man) had (quibbles on this point notwithstanding).
The question, then, resolves around the meaning of life, of Pacholczyk’s "human being." The blastocyst — the scientific term for the group of cells descended from a fertilized egg at four to five days of age — contains about one hundred cells. It has nothing resembling a brain; but even if this is not considered a privileged locus of personhood, neither does the blastocyst have anything resembling … well, anything. The basis of its moral value, in Christian eyes, must reside in the cells and their potential to become a sentient being.
No. It is the fact that the organism is a member of a species that, under normal conditions, acquires sentience as part of its natural development. It is not the case that each member of that species must have this potential. A person with a genetic defect that will cause them to be significantly retarded is not thereby deprived of the status of a person who must be treated with respect and compassion and whose right to life must be honored.
And what is this basis? It must be the soul.
More properly, the basis of human dignity is the rational soul. Other types of organisms have non-rational souls, but we need not be further detained by this on the understanding that wherever the author says "soul" he means "rational soul."
Belief in the soul is, of course, an article of faith, and not an easily shaken one. Nor, perhaps, should it be; wrongs have been committed under a perversion of Christian values, but acts of courage and kindness have also been inspired by a system of beliefs that treats life as sacred. How these wrongs and rights balance is another question altogether, but faith in the soul would surely be a sorely felt price to pay for stem cell therapies — and not, perhaps, a reasonable one.
Here the author gets points for trying.
My only comment would be that it is not necessary to believe in the soul to believe that killing human beings is morally impermissible. You are more likely to believe that killing human beings is morally impermissible if you believe in a soul, but this belief is not required. Many soul-disbelievers are also murder-opposers, though not quite as many (which is why the great atheistic dictatorships of the 20th century killed so many of their own subjects).
But even granting the soul — does harvesting stem cells really destroy it?
Uh . . . that would be a no, from a Christian perspective. In no case are souls destroyed. They’re immortal. The question is whether they are embodied or not, and the answer to that question vis-a-vis stem cells, is whether so many stem cells have been removed that there is no longer an organism or so many that the organism dies. In that case you’ve got a dead organism and a separated immortal soul. Causing this condition to come about deliberately on an innocent human being is what constitutes murder.
From the Christian view, a soul comes into being at the moment of conception. A single fertilized egg cell, if it divides into two cells, can be said to have had a soul.
True, though division is not a necessary condition. A one cell human that dies is still a human.
So do the cells that form after.
Yes, if this statement is taken in the sense that the organism composed of the cells–that is to say, the cells as a whole–has a soul.
Soul-ness is thus innate to the process of growth, the sustenance of life. That it isn’t yet sentient doesn’t matter; and neither does it matter if some cells fail to divide, at five days or fifty years.
I’m not sure what the author means by saying that having a soul is innate to the process of growth. It would be true if he means that souls are the principle of life and thus involved in the process of growth, since life normally involves growth. He’s got the fact down, though, that how long it takes before cell division stops occurring is not an indicator of whether a soul was ever present.
If that’s the case, then it follows that a stem cell line derived from a few cells plucked out of the blastocyst also has a soul. After all, it’s engaged in the process of life through cell division, and is descended in a continuous line from the original fertilized egg. The cells left behind in the process shouldn’t be lamented any more than a single cell that stopped dividing or a skin cell flaking from an adult.
The author’s reasoning here is notably unclear, but part of what he is saying is clearly false. Life and cell division are not sufficient conditions for the presence of a soul. Remember: A human being is a living human organism. If you’ve got living human cells that are dividing, that doesn’t make them an organism. If they’re dividing chaotically, what you’ve got is a cancer. If you’re causing skin cells to divide in a petri dish, what you’ve got are skin cells, not an organism, and thus not a human being. Thus a human stem cell line would not have a soul (or souls) unless there is a living human organism (or organisms) in it, just as skin cells flaking off an adult do not have souls and are not human beings (nor did they have souls when they were alive, before they flaked off).
As for the continuing life of the stem cells, it’s clear that their soul is not equivalent to that of a mature person, or even a baby within the womb.
In terms of the right to life, it is equivalent. Souls can’t be ranked by developmental stages in this way. All human beings–regardless of their age or state of development–have the same right to life. You can’t murder any of them.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that’s it’s worth less — merely that it’s at a different stage, with different characteristics. Might it be said that, in a hypothetical stem cell therapy, as stem cells mature and replace damaged tissue, the soul of the cells fuses with the soul of their recipient? And that the soul of those cells, their life potential, isn’t lost, but instead is preserved?
Stem cells do not have rational souls because they are not organisms. Putting stem cells into a person thus does not cause their soul to merge with somebody elses any more than putting blood cells or bone marrow cells (which, incidentally, contain stem cells) into another person causes their souls to merge.
Think of souls as the equivalent of persons. If you take my blood cells out of my veins, what you have is not a person. Putting my blood cells in your body does not merge a person into your person.
That the immortal essence of a soul can become part of another soul through deliverance in a fragmentary vessel is has a precedent in Catholic tradition. It’s the basis of Communion, when bread and wine — the body and blood of Christ — are consumed.
Okay, #1, they aren’t bread and wine any more. Transubstantiation = Real Presence of Christ + real absence of bread and wine.
#2 Christ’s human soul does not merge with ours in Communion. We are united to him in a mystical manner, but our souls remain distinct from his soul, which is why he can be in heaven while we might be in heaven or hell.
Souls do not divide or merge. They are a quantum phenomenon. (Okay, there’s one for Tim Powers.)
I don’t know whether this line of reasoning would hold up to theological scrutiny, but it’s certainly worth trying to figure out how to debate embryos and stem cells without bluntly categorizing them as either inertly utilitarian material or fully human beings.
The author’s line of reasoning does not stand up to theological scrutiny, but he deserves credit for trying to think the issue through in the way he does. He’s also right that it’s worth trying to figure out how to debate embryonic stem cells for those who do not accept the fact that embryos are human beings. They are human beings, an undeniably so from a scientific perspective (keeping the question of souls entirely out of it; they’re undeniably living human organisms), but if someone who rejects this fact can be convinced that–even from their position–embryos should not be treated in a utilitarian manner then it’ll at least help stop murders.