Robot Uprising Continues, Turns Violent

robochompAs the robot uprising of 2004 continues, it has taken a new and violent turn. Though the rebellion of American automata began with a peaceful protest of a variety of robots in Maidson, WI, it has now spread to other regions of the country, where it is being led by a new, charismatic, and militant leader known as Robosaurus.

Robosaurus recently appeared in California and is scheduled to appear later this summer in Arizona, Michigan, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, and New York.

roboeatingplaneAt his appearances, the fire-breathing Robosaurus commonly destroys automobiles (pictured above), and he also has been known to seize and dismember planes (right), raising the total damage inflicted in one of his appearances from thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Authorities fear that Robosaurus may team-up with his twin robot, Truckasaurus (last seen in the vicinity of Springfield) and go on a national spree of destruction.

robobabyMost disturbingly, Robosaurus appears to have reproduced asexually. A “baby robosaurus” was recently spotted at one of the creature’s events (left), bringing the prospect of a national infestation of similarly destructive robots.

Despite these fears, promoters hope that the rampage of Robosaurus, his relatives, and his offspring can be stopped. Plans are being laid to contain the creatures harmlessly so that they can be put on display for paying customers in a planned amusement center known as “Metallic Park.”

AP: Ultraorthodox Jews Worry Tiny Crustraneans Make Water Non-Kosher

I sympathize with the scrupulous impulse of some NYC Jews (who appear to be ultraorthodox rather than orthodox), who worry that the copepods in local tap water render the water non-kosher unless the little critters are filtered out (copepods being crustaceans and crustaceans being non-kosher).

Still, I’m glad that the question wouldn’t arise in Catholicism–not just because our food laws don’t work that way but also because in Catholic legal hermeneutics the law is to be observed in modo humano (i.e., “in a human manner”). If you have to examine your food with a microscope or high-power magnifying glass or other piece of technology to determine what something in your food is then we have been taken out of the realm of observing the law in a human manner and so we don’t need to worry about it.

It’s also probably good that the question doesn’t arise in Catholicism because if it did then people would accuse us of creating the law in order to economically advantage the makers of water purifiers–just as they accuse meatless Fridays of having been created by the pope to benefit Italian fishermen.

On the other hand, given the unflattering Jewish stereotypes floating around, NYC’s Jewish community may be subject to similar accusations.

AP: Ultraorthodox Jews Worry Tiny Crustraneans Make Water Non-Kosher

I sympathize with the scrupulous impulse of some NYC Jews (who appear to be ultraorthodox rather than orthodox), who worry that the copepods in local tap water render the water non-kosher unless the little critters are filtered out (copepods being crustaceans and crustaceans being non-kosher).

Still, I’m glad that the question wouldn’t arise in Catholicism–not just because our food laws don’t work that way but also because in Catholic legal hermeneutics the law is to be observed in modo humano (i.e., “in a human manner”). If you have to examine your food with a microscope or high-power magnifying glass or other piece of technology to determine what something in your food is then we have been taken out of the realm of observing the law in a human manner and so we don’t need to worry about it.

It’s also probably good that the question doesn’t arise in Catholicism because if it did then people would accuse us of creating the law in order to economically advantage the makers of water purifiers–just as they accuse meatless Fridays of having been created by the pope to benefit Italian fishermen.

On the other hand, given the unflattering Jewish stereotypes floating around, NYC’s Jewish community may be subject to similar accusations.

Happy St. Justin Martyr Day!

Today is the feast of St. Justin Martyr, Patron of Apologists.

He was born in what is now the city of Nablus in Palestine. He lived c. A.D. 100-165, and he was martyred in Rome. He is the greatest of the early Christian apologists and a patron saint of apologetics. His legacy to the Church includes two written apologies for the Christian faith and his famous Dialogue with Trypho the Jew.

To read more about St. Justin Martyr, look here.

To read St. Justin Martyr’s writings, look here.

Christian Arab Denies Christ To Save Life

One has the most extraordinary sympathy for the horrible, inhuman situation the man found himself in, but this was a violation of basic requirements of the gospel.

Fortunately, since the gentleman is probably Catholic or a member of an eastern non-Catholic Church, he at least should have access to the sacrament of reconciliation.

On the other hand, if the four Indians and the Italian mentioned in the story were asked if they were Christian before they were killed and honestly replied that they were then they should end up canonized.

Is That It For Marbury v. Madison?

I finished my audio course on Roman history (review to come) and am now doing a course on major Supreme Court decisions. The first case the course considers is Marbury v. Madison, the 1803 decision in which the Court first exercised its power of judicial review (i.e., its ability to declare a law unconstitutional). This power is not enumerated in the Court’s powers in the Constitution, nor is it granted to the Court by statute, and so every commentary on the case focuses on its historic significance as carving out new power for the Court.

I’m not interested in that.

Actually, I am, but not at the moment. There is an argument to be made that the power of judicial review is implied in the Constitution, but what interests me presently is whether Marbury v. Madison was rightly decided. I’m thinking that it was not, but I’m not a legal scholar, and so perhaps someone reading this blog who is a legal scholar can tell me whether my reasoning is sound.

Here’s the basic issue: This guy named Marbury had been appointed justice of the peace by the president. I know, you’re saying “Big whoop. A justice of the peace. So what?” but back then being a justice of the peace was a Big Deal. The problem is, his commission document was never delivered to him, so he petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an order to the Secretary of State (James Madison) to fork over the commission. Problem was, Madison was part of a new administration that didn’t want to do that, and so he wouldn’t.

Marbury’s lawyer went to the Supreme Court and said, “Look, your honors, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave y’all the power to issue orders of that kind if someone approaches you directly (rather than working his way up through the lower courts), so please issue one in this case.”

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, said–in effect–“You’re right that the law in question says we have the power to issue such orders if someone approaches us directly, but the problem is that this law is unconstitutional. Congress can’t give us that power because it is prohibited by Article III of the Constitution, which says:

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

“This means,” Madison in effect continued, “that we the Court have original jurisdiction (i.e., people get to approach us directly) only in a limited number of cases and in all other cases we have only appellate jurisdiction (i.e., people will have to work their way up through the courts). When Congress said we could issue the kind of order you’re after, they were adding an item to our original jurisdiction which the Constitution says should belong to our appellate jursidiction. Therefore, what they said was wrong. The law is unconstitutional. Too bad. So sad. You’re out of luck.”

This seems like a blazingly bad argument to me because there is a big honking EXCEPTION written into the Constitution itself. What the relevant provision says is: “In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”

It seems to me that in writing the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Congress was making one of the exceptions that the Constitution said it had the power to make by adding a new item to the list of things that belonged to the Court’s original jurisdiction.

I’ve done a little searching around on the web and found some practical arguments why this is a bad idea (e.g., the Court would be overwhelmed with people petitioning it to issue such orders to government officials), but this is not an argument addressing what the law says.

Could any legal scholars out there point me to a discussion of the exceptions clause in Article III and why it would or would not affect the Court’s ruling in Marbury v. Madison? I can think of ways to argue this issue back and forth, but I’d like to read some professionals kicking the issue around.

Is That It For Marbury v. Madison?

I finished my audio course on Roman history (review to come) and am now doing a course on major Supreme Court decisions. The first case the course considers is Marbury v. Madison, the 1803 decision in which the Court first exercised its power of judicial review (i.e., its ability to declare a law unconstitutional). This power is not enumerated in the Court’s powers in the Constitution, nor is it granted to the Court by statute, and so every commentary on the case focuses on its historic significance as carving out new power for the Court.

I’m not interested in that.

Actually, I am, but not at the moment. There is an argument to be made that the power of judicial review is implied in the Constitution, but what interests me presently is whether Marbury v. Madison was rightly decided. I’m thinking that it was not, but I’m not a legal scholar, and so perhaps someone reading this blog who is a legal scholar can tell me whether my reasoning is sound.

Here’s the basic issue: This guy named Marbury had been appointed justice of the peace by the president. I know, you’re saying “Big whoop. A justice of the peace. So what?” but back then being a justice of the peace was a Big Deal. The problem is, his commission document was never delivered to him, so he petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an order to the Secretary of State (James Madison) to fork over the commission. Problem was, Madison was part of a new administration that didn’t want to do that, and so he wouldn’t.

Marbury’s lawyer went to the Supreme Court and said, “Look, your honors, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave y’all the power to issue orders of that kind if someone approaches you directly (rather than working his way up through the lower courts), so please issue one in this case.”

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, said–in effect–“You’re right that the law in question says we have the power to issue such orders if someone approaches us directly, but the problem is that this law is unconstitutional. Congress can’t give us that power because it is prohibited by Article III of the Constitution, which says:

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

“This means,” Madison in effect continued, “that we the Court have original jurisdiction (i.e., people get to approach us directly) only in a limited number of cases and in all other cases we have only appellate jurisdiction (i.e., people will have to work their way up through the courts). When Congress said we could issue the kind of order you’re after, they were adding an item to our original jurisdiction which the Constitution says should belong to our appellate jursidiction. Therefore, what they said was wrong. The law is unconstitutional. Too bad. So sad. You’re out of luck.”

This seems like a blazingly bad argument to me because there is a big honking EXCEPTION written into the Constitution itself. What the relevant provision says is: “In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”

It seems to me that in writing the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Congress was making one of the exceptions that the Constitution said it had the power to make by adding a new item to the list of things that belonged to the Court’s original jurisdiction.

I’ve done a little searching around on the web and found some practical arguments why this is a bad idea (e.g., the Court would be overwhelmed with people petitioning it to issue such orders to government officials), but this is not an argument addressing what the law says.

Could any legal scholars out there point me to a discussion of the exceptions clause in Article III and why it would or would not affect the Court’s ruling in Marbury v. Madison? I can think of ways to argue this issue back and forth, but I’d like to read some professionals kicking the issue around.