Treasure of the Broken Land

Renee

Every year in August I have a series of special days. First, the 22nd (Queenship of Mary) is the anniversary of my reception into the Church. Then comes my birthday. Then, on the 26th, it is the anniversary of my wife’s death.

Renee passed eighteen years ago today after a two-month battle with colon cancer. She had just turned 28.

You can read about it if you like.

I realized that I’d never put a picture of her online, and so I scanned this one.

You don’t know it from looking at the picture, but she’s actually standing on phone books to make her look taller.

In the words of a Mark Heard song,

I see you now and then in dreams
Your voice sounds just like it used to
I know you better than I knew you then
All I can say is I love you

I thought our days were commonplace
Thought they would number in millions
Now there’s only the aftertaste
Of circumstance that can’t pass this way again

Treasure of the broken land
Parched earth, give up your captive ones
Waiting wind of Gabriel
Blow soon upon the hollow bones

I can melt the clock hands down
But only in my memory
Nobody gets a second chance
To be the friend they meant to be.

Okay, Liturgical Rant Time

This Sunday when I went to Mass there was a guest priest, someone I’d never seen before. As soon as I head him speak, I knew there was going to be trouble. While everyone as saying the Gloria, this is what the priest said:

Glory to God in the highest
And peace to

his

God’s people on earth.

“Oh, great,” I thought. “We’re already off to a bad start.”

Things went downhill from there.

Not only did Fr. Gender Edit tamper with the Gloria, he also was seemingly unaware of the existence of the subjunctive mood in English. Thus whenever the text called for him to say, “The Lord be with you,” he would instead say, “The Lord is with you.”

This is wrong for so many reasons. While it is true that the Lord is always with us in one sense—actually, in several senses—it is also true that the Lord is not with us in other senses and that there are senses in which he is sometimes with us and sometimes not. For example, he’s not always with us the way he is in the Eucharist. Christ’s Real Presence disappears once the appearances of bread and wine cease.

There are also senses in which the Lord can choose to be with us or choose not to be—for example, he is certainly with us in a particular way when we are doing his will but not when we are sinning.

Priests who chuck the subjunctive “The Lord be with you” in favor of the indicative “The Lord is with you” are presumably wanting to assure the flock of God’s presence, but what they’re actually doing is falsifying the liturgy, not just by tampering with the approved text but also by speaking presumptuously on behalf of God. It is precisely those senses in which God can choose to be with us (or not) that the Church intends in this greeting. That’s why the Church uses the subjunctive mood here—which is used in this case to express a wish or desire. By offering this greeting, the priest is asking God to bless us. He’s praying for us in the greeting.

By using the indicative mood—which is used to express actual states of affairs—the priest is not praying for us but announcing a result, which means either that he is speaking of one of those senses in which God is always with us (changing and flattening the meaning of the greeting) or he is presuming upon God’s free choice. Either way, it’s bad.

It’s also bad because we are supposed (for the next year and a bit) to respond by saying, “And also with you.” (Come Advent 2011, though, it’ll be the more literal, “And with your spirit.”)

This means that the priest is not only altering the meaning of what he’s saying, he’s also forcing a shift in meaning on what we say. The meaning of our response is conditioned by his greeting, and so to say, “And also with you” would mean “And the Lord is also with you.”

In other words, he’s forcing upon us his own modification of meaning and expecting us to make it our own via the reply.

A friend of mine pointedly refuses to give the response when a priest does this, and frankly, I do too. I just keep my mouth shut. The priest may have the power to deform the liturgy at this point, but that doesn’t mean I have to vocally affirm him in doing so.

Fr. Gender Edit’s defiant refusals to say what the Missal says for him to say, though, were peccadillos compared to what he did in the homily.

You may recall that the Gospel for the day was Luke 13:22-30, wherein our Lord is asked the question of whether those who are saved will be few and he replies,

“Strive to enter through the narrow gate,
for many, I tell you, will attempt to enter
but will not be strong enough.
After the master of the house has arisen and locked the door,
then will you stand outside knocking and saying,
‘Lord, open the door for us.’
He will say to you in reply,
‘I do not know where you are from.
And you will say,
‘We ate and drank in your company and you taught in our streets.’
Then he will say to you,
‘I do not know where you are from.
Depart from me, all you evildoers!’
And there will be wailing and grinding of teeth
when you see Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob
and all the prophets in the kingdom of God
and you yourselves cast out.
And people will come from the east and the west
and from the north and the south
and will recline at table in the kingdom of God.
For behold, some are last who will be first,
and some are first who will be last.”

So. . . . Salutary warning about the possibility of damnation, right? Not in Fr. Gender Edit’s hands! He got up and completely un-preached this passage. He started by talking about how the question raises Jesus’ “nightmare scenario” (Fr. Edit’s words)—the idea that even one soul might not be saved, and which he came to earth in order to prevent. The question thus revealed the anxiety of the one who asked it, but Jesus reassured him.

No comment whatsoever on the “many, I tell you, will attempt to enter but will not be strong enough” or “I do not know where you are from. Depart from me, all you evildoers!” Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, that which he could not speak of, Fr. Gender Edit passed over in silence.

Which raises the question: Why did he feel the need to subvert the Gospel reading of the day in this way? It wasn’t just a question of soft-peddling its message. It was completely reversing what the text was emphasizing.

So not only did Fr. Edit feel free to tamper with the prayers of the Mass, he also felt free to counter the text of sacred Scripture.

Why?

I hate to say it, but when a priest does this—especially with the possibility of damnation—one can’t help but wonder if there is a psychological dynamic of bad conscience at work. One can’t help but wondering if he has some moral fault—perhaps one of the various kinds of priestly moral faults that have so often appeared in the press in recent years—that makes it unendurable for him to acknowledge the possibility of damnation.

However that may be, it’s just a sad situation.

And it was made sadder when, as the Communion hymn, they did “I Am the Bread of Life”—a modern composition that has been systematically stripped of any and all gender references, despite the fact that it is based on John 6, where such references are used.

I tell you, the better you know Scripture, the more awful that song is, because it just grates on the nerves hearing the word of God systematically neutered, one line after another, in the service of a socio-political agenda. (And that’s even if you can get past singing line after line in the voice of Jesus.)

This song—especially its gender edited version—is another which I just keep my mouth shut for.

I’m sure that, as a visiting priest, Fr. Gender Edit had nothing to do with the selection of that song, but it was ironic and depressing that they picked for that particular Mass.

What I wonder, though, is what Fr. Gender Edit and his ilk will do come Advent 2011, when the new translation of the Roman Missal will go into effect (it has now been announced).

Over the last decade plus, the Holy See has been using a step-by-step approach to improve the quality of the liturgy, and it has been bearing fruit. Things aren’t as bad now as they were fifteen years ago. Not hardly.

But the new translation of the Mass will be a particularly big step, and I wonder what dissidents like Fr. Gender Edit will do when it gets here.

What are your thoughts?

How to Make Low Carb Pizza: The Movie!

The other day on Facebook (where you can friend me if you'd like) I posted a picture of some low carb pizza I had made over the weekend. I got a number of requests–online and off–for the recipe, and so I made the following video (my apologies for the camera work at a few points; it's not easy to make pizza with one hand while holding an iPhone with the other).

President Obama Defends Ground Zero Mosque!

In a speech at the White House on Friday—the Muslim holy day—commemorating the start of Ramadan—the Muslim holy month—President Obama expressed support for the right of Muslims to build a mosque near Ground Zero in New York City and, in fact, at the site of a building that was damaged in the 9/11 attacks when part of one of the planes used by terrorists crashed into the building’s roof.

In his usual snippy tone President Obama stated:

Let me be clear: as a citizen, and as President, I believe that Muslims have the same right to practice their religion as anyone else in this country. That includes the right to build a place of worship and a community center on private property in lower Manhattan, in accordance with local laws and ordinances

By the next day, he was backpedaling, stating:

I was not commenting and I will not comment on the wisdom of making a decision to put a mosque there.

Okay, so he’s a politician. You gotta expect flip-flops.

And non-denial denials, which is what his second remark was. He is deliberately not telling us what he thinks about the wisdom of building a mosque at Ground Zero. Let’s take him at his word on that. He may very well think it’s a great idea. Or he may not. We don’t know because he isn’t telling. He just wanted to take some of the political edge off his remark of the previous day.

I could even give him credit for defending a legal right on the part of Muslims to build a mosque on private property “in accordance with local laws and ordinances”—assuming two things: (1) That they actually have such a legal right (the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to build a place of worship anywhere you want) and (2) if he was backed into a corner and forced to answer the question.

Whether condition (1) obtains, I don’t know. But condition (2) didn’t.

He wasn’t backed into a wall and forced to answer the question. This wasn’t a press conference where Helen Thomas (or someone) sprang the question on him. It was part of his prepared remarks for a Happy Ramadan speech. This means that he chose to put in his oar on this issue. He didn’t have to do that. He chose to.

And he chose to for political reasons—to try to curry favor with the Muslim community.

It’s a calculated risk, because in making such remarks the President also opened himself up to critique on the issue, so if it results in a net loss of political capital for him, he deserves it. He invited it.

While it’s understandable that the President getting involved would focus the spotlight on him, I think that some light also should be shown on the people who are providing the property (presumably by selling it) to the mosque builders and on the mosque builders themselves.

Why do they want to build a mosque right there?

According to their website, they’re all about “improving Muslim-West relations.”

Hmmm.

Build a mosque—a place for Muslims to worship—within two blocks of the site of the worst Muslim terrorist attack in living memory—at the site of a building that was itself damaged as part of the attack.

Let’s flip some religious identities around.

Suppose that there was a Christian terrorist organization and that it attacked an iconic site in a major Muslim city—say, the Kaaba in Mecca—and in so doing not only destroyed the site but also killed 3,000 innocent people, overwhelmingly Muslim.

Then a group of Christians, who have set about “improving West-Muslim relations” announce that they want to build a Christian cultural center and church—a place for Christians to worship—just outside the former site of the Kaaba, at the spot where once stood a building damaged in the Christian terrorist attack.

Would any of us (a) think that this really would improve relations or (b) believe claims that this was the real motive (as opposed, e.g., to being a kind of covert Christian triumphalism)?

I know the Kaaba in Mecca isn’t a direct equivalent of the World Trade Center. It is more important to Muslims than the latter was to Americans—far more so, in fact. But the point remains the same. (And yes, I know that Saudi Arabia would never allow this, but we’re doing a thought experiment to tease out an underlying principle.)

I could understand Muslims wanting to build some kind of inter-religious discussion facility near Ground Zero as a way of allowing visitors to the area to hear the message, “We are Muslims and we don’t approve of what was done here. Please don’t judge our religion by this horrible atrocity.”

But that’s not the same thing as building a mosque—a place of worship for Muslims.

One would always have to suspect the motives of the builders-of-churches-near-the-demolished-Kaaba, as well as the motives of Christians who would go there to worship, and in the same way one must suspect the motives of the builders-of-mosques-near-Ground-Zero, as well as the motives of Muslims who would go there to worship.

Something smells rotten here because something is rotten here.

This is at best a colossally tone deaf and insensitive venture (particularly so for the families who lost loved ones in the 9/11 attacks, but also for all Americans).

At worst it is something far darker.

What are your thoughts?

No, You Can’t Deliberately Kill Innocent People (Sorry!)

A lot of folks have commented on my previous post, Commemorating a Major U.S. War Crime. In the course of the discussion, a number of issues have been raised that I would like to address.

Foremost among them is a foundational principle of Christian morality that quite a number of commenters do not appear to fully appreciate. It is this: One can never do something that is intrinsically evil, period. No circumstances whatsoever can make it morally licit.

That, in fact, is the difference between things that are intrinsically evil and those that are only extrinsically evil. Intrinsically evil things are evil by their own nature, regardless of circumstance, and so they can never be done (per the fundamental axiom of all morals: Do good and avoid evil). Extrinsically evil things become evil because of their circumstances and/or intent, not because of the nature of the act itself. As a result, such acts can be done in some circumstances (those in which they are not immoral), while they cannot be done in others (when circumstances make them immoral to do).

The fact that some actions are intrinsically evil is reflected in St. Paul’s rejection of the proposal, “Why not do evil that good may come?” He says of those who propose this, “Their condemnation is just” (Rom. 3:8).

The principle is treated more elaborately in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which states:

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts – such as fornication – that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

In his subsequent encyclical on moral theology, Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II stressed:

Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances [VS 80].

He returned to the theme again in his encyclical on life, Evangelium Vitae:

No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church [EV 62].

So this point is quite firm in Catholic moral teaching: Some acts, by their very nature, are intrinsically evil and thus cannot be done by anyone at any time, no matter what the intention or circumstances.

One of these acts is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being. In Evangelium Vitae John Paul II proclaimed:

[B]y the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, and in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral. This doctrine, based upon that unwritten law which man, in the light of reason, finds in his own heart (cf. Rom 2:14-15), is reaffirmed by Sacred Scripture, transmitted by the Tradition of the Church and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.

The deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of his life is always morally evil and can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end. It is in fact a grave act of disobedience to the moral law, and indeed to God himself, the author and guarantor of that law; it contradicts the fundamental virtues of justice and charity. “Nothing and no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person, or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a person who is dying. Furthermore, no one is permitted to ask for this act of killing, either for himself or herself or for another person entrusted to his or her care, nor can he or she consent to it, either explicitly or implicitly. Nor can any authority legitimately recommend or permit such an action”.

As far as the right to life is concerned, every innocent human being is absolutely equal to all others. This equality is the basis of all authentic social relationships which, to be truly such, can only be founded on truth and justice, recognizing and protecting every man and woman as a person and not as an object to be used. Before the moral norm which prohibits the direct taking of the life of an innocent human being “there are no privileges or exceptions for anyone. It makes no difference whether one is the master of the world or the ‘poorest of the poor’ on the face of the earth. Before the demands of morality we are all absolutely equal” [EV 57].

In this passage, John Paul II walks right up to the edge of invoking papal infallibility. He is using the most solemn form of papal teaching shy of invoking infallibility (had he said “I declare and define” instead of “I confirm,” he would have invoked infallibility), though in this case that is not necessary because the same teaching has already been infallibly proposed by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church.

Because the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is intrinsically evil, it is never morally legitimate to target innocent civilians, even in wartime. It does not matter what authority (civilian or military) has recommended or ordered the action—even if he be the American president or the master of the world. It does not matter whether innocent people on your side will die as a result. They are absolutely equal to the innocent on the other side and cannot be preferred.

Furthermore, to threaten to do something intrinsically evil is itself intrinsically evil, and to threaten—by words or deeds—to target civilians is intrinsically evil and cannot be done under any circumstances. You cannot hold innocents as hostages to another goal, however noble or lofty it may be.

These are exactly the same principles that underlie the intrinsic immorality of abortion, euthanasia, and other forms of murder. One cannot justify them, no matter the circumstances or the intention.

This does not deal with all the subjects that have been brought up in the combox. It does not, for example, go into cases where—by the law of double-effect—civilian casualties can be tolerated for a proportionate reason. But it does show the fundamental conflict between Catholic morality and the position of those trying to justify the targeting of civilians due the exigencies of wartime or as the “lesser evil” compared to what would otherwise happen.

Killing, attempting to kill, or threatening to kill the innocent can never be justified, even if it means you yourself—also an innocent—will die.

Commemorating a Major U.S. War Crime

Friday was the anniversary of the U.S. Bombing of Hiroshima during World War II. Monday is the anniversary of its bombing of Nagasaki.

The explosion of the Fat Man atomic device over Nagasaki is pictured. It rose eleven miles into the sky over Ground Zero.

The important thing, though, is that it—together with the Little Boy device that was deployed over Hiroshima—killed approximately 200,000 human beings. And it ended the war with Japan.

It is understandable that many Americans at the time were relieved that the long burden of the bloodiest war in human history could finally be laid down. Many then, as now, saw the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a necessary step to preventing even more casualties.

However, some of the blogging being done to commemorate the attack is most unfortunate.

Consider Michael Graham, who wishes his readers a “Happy Peace Through Victory Day.”

Today marks the anniversary of the single greatest act in the cause of peace ever taken by the United States:

Dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.  That one decision, that one device, saved more lives, did more to end war, and created more justice in the world in a single stroke than any other.  It was done by America, for Americans. It saved the lives of hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of American soldiers and sailors.

So, obviously, President Obama’s not too happy about it. . . .

Euroweenie peaceniks and an annoying number of American liberals see the bombing of Hiroshima as a shameful act.  What is it America should be ashamed for—defeating an enemy that declared war on us? Bringing about the end of a fascist empire that killed millions of people, mostly Asians? Preventing the slaughter of the good guys—Americans—by killing the bad guys—the Japanese?

I am not a Euroweenie or a peacenik or a political liberal or even someone opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in principle. I can imagine scenarios in which their use would be justified. I can even deal with the cheeky “Happy Peace Through Victory Day” headline.

But Mr. Graham’s analysis of the situation on a moral level is faulty.

It is true that, by instilling terror in the Japanese government, the use of atomic weapons prevented further and, in all probability, greater casualties on both sides.

Preventing further and greater casualties is a good thing, but as the Catechism reminds us:

The Church and human reason both assert the permanent validity of the moral law during armed conflict. The mere fact that war has regrettably broken out does not mean that everything becomes licit between the warring parties [CCC 2312].

It isn’t just a question of the goal of an action. The goal may be a good one, but the means used to achieve it may be evil. The Catechism states:

Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation. A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons – especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons – to commit such crimes [CCC 2314].

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were definitely acts of war directed to the destruction of whole cities or—at least—vast areas with their inhabitants. The only quibbling could be about whether this was “indiscriminate” destruction. Someone might argue (stretching the word “indiscriminate” rather severely and taking it in a sense probably not meant by the Catechism) that they were not indiscriminate attacks in that they were aimed at vital Japanese war resources (munitions factories, troops, etc.) and the only practical way to take out these resources was to use atomic weapons.

Mounting such a case would face a number of problems. One would have to show that Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained such resources (not that difficult to show) and that these resources themselves were proportionate in value to the massive collateral damage that would be inflicted (a much more difficult task) and that there was no other practical way—like a more targeted bombing—to take them out (again a difficult task).

But for purposes of argument, let’s grant all this. Let’s suppose that there were such resources, and that they were proportionate in value to the massive loss of civilian lives and that there was no other way to get rid of them.

Does that absolve the U.S. of guilt in these two bombings?

No.

You can see why in the logic that Mr. Graham used. It stresses the fact that the use of these weapons saved net lives. This was undoubtedly uppermost in the U.S. military planners’ thinking as they faced the possibility of an extremely bloody invasion of Japan in which huge numbers on both sides would die.

But notice what is not being said—either by Mr. Graham or anybody else: “Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained such important war widgets that without those widgets Japan would be unable to prosecute the war. Thus by taking out those military resources we could deprive Japan of its ability to make war.”

Neither is anybody saying something like this: “We needed to scare Japan into surrender by showing them that we could destroy all of their military resources. We needed to make them terrified of losing all their military resources so that, out of a desperate desire to preserve their military resources, they would surrender.”

These are the dogs that didn’t bark, and they are why this line of argument is a dog that won’t hunt.

The reason nobody says these things is that they were not the thinking behind the U.S.‘s actions. The idea was not to end the war through the direct destruction of military resources in these two cities, nor was it to end the war by scaring Japan into thinking we might destroy all of its military resources. It was scaring Japan into surrendering by threatening (explicitly) to do this over and over again and inflict massive damage on the Japanese population. In other words, to make them scared that we would engage in “the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants.”

That means that, even if Hiroshima and Nagasaki had contained military resources that of themselves would have justified the use of atomic weapons (which is very hard to argue), our intention still was not pure. We were still using Japanese civilians as hostages to the war effort, still threatening to kill civilians if Japan did not surrender. That was the message we wanted the Japanese leadership to get—not, “We will take out your military resources if you keep this up,” but, “We will take out big chunks of your population if you keep this up.”

That meant that the U.S. leadership was formally participating in evil. It does not matter if the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could (through some stretch of the imagination) be justified in themselves. The fact is that they were used to send a message telling the Japanese government that we would kill massive numbers of the military and civilian population, without discrimination. That message is evil, and to knowingly and deliberately send that message is to formally participate in evil.

That made these attacks war crimes.

Now, make no mistake. I’m an American. I’m a fan of the U.S. But love of the United States should not preclude one from being able to look honestly at the mistakes it has committed in the past. Indeed, it is only by looking at and frankly acknowledging the mistakes of the past that we can learn from them. Love of one’s country should impel one to help it not commit such evils.

Racial discrimination? Bad thing. Allowing abortions? Bad thing. Dropping nukes to deliberately kill civilians? Bad thing. Let’s try not to have things like these mar America’s future.

READ ABOUT THE HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI BOMBINGS.

What are your thoughts?

Effects of Excommunication

PopeExcommunicationDet In the combox down yonder, a reader writes:

Jimmy, I’ve got a question for you. What does it really mean, on a day-to-day basis, if someone is excommunicated?

Here’s where I’m coming from: If someone commits a mortal sin, he can’t (or shouldn’t) go to communion until he repents and makes a good confession. If someone is under interdict, he can’t (or shouldn’t) receive communion until the interdict is lifted. If someone is excommunicated, he can’t (or shouldn’t) go to communion until the excommunication is lifted.

Okay, but if you have one of those automatic excommunications that aren’t reserved to the bishop or something, then you can have the excommunication lifted by repenting and making a good confession.

So, what’s the difference? Surely, we keep hearing that excommunication is not the same thing as being excluded from receiving communion. Okay, but if it’s not the same thing, what’s different about it?

It’s understandable why there is confusion on this point. For an ordinary lay person (the kind you’d find in the wild, not one who is a nun or a monk or a diocesan officer of some kind) the day-to-day effects of excommunication (and interdict) boils down to basically lack of ability to participate in the sacraments (including performing ministries at Mass).

There are, however, other effects, which strike clerics and lay people of certain kinds. The Code of Canon Law provides:

Can. 1331 §1. An excommunicated person is forbidden:

1/ to have any ministerial participation in celebrating the sacrifice of the Eucharist or any other ceremonies of worship whatsoever;

2/ to celebrate the sacraments or sacramentals and to receive the sacraments;

3/ to exercise any ecclesiastical offices, ministries, or functions whatsoever or to place acts of governance.

§2. If the excommunication has been imposed or declared, the offender:

1/ who wishes to act against the prescript of §1, n. 1 must be prevented from doing so, or the liturgical action must be stopped unless a grave cause precludes this;

2/ invalidly places acts of governance which are illicit according to the norm of §1, n. 3;

3/ is forbidden to benefit from privileges previously granted;

4/ cannot acquire validly a dignity, office, or other function in the Church;

5/ does not appropriate the benefits of a dignity, office, any function, or pension, which the offender has in the Church.

Can. 1332 The prohibitions mentioned in ⇒ can. 1331, §1, nn. 1 and 2 bind an interdicted person. If the interdict has been imposed or declared, however, the prescript of ⇒ can. 1331, §2, n. 1 must be observed.

You can see how some of these additional effects would strike clerics and certain types of lay folk–e.g., a nun who is a mother superior would not be able to exercise her office, etc.

Which Church (Sui Iuris) Do You Enter at Baptism?

In the combox down yonder, a reader writes:

I'd be curious how to find out what rite one is. I have a friend who was born to a Latin mother and a Ukrainian Catholic father and was baptized in a Byzantine Catholic church. As we understand it, it depends on what year he was baptized in, but we're not sure how the church of baptism factors into it. In any case, it's an interesting general question as to how the various rites are kept track of and managed as far as individuals are concerned.

Here is what the present law says:

Code of Canon Law (1983)

Can. 111 §1. Through the reception of baptism, the child of parents who belong to the Latin Church is enrolled in it, or, if one or the other does not belong to it, both parents have chosen by mutual agreement to have the offspring baptized in the Latin Church. If there is no mutual agreement, however, the child is enrolled in the ritual Church to which the father belongs.
§2. Anyone to be baptized who has completed the fourteenth year of age can freely choose to be baptized in the Latin Church or in another ritual Church sui iuris; in that case, the person belongs to the Church which he or she has chosen.

Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (1990)

Canon 29
§1. By virtue of baptism, a child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year of age is enrolled in the Church sui iuris of the Catholic father; or the Church sui iuris of the mother if only the mother is Catholic or if both parents by agreement freely request it, with due regard for particular law established by the Apostolic See.
§2. If the child who has not yet completed his fourteenth year is:
(1) born of an unwed mother, he is enrolled in the Church sui iuris to which the mother belongs;
(2) born of unknown parents, he is to be enrolled in the Church sui iuris of those in whose care he has been legitimately committed are enrolled; if it is a case of an adoptive father and mother, §1 should be applied;
(3) born of non-baptized parents, the child is to be a member of the Church sui iuris of the one who is responsible for his education in the Catholic faith.

And here is what the prior law said:

Code of Canon Law (1917)
Canon 756
§1. Children must be baptized according to the rite of the parents.
§2. If one parent belongs to the Latin rite, and the other to an oriental [rite], the children are baptized according to the rite of the father, unless provided otherwise by special law.
§3. If only one [parent] is Catholic, the children are to be baptized in that rite.

As you can see, there are some options. Partly, it does depend on when the child was baptized (and I'm presuming the child was under 14). If it was before 1983, the 1917 Code's canon would have applied. If it was after 1983 then that year's Code's canon would have applied. And if it was after 1990s, the Eastern Code's canon would also have applied.
It isn't just the year that is in issue, though. It is also the choice of the parents if it was after 1983.
My guess is that since the child had a Byzantine rite father and a Latin mother and the child was baptized in a Byzantine church that the parents probably had not agreed to have it baptized as a Latin (otherwise one would think it would have been baptized in a Latin parish). So probably the child belongs to whichever Byzantine rite church the father belongs to.
Which raises another point . . .
There is a difference between a "rite" and an Eastern Catholic church.

Canon 28
§1. A rite is the liturgical, theological, spiritual and disciplinary patrimony, culture and circumstances of history of a distinct people, by which its own manner of living the faith is manifested in each Church sui iuris. 

§2. The rites treated in this code, unless otherwise stated, are those which arise from the Alexandrian, Antiochene, Armenian, Chaldean and Constantinopolitan traditions. 

Canon 27
A group of Christian faithful united by a hierarchy according to the norm of law which the supreme authority of the Church expressly or tacitly recognizes as sui iuris is called in this Code a Church sui iuris.

So properly speaking the child belongs to a church sui iuris (a church with its own law) and the church follows a particular liturgical/theological/spiritual/etc. rite. There are more than a dozen Catholic churches sui iuris that follow the Byzantine rite, but the child is only a member of one of them.