What’s This?

Bird_dog

It’s a bird dog, of course!

It’s also one of the entries into a Worth1000.com context. Worth1000 is a site that runs contests for people who are proficient with Photoshop. I’ve run some posts on them before, but just recently a reader kindly sent me a link to some amazing pictures from a contest involving photoshopped hybrid animals like the one above. (CHT!)

Some of the pix are quite striking, so . . .

CHECK ‘EM OUT.

Hello, Doctor

Drwho10The longest-running science fiction television series is–it seems hard to question—the BBC "programme" Dr. Who.

Fans of the series have followed The Doctor through all ten of his incarnations thus far, and tonight a new one begins for his American fans.

Yes, tonight on Sci-Fi the Doctor returns for another season and another incarnation of the famous time-travelling timelord.

The season debuts at 8 p.m. Eastern and Pacific, from what I have been able to tell.

MORE DETAILS.

SSA & Seminary

A reader writes:

I have been discerning a vocation to the priesthood. Though I’m in college, my home-diocesan vocations director has indicated that the diocese would accept me into the seminary as a candidate for priesthood if I were to apply now (or, presumably, when I’ve graduated). He knows that I experience same-sex attractions; that for about three years I have had a deep and varyingly consuming obsession with a particular male; that my homosexuality has been related to (if not causal of or resulting from, or both) a weak masculine identity and other affective problems; that I am speaking regularly to a NARTH psychiatrist to overcome these problems; etc. But the vocations director has explicitly assured me that the same-sex attraction does not present an impediment to my entering the seminary with a view to being ordained (all else going well).

I understand that even my life-long, exclusive attraction to the priesthood is neither sufficient nor necessary to demonstrate that I do have a vocation. I know that I have no right to be ordained, that the Church must discern with me and make the ultimate decision in the person of the bishop and his assistants, etc. But I am concerned here that the vocations director would be allowing me to do something which the Church universal, traditionally and also most recently in the Instruction issued last year by the Congregation for Catholic Education, has prohibited. The Instruction prohibits the ordination or admission to the seminary of those who (1) practice homosexuality, (2) present deep-seated (or, in what I consider a closer translation of the Italian, deeply rooted) homosexual tendencies, or (3) support the ‘gay’ culture.

Never having been in a sexual relationship with anyone, I don’t meet the first condition. Nor do I meet the third. My question, then, is how precisely to interpret the second condition, and how to differentiate it from the "transitory" tendencies which the Instruction indicates might not disqualify a man, provided he has been chaste for three years before ordination to the diaconate. Because I personally believe that same-sex attraction is in most cases the result of developmental problems, I consider most if not all homosexual tendencies to be in principle transitory (that is, not insuperable). And I’m still quite young; that leaves time for change, natural or induced. But I am also a realist and recognize that my tendencies, which do reveal some degree of affective immaturity and sometimes manifest themselves in difficulties in dealing with men and women (or in asserting myself healthily, or in leading, etc.), may not in fact ever go away because of contingent factors. They are rooted in childhood and early adolescent difficulties that are not easily overcome.

Even if my diocese grants official approval, if the Church has expressed a will that people in my condition not be ordained, I take this alone as sufficient to show that God has not called me. I do not want to take advantage of my diocese’s laxity in this regard if it is indeed illicit laxity, and I consider it my responsibility to discern whether I’m fit to present myself to the diocese. But do I in fact meet the second condition of the Instruction? Or if you do not have sufficient information to determine this in my case, can you explain precisely what you take the second condition to mean? I have read a wide variety of opinions, some of which would exclude me and others not.

I have to say that I have nothing but admiration for the clear-eyed, level-headed way in which the reader is approaching this situation. He is displaying a great deal of personal integrity, and I think he deserves the applause of everyone for the way in which he is conducting himself in this.

In addressing the question, I would suggest several points:

1) Individuals can try to shoulder too much of the burden of discernment. The question of whether the reader’s degree of same-sex attraction would be sufficient to prevent his admission to seminary is not exclusively his own to discern. In principle what the Church would want him to do is present the facts to the relevant officials and then they would have the primary burden of determining whether the degree of SSA is sufficient to meet the criteria in the document that the Holy See issued. In other words, in the ideal, he should be open and honest and submit to their judgment.

2) That being said, it is clear that there are individuals who have tried to minimize the import of the document and to interpret its second clause in manifestly inaccurate ways that would have the effect of gutting its meaning. Thus seminarians in some areas are not in the ideal situation and have some duty to use their own judment in determining whether or not their SSA meets the criteria described in the document.

3) The document itself also does not elaborate its criteria in great detail. As a result, there is some ambiguity in interpreting its meaning. Just what degree of SSA is needed for it to be "deep-seated" (or "deeply-rooted")? This is not altogether clear, and the resulting ambiguity is presumably something that the Holy See intends, so that the issue can be more thoroughly worked out in practice. Perhaps in the future the Holy See will publish more detailed guidance on the subject, but in the meantime there is at least some liberty of interpretation that local officials have in applying the document. It isn’t as if the Holy See said that any SSA–even light and momentary–bars one from the priesthood. The document speaks (see below) of some candidates for the priesthood having overcome a transitory problem with homosexual tendencies, but if one has ever had these, it is likely that they will continue to manifest at least occasionally and in a minor way later in life. How strong that manifestation would have to be to bar a candidate from ordination is something that the Holy See has not yet told us and thus the determination falls to local officials.

4) It therefore seems to me that the reader should seek to make the best determination he can based both on the judgment of local officials and his own understanding. He should not submit uncritically to the judgment of officials if they are unambiguously ignoring the meaning of the document, but neither should he presume to judge what the document requires exclusively according to his own judgment, for the Church has not charged him with that task. He should seek to make the best determination he can through an appraisal of the situation that seeks to incorporate both deference to local officials with his own judgment serving as a back-up if they are manifestly misinterpreting the document.

5) To apply the document to the reader’s own situation, it would be useful to review what it actually says:

In the light of such teaching, this Dicastery, in accord with the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, believes it necessary to state clearly that the Church, while profoundly respecting the persons in question, cannot admit to the seminary or to holy orders those who practise homosexuality, present deep-seated homosexual tendencies or support the so-called "gay culture".

Such persons, in fact, find themselves in a situation that gravely hinders them from relating correctly to men and women. One must in no way overlook the negative consequences that can derive from the ordination of persons with deep-seated homosexual tendencies.

Different, however, would be the case in which one were dealing with homosexual tendencies that were only the expression of a transitory problem – for example, that of an adolescence not yet superseded. Nevertheless, such tendencies must be clearly overcome at least three years before ordination to the diaconate.

The contrast that the document presents between "deep-seated tendencies" and "tendencies that were only the expression of a transitory problem" that is capable of being "clearly overcome" would seem to refer to a contrast between tendencies that are strong and enduring and those that, while they may be strong for a time, are eventually mitigated and thus overcome.

It would be a mistake to read the tendencies as having to be so strong that they actually drive the person to homosexual behavior. That is clearly not required (a) because the word "tendencies" is being used and that word does not imply outward action based on the tendencies, (b) because the commission of homosexual acts is listed as a separate criterion (albeit an ongoing commission), and (c) because the Holy See did not say "tendencies so strong that they lead the individual to commit homosexual acts."

It also would be a mistake to read the the document as saying that once the tendencies have been overcome that the individual never experiences SSA again in his life. Any time one has had a particular sexual temptation for any period of time, human nature is such that this temptation is likely to recur at some point, even if it is just a mild and momentary desire.

Putting these pieces together, it seems to me that the Holy See would find acceptable a candidate who had a period of strong homosexual desires, whether or not they led him to have homosexual sex, who then is able to overcome these to the point that, even if they do not go away entirely, they markedly diminish and remain at their diminished level for a period of years.

In this regard, the document mentions them needing to be overcome for a period of at least three years prior to ordination to the diaconate. That clause seems to be included primarily to cover those who are already in seminary, but it (or a significiant portion of it, like two years) might serve as a useful guide in determining whether one is ready for admission to seminary.

6) As to what the overcoming of the temptations might involve, I can only conjecture here, because the Holy See has not given us criteria on this point, but I would conecture that the temptations have not yet been overcome if one or more of the following conditions obtain:

* An individual finds himself spending a significant amount of time fantasizing about homosexual acts.
* An individual finds himself spending a significant amount of time having romantic but non-sexual fantasies about members of the same sex.
* An individual regularly commits autoerotic acts that have homosexual fantasy content.

In suggesting these criteria, I am not talking about temporary slips but about ongoing, regular patterns of behavior.

7) In applying all of this directly to the case of the reader, it strikes me that at least at one time the reader has had a strong tendency (I’d not the apparently long-standing crush on another individual), but it is not clear to me whether this level of temptation still applies. It may well have moderated or begun to moderate.

There also is the fact that he is seeing a NARTH counsellor and the fact that he is still very young (I have removed his actual age in keeping with my policy of omitting personally identifying information from posts). All of these are positive signs, and I would encourage him to bide his time and see what happens with his SSA. It may mitigate to the point and remain mitigated long enough that the document would not prevent him from persuing a vocation to the priesthood.

If I may also offer one bit of advice from personal experience: When I was in college I once had an enormous crush on a young woman and the crush finally abated when I realized what a jerk she actually was. I’m not suggesting that the reader foster ill-will toward the individual to whom he is attracted, but trying to form a clear-eyed appraisal of the individual, including his faults, may serve to dispel some of the romantic aura that surrounds him.

As always, I would encourage my readers to keep the gentleman who wrote in prayer, as well as all who are in similar conditions. May they handle matters as oustandingly as this gentleman is.

20

Certain People Will Never Be President

One of them is me. Another is Rudy Giuliani. A third is Mitt Romney.

The reasons for this vary.

In my case, I (a) have no interest in being president and (b) I don’t have the background for it and (c) I’m simply unelectable to that office.

(N.B., though I have no interest in being president, I would like to be king of all Londinium and wear a shiny hat.)

Being unelectable is something I share with Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney, although the reasons we are unelectable are also varied.

I would be perceived by too large a number of voters as a hardcore Catholic theocrat who is dangerously unqualified for the position. And all of that except the theocrat part would be true.

In Rudy’s and Mitt’s cases, though, the reasons for unelectability are different.

Rudy is pro-abort and pro-homosexual and anti-gun, so he’s got this whole tripple whammy thing going. He got points for his performance on 9/11, but that’s not a pass with social conservatives in this country on the issues they care about. With the nation as evenly divided as it is today, all it takes are a few of them to be not motivated enough to go to the polls and Rudy loses. With the Giuliani triple whammy, more than enough social conservatives would stay home.

Same thing applies to Mitt. First, there is his Mormonism. Like it or not, too large a slice of Christian voters–both Evangelicals and Catholics–will simply not be motivated to show up at the polls to vote for a Mormon, no matter how much they’d otherwise like him. That may not be fair, but that’s the way it is.

But how much cause do Christians have to like Romney? Although in the last few years he’s taken to calling himself a pro-life politician, there are lingering questions about the extent to which he can be trusted.

Don’t get me wrong. I’d love to see all pro-aborts switch sides and become opposed to babykilling. Such moral conversion should be welcomed.

But there also have to be adequate signs that a person is sincere in his conversion, and a iffy/maybe switch to the pro-life side that is articulated in mild, cautious, carefully-parsed terms won’t cut it, especially after years of supporting legalized abortion in which one supported "a woman’s right to choose" while still resisting the "pro-choice" label. That history of playing word games means that any current claim to be pro-life will receive strict scrutiny.

The presidency and its ability to influence the abortion issue through Supreme Court nominations and executive policy decisions is simply too great to entrust to a recent convert who does not forcefully articulate the case for making it illegal to kill babies.

Someone with a history of being pro-life could be allowed to phrase himself on this subject in a mild way that will not frighten uncommitted voters, but a person who has historically been on the other side and played word games about it and then says "I’m pro-life now; vote for me" doesn’t have that luxury.

HERE’S SOME OF THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE FROM ROMNEY’S PREVIOUS RECORD AND HIS CURRENT POSITION.
(CHT: Southern Appeal.)

MORE.

Helping A Brother With SSA

A reader writes:

Just yesterday I was blown away with news of my younger brother who says that he has same-sex attraction. I am a few years older than he is, and my younger brother is still in his teens; both of us are practicing Catholics. I spoke to him about his attraction and he says that he feels that his attraction to the male sex is stronger than for the female; the female is almost non-existent. We both live chaste lives and before I could even tell him how wrong it is, he informed me that he is aware of how wrong it is. I want to help him by talking to a priest about it or seeing a Catholic therapist concerning his issue. What more can I do to help him or even reverse the attraction; I know there have been many people who have had SSA and have led heterosexual lives.

I feel for the situation that you and your brother are in. This can be a very painful thing to have to deal with.

It sounds to me as if both of you already have a good perspective on the situation, and I don’t know how much additional advice there is that I can give. You already have a pretty good handle on matters.

Obviously, I would encourage you to pray for him and to try to help him witout making him feel worse about the situation than he already does. I would encourage him, whenever these thoughts occur to him, to relax and try to put them out of his mind.

Speaking with a priest is a good idea, but speaking to a therapist is likely to be particularly valuable since those who specialize in reparative therapy will have expertise in the matter that goes beyond what an individual priest is likely to have.

To that end, I would recommend that you contact NARTH, which specializes in such matters and has online resources that may also be helpful. Additionally, there are books on the subject that may be of help.

I would also encourage you and your brother to be optimistic about this. He is at a time in his life when many people experience sexual confusion of one sort or another, when one’s sexual inclinations can still be in flux, and the sooner that the problem is addressed in a compassionate, professional manner then the greater the progress is likely to be.

20

The Saints & Purgatory

A reader writes:

Sorry to trouble you, however, you are the person that comes to my mind when I think of Purgatory.

Hmmm. I’m not sure if that’s a compliment or not. . . . Well, let’s press on. . . .

I’ve heard you mention that Purgatory is sort of a cleansing process that we would go through because we are all guilty of sin and nothing unclean can enter heaven.  We know saints have been sinners too, some very great sinners at one point in their life.  How can we assume they make it to heaven and why would they not have to have their souls cleansed by Purgatory?

I have run into Catholics who have advanced the opinion that the saints did not go through purgatory (because they didn’t need it), but I can find no Church teaching to back up that claim. As far as I can tell, it is quiet possible that individuals who are now saints did indeed go through purgatory.

This is not to say that everybody does. The Catechism of the Catholic Church notes:

1472 To understand this doctrine and practice of the Church, it is necessary to understand that sin has a double consequence. Grave sin deprives us of communion with God and therefore makes us incapable of eternal life, the privation of which is called the "eternal punishment" of sin. On the other hand every sin, even venial, entails an unhealthy attachment to creatures, which must be purified either here on earth, or after death in the state called Purgatory. This purification frees one from what is called the "temporal punishment" of sin. These two punishments must not be conceived of as a kind of vengeance inflicted by God from without, but as following from the very nature of sin. A conversion which proceeds from a fervent charity can attain the complete purification of the sinner in such a way that no punishment would remain.

So it seems possible that some individuals are purified by the end of life such that they do not need to experience purgatory, and the saints would presumably be among the better candidates for that.

Nevertheles, I can find no Church teaching to back up the idea that anyone who ends up as a canonized saint by definition avoided purgatory. That strikes me as a pious belief, but not something that the Church teaches.

As to how one could reason that a canonized individual is now in heaven, there would seem to be two lines of reasoning by which one could do this.

First, one could infer it from the fact of the canonization itself, which is infallible. In making canonizations, popes use the formula

We declare and define that X is a saint.

(See the decree of canonization for Jose Maria Escriva for an example.)

If one takes the term "saint" in this context to mean "a person who is completely purified and in heaven" then the canonization itself would function as a guarantor of the fact that the individual is no longer in purgatory.

However, there is another basis, which precedes and prepares the way for canonization, and that is the verification of miracles performed through the individual’s intercession. These miracles are regarded as a sign that, in some sense, God wishes the individual to be known as a saint and thus can be taken as an indication that the individual is in heaven and no longer experiencing purification.

In keeping with my own inclination to be reserved about what can be asserted with confidence about the afterlife, how time works there, and similar matters, I would employ such arguments with a measure of caution, though those are the arguments that suggest themselves and that cohere with the historic sensus fidelium regarding the fact that canonized saints are already in heaven.

Ministry Vs. Apostolate

A reader writes:

What is the difference between a ministry and an apostolate?  What does the Church teach on this? And lastly, are there restrictions on laymen, for example, who use the term ministry when in all actuality it is an apostolate.

This is a common question. People are often perplexed by the relationship between the two terms and the fact that they are often used interchangeably. And there’s a good reason for that: They are interchangeable–at least substantially so.

The term ministry (in a religious context) at its base conveys the idea of performing a spiritual service of some kind, while the term apostolate at its base conveys the idea of in some manner promoting the work of the apostles or functioning in a capacity somewhat like that of the apostles. Since the apostles performed spiritual services, the two terms basically converge.

Thus both "ministry" and "apostolate" can refer either to particular spiritual services or to organizations that are devoted to providing such services.

Because the clergy and laity have different functions, they perform ministries or apostolates in different ways, but the laity are envisioned in participating in apostolic activity. Thus Vatican II issued a Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity.

With recent dissident efforts at horizontalizing the Church and bluring the distinction between clergy and laity, there can be confusion about what apostolates are appropriate to clergy and laity. The same thing can happen regarding ministries, and the 1997 Instruction on Collaboration was notably concerned about the use of the term "ministry" in certain contexts involving lay individuals, for example (see Practical Provisions, Article 1).

Despite these difficulties, the two terms retain substantial overlap, even if they need to be carefully understood and distinguished in particular contexts.

I’m My Own Grandpa: A Canonical Analysis

"I’m My Own Grandpa," for those few who may not know, was a signature song for country comedy artists (and Grand Ole Opry regulars) Lonzo & Oscar. It has also been recorded by others, including Grandpa Jones, and it makes a memorable appearance in the hilariously stupid movie, The Stupids (which is also remarkably clean, one of the few such comedy films).

The premise of the song is that an unusual pair of marriages result in bizarre relational implications for the character in the song, such that he is now his own grandpa (as you might suppose from the title).

The bizarre relationships that result from this pair of marriages are extensive, and now someone has now gone and done a hypertext version of the song that allows you to keep track of how all the relationships work, complete with diagrams.

With this in mind (and linking the hypertext version), a reader writes:

Would the following be considered licit…   http://gean.wwco.com/grandpa/  from the Church’s perspective? 

Ever one for applying theological and canonical principles to far-out, eXtreme situations (what you might call  X-Canon Law and X-Theology), I’m more than happy to entertain the question.

Let’s start by looking at the opening verse of the song, which sets up the pair of marriages that results in the Me = Grandpa situation:

Now many, many years ago, when I was twenty-three,
I was married to a widow who was pretty as could be.

That’s marriage #1. We’ll refer to the groom in this song as The Singer. To keep things simple, let’s assume that this is a valid marriage and that both The Singer and The Widow are Catholic, so that they will be bound by canon law.

Now a new character enters the picture:

This widow had a grown-up daughter
Who had hair of red.

Okay, so the widow has a daughter, who we’ll creatively call The Daughter. How is she related to The Singer, and how might that affect who she can marry? Well, there are two ways you can be related to someone the become relevant in marriage situations. These are known as consanguinity and affinity.

Consanguinity occurs when you are related by blood. The song does not tell us whether any of the marriage partners are related by blood, but since the issue isn’t raised, it doesn’t seem to be relevant to the situation. We may thus set it aside and assume that The Singer is not related by blood to either The Widow or The Daughter, so issues of consanguinity don’t arise.

Affinity, however, occurs when one is related to someone by marriage. Since The Singer is married to The Widow, he is thereby related to The Daughter by affinity–which is crucial to setting up the bizarre complex of relationships that ensue. Here’s how that happens:

My father fell in love with her [the Daughter],
And soon they, too, were wed.

That’s marriage #2.

Now, absolute relational chaos ensues:

This made my dad my son-in-law
And changed my very life.
My daughter was my mother,
‘Cause she was my father’s wife.

That’s just the beginning. It gets much, much worse from there.

The key question, canonically, is can The Singer’s father (a.k.a., The Father) marry The Daughter?

At one time under Church law the answer was no. The affinity that existed between The Singer and his wife’s family was held to apply also to the rest of The Singer’s family (or at least significant portions of it). Thus The Daughter was not only reckoned as The Singer’s Step-Daughter but as The Father’s Step-Granddaughter, and he couldn’t marry her.

But then the Fourth Lateran Council happened in the year 1215, and that council decreed the following:

CANON 50

It must not be deemed reprehensible if human statutes change sometimes with the change of time, especially when urgent necessity or common interest demands it, since God himself has changed in the New Testament some things that He had decreed in the Old. Since, therefore, the prohibition against the contracting of marriage in secundo et tertio genere affinitatis ["in the second and third degree of affinity"] and that against the union of the offspring from second marriages to a relative of the first husband, frequently constitute a source of difficulty and sometimes are a cause of danger to souls, that by a cessation of the proibition the effect may cease also, we, with the approval of the holy council, revoking previous enactments in this matter, decree in the resent statute that such persons may in the future contract marriage without hindrance. . . .

So Fourth Lateran wiped out the prohibition on people marrying who were in the second and third degree of affinity.

Without dwelling on what these degrees consisted in (the concept is a little hard to explain, and it’s not relevant to current law on the matter), this would have permitted The Father to marry The Daughter.

Now let’s jump forward to current law. According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law:

Can. 109 §1. Affinity arises from a valid marriage, even if not consummated, and exists between a man and the blood relatives of the woman and between the woman and the blood relatives of the man.

Can.  1092 Affinity in the direct line in any degree invalidates a marriage.

When one puts these two canons together, one discovers who in the song can’t marry whom.

Affinity exists between The Singer and the blood relatives of The Widow, which would include The Daughter. So The Singer can’t marry anyone in a "direct line" relationship to The Widow. Those relatives are off limits to him.

The direct line is anybody you are descended from and anybody who is descended from you. It includes your grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, etc.

Since The Daughter is a blood relative of The Widow and is in her direct line, The Singer can’t marry her (should The Widow die) because of the impediment created by affinity.

Likewise, affinity applies to The Widow and her ability to marry relatives of The Singer. Since The Father is a blood relative in the direct line for The Singer, The Widow can’t marry The Father (should The Singer die).

But The Singer and The Widow are the only two people who have affinity regarding each other’s families. You’ll note that Canon 109 says, "Affinity . . . exists between a man [and his wife’s blood relatives] . . . and a woman [and her husband’s blood relatives]."

It does not say that the relatives in one family have affinity with respect to the relatives in the other family. They only have affinity with the man or the woman. Thus The Singer has affinity with The Daughter and The Father has affinity with The Widow but–and this is the important point–The Father and The Daughter DO NOT HAVE AFFINITY WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER.

Thus there is an old saying in canon law: Affinitas non gignit affinitatem–or "Affinity does not beget affinity."

Just because two people are in a condition of affinity, that doesn’t mean all their relatives are also mutually in this relationship.

Thus–unless there is something else blocking the validity of the marriage–it is perfectly (canonically) legitimate for The Father to marry The Daughter and set the whole cascade of relational chaos in motion.

So at least since 1215, you’ve been able to become your own grandpa.

It sounds funny, I know, but it really is so.

(By the way, kids, don’t try this at home.)

Incidentally, if you’ve never heard this delightful song, it’s available for download from iTunes. Just look up "I’m my own grandpa" or "Lonzo & Oscar."

AND THERE’S A BIG OL’ .WAV OF IT HERE (THE VERSION FROM THE STUPIDS).

BE
SURE TO CHECK OUT THE STUPIDS, TOO–YOU’LL LAUGHT TILL YOU STOP!

LYRICS, WITH HELPFUL DIAGRAMS, HERE.

Perhaps another time we can "prick that annual blister: marriage with deceased wife’s sister."

Would It Be A Sin To Sell St. B16’s Car That You Bought On Ebay?

A reader writes:

When JPII is canonized, will that mean that any faithful Catholic trying to sell something that the pope used (say like a popemobile) would be in a state of sin as it would then be considered a relic?   

Let me change the question just a little bit to sharpen the point: Suppose that our present pontiff, His Most Awesomeness Benedict XVI, one day goes to his reward and is declared a saint.

Since his car was sold on eBay a piece back, it is actually in the hands of someone other than the Church (I don’t know that to be the case for the popemobiles JP2 used, which is why I make the change in the question).

Should such a canonization occur, would selling B16’s former 1999 Volkswagen Golf be a sin?

Well, canon law provides the following:

Canon 1190

§1. It is absolutely forbidden to sell sacred relics.

The question is thus whether something like this would count as a relic in the sense that canon law is using the term. If it is then, since traffic in sacred things is sinful, it would be sinful to sell it.

Well . . . this canon has not received an authentic interpretation from the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts, so we don’t have much guidance on that front of what the Code considers a relic.

None of the commentaries I have at hand dwell on this question either. Both the Code and the commentators tend to assume that you already know what the law intends to count as a relic. This would suggest that one should fall back on what is traditionally called a relic, which would include first-class, second-class, and third-class relics. (More on those distinctions below.)

The most official treatment of the subject that I’ve been able to find comes from the Directory on Popular Piety, which defines relics as follows:

The Relics of the Saints

236. The Second Vatican Council recalls that "the Saints have been
traditionally honoured in the Church, and their authentic relics and
images held in veneration". The term "relics of the Saints" [a] principally signifies the bodies – or notable parts of the bodies – of the
Saints who, as distinguished members of Christ’s mystical Body and as
Temples of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 3, 16; 6, 19; 2 Cor 6, 16) in
virtue of their heroic sanctity, now dwell in Heaven, but who once lived on earth. [b] Objects which belonged to the Saints, such as personal objects,
clothes and manuscripts are also considered relics, as are [c] objects which
have touched their bodies or tombs such as oils, cloths, and images.

The blue letters I’ve inserted into this treatment correspond to what are commonly (in English, anyway) called first-, second-, and third-class relics. First-class relics are principally bodies or parts of bodies. Second-class relics are former belongings of the saints. And third-class relics are things touched to their bodies (after death) or their tombs.

Now, the Directory for Popular Piety is not a legal document. It’s an instructional document. And the body that issued it–the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments–is not empowered to make authentic interpretations of canon law. Nevertheless, what it has to say may shed light on Rome’s thinking at least in a general way.

So now having established how the directory uses the term "relic," let’s go on to see what it has to say about the treatment of relics:

237. The Missale Romanum reaffirms the validity "of placing
the relics of the Saints under an altar that is to be dedicated, even when
not those of the martyrs". This usage signifies that the
sacrifice of the members has its origin in the Sacrifice of the
altar, as well as symbolising the communion with the Sacrifice of
Christ of the entire Church, which is called to witness, event to the
point of death, fidelity to her Lord and Spouse.

Many popular usages have been associated with this eminently liturgical cultic expression. The faithful deeply revere the relics of the Saints. An adequate pastoral instruction of the faithful about the use of relics will not overlook:

  • ensuring the authenticity of the relics exposed for the veneration
    of the faithful; where doubtful relics have been exposed for the veneration of the faithful, they should be discreetly withdrawn with due pastoral prudence;
          
  • preventing undue dispersal of relics into small pieces, since such practice is not consonant with due respect for the human body; the liturgical norms stipulate that relics must be "of a sufficient size as make clear that they are parts of the human body";
          
          
  • admonishing the faithful to resist the temptation to form collections of relics; in the past this practise has had some deplorable consequences;
          
  • preventing any possibility of fraud, trafficking, or superstition.
       

The various forms of popular veneration of the relics of the Saints, such as kissing, decorations with lights and flowers, bearing them in processions, in no way exclude the possibility of taking the relics of the Saints to the sick and dying, to comfort them or use the intercession of the Saint to ask for healing. Such should be conducted with great dignity and be motivated by faith. The relics of the Saints should not be exposed on the mensa of the altar, since this is reserved for the Body and Blood of the King of Martyrs.

So as the highlighted phrase from paragraph 237 indicates, trafficking in relics is to be forbidden, and since the preceding paragraph (236) just defined relics for purposes of this discussion as including first-, second-, and third-class relics, it would seem that the Congregation for Divine Worship doesn’t want people selling them–even third class relics.

And I can see the logic behind that. My own sensibilities regarding piety do suggest to me that we shouldn’t have people running up to a saint’s tomb, pressing cloths to it, and then selling them on the ground that they are now holy relics. If you’re going to have the idea of third-class relics at all then it seems to me you shouldn’t be selling them.

(NOTE: I also am not impressed with the theory I’ve heard that you can sell a third-class relic for the intrinsic value of the relic–thus if you pressed a handkerchief to the tomb of St. Pius V, you could sell it for the value of the handkerchief. I don’t think things have determinable intrinsic economic values–the market has to determine value, and you’ll never be able to properly untangle the "third-class relic" factor from a third-class relic. This is just a back-door way for people wanting to sell such relics to rationalize it. The mere fact that something has become a third-class relic changes its value. The "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief comes from the fact I can blow my nose on it. If I can’t blow my nose on a third-class relic handkerchief then I no longer am receiving an object with the "intrinsic" value of a handkerchief. How much would you pay for a handkerchief you can’t blow your nose on or wipe your brow with? And why would you want to buy one in the first place if it wasn’t for it being a third-class relic? That’s its real value to you. A "cost of materials" rationale would be better here–i.e., "I paid 50 cents for this handkerchief at Wal-Mart, so you can reimburse me for that much now that it’s a third-class relic," but this exception isn’t present in the law, or in the commentaries I have to hand, or in the Directory of Popular Piety.)

I also understand the rationale behind not selling first-class relics. That clashes with my sensibilities regarding piety, too.

But what about second-class relics? The way the Directory presents matters, selling them would also be prohibited. But is every paperclip ever owned by Joseph Ratzinger really a second-class relic once he becomes a saint?

One theory I’ve heard floated is that not all legal property of a saint should be counted as a second-class relic. Perhaps only things that are especially "personal" should be–things like his clothes, his reading glasses, his Breviary, his Bible, his Rosary, etc.. By that standard, someone might judge that a saint’s paperclips or automobile are not sufficiently personal to get counted as relics (unless, perhaps, his heroic virtue was displayed by his tireless efforts on behalf of ministries like Meals on Wheels or Clips for the Clipless).

That’s not what the Directory for Popular Piety says, of course. It simply speaks of objects owned by the saints being relics. But the fact that it feels the need to go on and name examples could be taken as an indication that there is something of this concept lurking in the back of the Congregation’s mind.

It thus strikes me that we have an ambiguity here, and we may (don’t hold your breath) get clarification on it at some point in the future. At least, that’s what we’d really need to settle it.